United States v. Johnson , 242 F. App'x 7 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4078
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00110-H-ALL)
Argued: May 25, 2007 Decided: July 18, 2007
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and T. S. ELLIS, III,
Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Joe Exum, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: George E. B. Holding, Acting United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The United States appeals the 144-month sentence imposed on
appellant Robert Johnson for three child pornography offenses. We
conclude the sentence is procedurally and substantively infirm, and
accordingly we vacate and remand for resentencing.
I.
Johnson pled guilty to a three-count indictment charging him
with transmission, receipt, and possession of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4)(B),
respectively. Johnson’s arrest was precipitated by the arrest of
a cooperating witness who permitted Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents to utilize his email address and chat room
identity. In February 2004, Johnson sent several emails and
instant-messages to this online identity, whom he believed to be
the cooperating witness, but who was in fact a government agent
utilizing the cooperating witness’ identity. In these messages,
Johnson described, inter alia, viewing child pornography and
grooming his grandchildren for sex with him. During the exchange,
Johnson also sent 11 images of child pornography and a video image
of himself to the agent. ICE traced the email and messages to
Johnson, obtained a search warrant, and searched Johnson’s
residence and computer on November 10, 2004. The search of
Johnson’s computer equipment disclosed over 1,900 images of child
2
pornography, including sexually explicit still images and videos.1
Most of the images depicted pre-pubescent victims. Moreover, many
of the victims were in bondage,2 and one victim appeared to be
deceased. ICE agents also recovered from Johnson’s computer logs
of Johnson’s conversations in chat rooms, which revealed that
Johnson, by his own statements, had (i) watched live molestation or
sexual abuse of children over the Internet, (ii) exposed himself to
children over the Internet, (iii) used the Internet to arrange a
sexual encounter with a child, and (iv) had sex with children in
the Dominican Republic. Johnson’s passport indicated he had
recently traveled to the Dominican Republic.
Following the search, Johnson was indicted on April 20, 2005,
arrested two days later, and pled guilty on August 1, 2005. The
district judge ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence
investigation report (PSIR). As the PSIR noted, and as defense
counsel argued at sentencing, Johnson successfully raised two adult
children, maintained gainful employment, provided extensive care to
his ex-wife for her alcohol abuse and multiple sclerosis, and,
apart from the instant offenses, lived an essentially law-abiding
1
This total number of images is arrived at by considering, as
the Guidelines direct, that one video is equivalent to 75 still
images. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.4(B)(ii).
2
For example, the government describes one image as depicting
a naked, pre-pubescent child suspended upside down, bound and
gagged, with what appears to be a Sharpie pen lodged in her vagina.
3
life. As counsel and the PSIR also noted, Johnson was 54 years old
when sentenced.
Based on the PSIR, which the district judge adopted, the
offenses had a base offense level of 22 under the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines. In calculating the appropriate Guidelines
range, the district judge also added the following enhancements:
(i) a two-level enhancement because the images depicted children
under the age of 12, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(2), (ii) a five-level
enhancement because the offense involved distribution, receipt, or
expected receipt of a thing of value but not for pecuniary gain,
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), (iii) a four-level enhancement because
the images depicted sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other
depictions of violence, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4), (iv) a two-level
enhancement for use of a computer, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6), and (v)
a five-level enhancement because the offense involved 600 or more
images of child pornography, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). A three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility was also allowed,
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(e), bringing the final offense level to 37. Since
Johnson’s criminal history category was I, his advisory Guidelines
range was thus 210 to 262 months.3 U.S.S.G. § 5A (table). The top
of this range was restricted to 240 months, the statutory maximum
3
The PSIR erroneously stated that the applicable Guidelines
range was 240 months. See Joint Appendix (JA) at 180. The district
judge repeated this error in the course of sentencing and in the
judgment and commitment order. See JA 185.
4
for counts 1 (transmission) and 2 (receipt). 18 U.S.C. §
2252(b)(1). The maximum sentence for count 3 (possession) was 120
months. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2).
At sentencing, the district judge heard argument from counsel
and testimony from defense psychologists opining that Johnson was
not a pedophile, that is, that he did not act on his sexual
attraction to children or attempt to prey on children, and that his
sexual attraction to children did not disrupt his personal
relationships. The district judge did not weigh this testimony
against other contrary evidence and made no explicit finding
concerning whether Johnson was a pedophile.
In the end, the district judge elected to impose a variance
sentence consisting of sixty months as to each of counts 1 and 2,
and a twenty-four month sentence as to count 3, all to run
consecutively, for a total custody sentence of 144 months.4 This
sentence represented a sixty six month, or thirty one percent,
downward variance from the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.
The district judge justified the departure by reference chiefly to
Johnson’s age, stating in the judgment that the “reason for
sentence outside [the Guidelines] is due to the defendant’s age at
the time of release weighed against the amount of time served
4
The district judge also imposed supervised release and a
$20,000 fine.
5
within the Guideline range.” The government opposed this variance
and timely noticed this appeal.
II.
We review sentences on appeal for reasonableness, a “complex
and nuanced” task in which our ultimate goal is to consider
“whether the sentence was selected pursuant to a reasoned process
in accordance with law, in which the court did not give excessive
weight to any relevant factor, and which effected a fair and just
result in light of the relevant facts and law.” United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456-57 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2309 (2006). A sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is
“presumptively reasonable,” id. at 457, but of course, this
presumption does not operate here, as a variance sentence was
imposed.
As we have noted, a sentence may be unreasonable for
procedural or substantive reasons. A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if the district judge provides an inadequate
explanation for the sentence or fails to make a finding of fact
necessary to support the sentence. United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006). We have also explained the
procedure a district judge must follow in imposing any sentence,
including a variance sentence. First, the district judge must
correctly calculate the Guidelines range. Id. at 432. A
6
miscalculation of the applicable Guidelines range is an error of
law which typically renders a sentence unreasonable. Id. at 433;
see also Green, 436 F.3d at 457. Next, the district judge must
determine whether a sentence within the Guidelines range serves the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moreland, 437
F.3d at 432. If not, the district judge must impose a sentence
that serves those factors, constrained by any statutory minima or
maxima. Id. In doing so, the district judge should first consider
whether a departure is warranted based on the Guidelines or
existing case law. Id. If a departure is not available, or the
resulting departure range still does not adequately serve the §
3553(a) factors, the district judge may impose a variance sentence,
taking care to explain and justify the variance by reference to the
§ 3553(a) factors. Id. at 432-33. The greater the extent of the
variance, the more closely we scrutinize the reasons offered in
support of it, and the more compelling those reasons must be. Id.
Nonetheless, a district judge need not mechanically check off the
list of § 3553(a) factors; instead, “it is enough to calculate the
[Guidelines] range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies
outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.” Id. at 432-33.
With these principles in mind, it is apparent that the 144-
month sentence in this case is procedurally unreasonable. First,
the district judge relied on an incorrect calculation of the
Guidelines range, concluding erroneously, both at sentencing and in
7
the judgment and commitment order, that the appropriate Guidelines
range was 240 months. Second, the district judge imposed a
variance sentence without first considering the possibility of a
conventional downward departure under the Guidelines. A downward
departure for age is explicitly discouraged, although not
altogether precluded by a Guidelines policy statement, U.S.S.G. §
5H1.1, which a sentencing judge is required to take into account by
§ 3553(a)(5). Procedurally, then, before imposing a variance
sentence on a ground to which the Guidelines speak, the district
judge should have considered the possibility of a Guidelines
departure based on age, even though the ultimate conclusion might
well be that a departure on this ground was not warranted. We note
that even if the district judge had concluded that no age-based
departure was warranted, as likely would have been the case,5 the
5
The Guidelines policy statement notes that “age (including
youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted,” though exceptions may exist for “elderly
and infirm” defendants for whom other forms of punishment would be
“equally efficient and less costly.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. Pre-Booker
jurisprudence held that a departure based on age and infirmity (or
any disfavored factor) is to be granted only in extraordinary
circumstances, that is, when the disfavored factor is present to an
exceptional degree or “in some other way that makes the case
different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.”
United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 68-69 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1996)
(internal citations omitted). Further, our sister circuits have
held that downward departures are inappropriate when based merely
on the fact that a defendant would be elderly when released, or
that a lengthy Guidelines sentence would effectively sentence an
elderly defendant to life. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 30
F.3d 199, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1994) (interrelationship of age and
prospective sentence is not adequate grounds for departure) (citing
8
discipline of following this required sentencing procedure would
have alerted the district judge to the fact that age-based
departures are disfavored and thus to the need to take special care
to explain fully the reasons under § 3553(a) for a variance
sentence.
The final procedural infirmity is the district judge’s failure
to acknowledge and take into account Congress’ policy judgment –
embodied in § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii)6 – that child pornography crimes
cases); United States v. Fierro, 38 F.3d 761, 775 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied 514 U.S. 1051 (1994) (downward departure inappropriate based
on fact that defendant would be 64 or 65 when released; departure
not warranted when defendant is not elderly and infirm at the time
of sentencing). Indeed, no reported circuit decision has been
found approving a downward departure based solely on a defendant’s
age. But some courts have found that where a defendant’s age and
medical condition render him feeble and infirm, a departure may
appropriately be granted. See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 914
F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass 1995) (76 year old defendant, suffering from,
inter alia, heart condition, suspected prostate cancer, pituitary
disease, removed pituitary gland, and unstable mental condition,
warranted downward departure).
6
This provision provides that
[i]n sentencing a defendant convicted of an
offense
. . . under chapter . . . 110 [Sexual Exploitation and
Other Abuse of Children] . . . the court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to
in subsection (a)(4)[, that is, a Guidelines sentence,]
unless –
(ii) the court finds that there exists a
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree that
(I) has been affirmatively and
specifically identified as a
permissible ground of downward
departure in the sentencing
guidelines or policy statements ...
9
are grave offenses warranting significant sentences. As originally
enacted, this provision mandated no less than a Guidelines
sentence, but as required by Booker, we have held the mandatory
language unconstitutional and excised it from the statute. United
States v. Hecht, 470 F.3d 177, 181-82 (4th Cir. 2006).
Nonetheless, it remains true that a district judge “in the course
of selecting an appropriate sentence, ought to give respectful
attention to Congress’ view that . . . [child pornography crimes]
are serious offenses deserving serious sanctions.” Id. at 182. We
see no record evidence that the district judge considered Congress’
policy judgment concerning child pornography offenses in granting
a variance. Together with the others described here, this
procedural shortcoming is sufficient to render the sentence
procedurally unreasonable.7
Quite apart from its procedural infirmities, it appears the
sentence is also substantively flawed; it is based on a factor
(II) has not been taken into
consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the
guidelines, and
(III) should result in a sentence
different from that described... .
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii).
7
Moreland and Green had not been decided at the time of
sentencing, and accordingly, we intend no criticism of the district
judge for failing to follow the procedures we announced in those
decisions. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 499 n.14 (4th
Cir. 2006).
10
that, even if otherwise permissible as a basis for a variance,
cannot support a variance sentence in the circumstances of this
case. Here, the district judge imposed the variance sentence not
on the basis of a reasoned application of the § 3553(a) factors,
but rather, solely on Johnson’s age, the district judge noting that
Johnson would be approximately 75 years old when released and that
his imprisonment would “cost the taxpayers several million
dollars.”
The question, then, is whether this variance sentence can be
justified on the basis of Johnson’s age. Whether age, by itself,
can support a variance sentence is an open question in this
circuit, as we have previously declined to decide whether a
variance may be granted based on a factor “discouraged as a basis
for departure under the Guidelines.” United States v. Hampton, 441
F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2006).8 Nor must we decide the question
today, for assuming without deciding that we were to follow the
8
Other circuits have generally concluded that variances may be
granted in reliance on discouraged or forbidden Guidelines factors,
as “the guidelines . . . are no longer decisive as to factors any
more than as to results,” though “reliance on a discounted or
excluded factor may, like the extent of the variance, have some
bearing on reasonableness.” United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491,
498 (6th Cir. 2006) (district court “has a freer hand to account
for the defendant’s age in its sentencing calculus under § 3553(a)
than it had before Booker”); United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d
1115, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 2006) (same). But see United States v.
Lee, 454 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) (“age is normally not
relevant to sentencing, unless the defendant is elderly and
infirm”).
11
majority of circuits and conclude that disfavored factors may
appropriately form the basis of a variance sentence in some
circumstances, it is nonetheless apparent that a variance based on
Johnson’s age was substantively unreasonable here.
First, no reason is apparent on this record why Johnson’s age
is a personal characteristic that would justify a variance, or
indeed, that should matter to the § 3553(a) calculus at all.
Although Johnson’s health is described in the PSIR as only “fair,”
he certainly is not infirm. Defense counsel argued that Johnson
would not survive a 240-month sentence, but there is no medical
evidence in the record to that effect. More to the point, we fail
to see how the egregiousness of Johnson’s offenses, the clear
statements of Congressional policy acknowledging the grave nature
of child pornography crimes, the need to deter further appalling
abuse of children, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in
sentences imposed on persons convicted of similar offenses, all of
which militate strongly in favor of a Guidelines sentence, could be
outweighed by a single personal characteristic that is not atypical
of child pornography offenders.9 Johnson’s unexceptional personal
history and characteristics, including his age, do not distinguish
9
Indeed, as the government points out, a study by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children has concluded that men
over age 40 are the most common offenders of the child pornography
laws. See Wolak, Finklehor, and Mitchell, Child Pornography
Possessors Arrested in Internet-Related Crimes: Findings from the
National Juvenile Online Victimization Study (2005), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
12
him from other defendants convicted of child pornography crimes,
and accordingly, they do not justify a variance sentence.
For all the reasons stated herein, Johnson’s sentence must be
vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED
13