Poteat v. Prince George's Cnty ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN C. POTEAT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY; ARCHIE L.
    O'NEIL,                                                             No. 96-7310
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    BROWNING-FERRIS, INCORPORATED,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    William G. Connelly, Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-95-2238-JFM)
    Submitted: August 19, 1997
    Decided: September 3, 1997
    Before HAMILTON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
    BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    John C. Poteat, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Daniel Wallace, Laura Jean
    Gwinn, COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Upper Marlboro, Mary-
    land, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    John Poteat appeals a jury verdict rendered against him in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (1994) action alleging, among state claims, deprivation
    of civil rights arising out of a traffic stop. The record does not contain
    a transcript of the jury trial. Poteat has been granted in forma pauperis
    status; thus, the Government may provide a free transcript if it is
    determined that the appeal presents a "substantial question." See 
    28 U.S.C. § 753
    (f) (1994). Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
    non-frivolousness and substantiality. See Maloney v. E. I. DuPont de
    Nemours & Co., 
    396 F.2d 939
    , 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). A substantial
    question has been held to be one that is "reasonably debatable," Ortiz
    v. Greyhound Corp., 
    192 F. Supp. 903
    , 905 (D. Md. 1959), or one
    "where the law appears to be settled, but where the Appellant is able
    to show that his chances of changing the law on appeal are strong."
    Lee v. Habib, 
    424 F.2d 891
    , 905 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Conclusory allega-
    tions do not establish a substantial question. King v. Carmichael, 
    268 F.2d 305
    , 306 (6th Cir. 1959).
    An appellate court must accept a jury's verdict if it is supported by
    substantial evidence. See Vodrey v. Golden, 
    864 F.2d 28
    , 30 n.4 (4th
    Cir. 1988). "Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence that a
    reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the conclusion
    even if different conclusions might also be supported by the evidence.
    Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 
    860 F.2d 1275
    , 1297 (5th Cir.
    1988). A jury verdict cannot be set aside unless the evidence, viewed
    in the light most favorable to the Appellee, is so clear that reasonable
    people could reach no other conclusion than that asserted on appeal.
    Coates v. Daugherty, 
    973 F.2d 290
    , 293 (4th Cir. 1992).
    Under this standard and upon consideration of the arguments raised
    by Poteat on appeal and the record presently before the Court, we
    conclude that Poteat does not present a substantial question warrant-
    2
    ing the preparation of a transcript at government expense. Accord-
    ingly, we deny Poteat's motion for a transcript at government expense
    and affirm the jury's verdict. We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
    als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
    cess.
    AFFIRMED
    3