Canidate v. Food Lion Inc ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
WILLIE CANIDATE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
VALERIE D. SUTTON; BILL HOLLIMON;
LLOYD WILLIAMS; ALEX SMITH;
MICHAEL WRENN; FREDDIE BLOCKER;
JACOB HENDERSON; JAMIE WILLIAMS; No. 95-1279
LEE SMITH; CLIFFORD HUNTER; ALLEN
VAIL; HOWARD MCCOY, JR.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FOOD LION, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
(CA-94-322-3)
Argued: December 4, 1995
Decided: January 5, 1996
Before HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: John Clark Davis, SPRIGGS & JOHNSON, Tallahassee,
Florida, for Appellant. Donald R. Livingston, AKIN, GUMP,
STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appel-
lee. ON BRIEF: Harris D. Butler, III, BUTLER, MACON, WIL-
LIAMS, PANTELE & LOWNDES, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Randall L. Sarosdy, Daniel L. Nash, AKIN, GUMP,
STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Scott S.
Cairns, Dana L. Rust, Deanna L. Ruddock, MCGUIRE, WOODS,
BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., plaintiff Willie Cani-
date appeals orders of the district court (i) striking his demand for trial
by jury, (ii) declining to order a trial by jury under Fed. R. Civ. P.
39(b), and (iii) entering final judgment for defendant Food Lion, Inc.,
after a bench trial. We have considered the briefs and heard the argu-
ments of the parties, and we affirm the judgment of the district court
for the reasons, with one caveat discussed below, stated in that court's
memorandum opinions. Sutton, et al. v. Food Lion, Inc., No.
3:94CV322 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 1994); Sutton, et al. v. Food Lion, Inc.,
No. 3:94CV322 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1995).
The district court held that Canidate did not prove a prima facie
case of retaliatory discharge. After a full trial on the merits, the issue
in a Title VII case is discrimination (or retaliation) vel non; the "va-
garies" of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine* proof paradigm are no
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*Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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longer of concern. Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369,
377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 380 (1995); see St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749-2750 (1993). Stating
ultimate findings after trial in terms of the prima facie case may serve
to confuse the relatively light burden upon the plaintiff to state a
claim of discrimination with the more rigorous showing that is often
necessary to convince the trier of fact that unlawful discrimination
actually occurred. In any event, the district court found that Cani-
date's firing was not causally connected to his earlier filing of a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This
finding fully supports the judgment for the defendant, even if Cani-
date made a prima facie showing of retaliation under McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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