United States v. Cook ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                         UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            No. 01-5009
    ELGIN ANDERSON COOK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
    Henry C. Morgan, Jr, District Judge.
    (CR-01-72)
    Submitted: June 6, 2002
    Decided: July 11, 2002
    Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    David M. Tichanski, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J.
    McNulty, United States Attorney, Lisa R. McKeel, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                      UNITED STATES v. COOK
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Elgin Anderson Cook was convicted of possession with intent to
    distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (b)(1)(B), and
    was sentenced to 66 months imprisonment. On appeal, Cook claims:
    (1) the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress cocaine
    found in the vehicle Cook was driving at the time of his arrest; (2)
    the district court erred by refusing to accept Cook’s instruction
    regarding the possession element of the crime; and (3) the evidence
    at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. Finding no revers-
    ible error, we affirm.
    We review the district court’s legal conclusions made in the course
    of a suppression hearing de novo, but we review the underlying fac-
    tual findings for clear error. See United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th Cir. 1998). The evidence is reviewed in the light most
    favorable to the Government, as the prevailing party below. 
    Id.
     In
    Colorado v. Bertine, 
    479 U.S. 367
     (1987), the Supreme Court held
    that an officer is entitled to open closed containers while conducting
    a routine inventory search of an impounded vehicle, providing:
    Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some par-
    ticular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect
    police officers in the everyday course of business to make
    fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or
    items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.
    When a legitimate search is under way, and when its pur-
    pose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinc-
    tions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case
    of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered
    seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehi-
    cle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient
    completion of the task at hand.
    
    Id. at 375
     (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also
    United States v. Brown, 
    787 F.2d 929
    , 931-32 (4th Cir. 1986) (hold-
    ing that defendant’s vehicle lawfully was impounded following his
    arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and ensuing inventory
    UNITED STATES v. COOK                         3
    search was valid under the Fourth Amendment). Accordingly, the dis-
    trict court did not err in denying Cook’s motion to suppress the
    cocaine because the officer discovered the cocaine during an inven-
    tory search of the vehicle, in accordance with the relevant Virginia
    regulations.
    Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    declining to use Cook’s proffered jury instruction. See United States
    v. Patterson, 
    150 F.3d 382
    , 389 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating standard of
    review); United States v. Lewis, 
    53 F.3d 29
    , 32-33 (4th Cir. 1995)
    (establishing relevant test to determine whether trial court erred in
    denying instruction).
    Finally, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support
    Cook’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942) (providing standard
    of review); United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 873 (4th Cir. 1996)
    (discussing elements of possession with intent to distribute a con-
    trolled substance).
    Accordingly, we affirm Cook’s conviction and sentence. We dis-
    pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED