United States v. Frye , 53 F. App'x 682 ( 2002 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
               No. 02-4395
    JAMES PRESTON FRYE, a/k/a Jamie
    Frye,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    James R. Spencer, District Judge.
    (CR-01-167)
    Submitted: November 18, 2002
    Decided: December 17, 2002
    Before LUTTIG, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Janipher W. Robinson, ROBINSON & GREENE, Richmond, Vir-
    ginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, John
    S. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    2                       UNITED STATES v. FRYE
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted James Preston Frye, Jr., of one count of distribu-
    tion of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and
    841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000). After trial but before sentencing, Frye
    moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial based on juror mis-
    conduct. The court did not grant the motions but did allow Frye to
    subpoena telephone records and recordings in an attempt to build evi-
    dentiary support for his motions. Frye later moved to interview jurors.
    The court denied the motions and sentenced Frye to 120 months of
    imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. Frye appeals the
    denial of his post-trial motions, and we affirm.
    Frye provided two affidavits in support of his motion. One was
    from an inmate, Aaron Harley, who stated that Frye’s prior record,
    not in evidence at trial, was the reason for Frye’s conviction. The affi-
    davit contained no indication of the source of this knowledge. The
    second affidavit was from Charles Pratt, a defense witness at trial,
    who stated that Harley called him and told him the same information
    concerning Frye’s trial and that Harley got this information from
    another inmate, Timothy Taylor. In addition to the affidavits, Frye
    submitted tape recordings of a telephone call between Taylor and his
    father, who was married to a member of Frye’s jury. Taylor’s father
    mentioned that by chance, he found out after the trial that Frye had
    a prior record, and that "if the jurors had known that they probably
    would have convicted him faster than they did."
    Frye then moved to interview jurors, but the district court denied
    the motions, finding "insufficient evidence based on this record to
    establish the good cause for any kind of interview with the jurors,"
    and that any notion of misconduct was "pure speculation."
    Post-trial requests to impeach a jury verdict by contact with jurors
    are disfavored and must be supported by a threshold showing of
    UNITED STATES v. FRYE                          3
    improper outside influence on the jurors. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b);
    Tanner v. United States, 
    483 U.S. 107
    , 125 (1987); United States v.
    Gravely, 
    840 F.2d 1156
    , 1159 (4th Cir. 1988). Rule 606(b) precludes
    testimony by jurors about "the effect of anything upon that or any
    other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror . . . or concern-
    ing the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith." Fed. R.
    Evid. 606(b). This court’s review is for abuse of discretion. Gravely,
    
    840 F.2d at 1159
    .
    We conclude Frye did not make the requisite showing. The evi-
    dence presented was entirely speculative and did not in any way indi-
    cate the jury knew about Frye’s record. The district court has wide
    discretion in dealing with allegations of juror misconduct, and the
    court did not abuse that discretion here. See Gravely, 
    840 F.2d at 1159
    ; United States v. Duncan, 
    598 F.2d 839
    , 866 (4th Cir. 1979).
    Nor did the court err in denying Frye’s motions to set aside the ver-
    dict and for a new trial, as the only ground for these motions was
    juror misconduct, which Frye failed to show. We therefore affirm. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-4395

Citation Numbers: 53 F. App'x 682

Judges: Luttig, King, Gregory

Filed Date: 12/17/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024