United States v. Billman ( 1996 )


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  •                                                 Filed:   June 5, 1996
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 94-5526
    (CR-89-466-JFM)
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    Tom J. Billman,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    O R D E R
    The Court amends its opinion filed May 21, 1996, as follows:
    On page 4, first paragraph, line 3 -- the words "do support"
    are corrected to read "does support."
    For the Court - By Direction
    /s/ Bert M. Montague
    Clerk
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                            No. 94-5526
    TOM J. BILLMAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
    (CR-89-466-JFM)
    Argued: February 2, 1996
    Decided: May 21, 1996
    Before LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and DOUMAR, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
    of Virginia, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: John Robert Fornaciari, ROSS & HARDIES, Washington,
    D.C., for Appellant. Barbara Slaymaker Sale, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Joyce Kallam McDonald, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert M. Disch,
    ROSS & HARDIES, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Lynne A. Bat-
    taglia, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Tom Billman was one of four people indicted in 1989
    for conspiracy (
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ), racketeering (
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (c)),
    and eighteen counts of wire and mail fraud (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1341
     &
    1343), following the collapse of the Maryland-chartered Community
    Savings and Loan approximately six months after Billman sold his
    interests in the various partnerships connected with Community for
    nearly $30 million. Billman's co-conspirators were acquitted after a
    four-month trial in 1992. Billman, however, had fled the country in
    1988 after the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund won a civil judg-
    ment of $112 million against him. He was subsequently arrested in
    France in March 1993, extradited in December 1993, and, after a
    bench trial on all but the conspiracy and racketeering counts, found
    guilty of eleven counts of wire and mail fraud, and sentenced to forty
    years in prison and ordered to pay nearly $42 million in restitution to
    the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund. Billman's principal argument
    is that the prosecution of the wire and mail fraud counts was contrary
    to the terms of the French extradition decree, and therefore barred.
    The United States requested extradition of Billman under the
    Franco-American extradition treaty of 1909. Article VII of the Treaty
    incorporates the "doctrine of specialty," which prohibits the request-
    ing nation from prosecuting the extradited individual for offenses
    other than those on which the surrendering nation agreed to extradite.1
    See United States v. Rauscher, 
    119 U.S. 407
    , 418-19 (1886); United
    States v. Khan, 
    993 F.2d 1368
    , 1373 (9th Cir. 1993). Compare United
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 "No person surrendered by either of the High contracting Parties to
    the other shall be triable or tried or be punished for any crime or offence
    committed prior to his extradition, other than the offence for which he
    was delivered up . . . ." Extradition Convention, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-Fr.,
    art. VII, 
    37 Stat. 1526
    , 1531 ("Treaty").
    2
    States v. Alvarez-Machain, 
    504 U.S. 655
    , 659-60 (1992) (distinguish-
    ing Rauscher on the ground that the defendant was not before the
    court by virtue of a treaty). Article I of the Treaty allows for extradi-
    tion "only . . . upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the
    laws of the [surrendering nation], would justify his or her apprehen-
    sion and commitment for trial if the crime or offence had been there
    committed." 37 Stat. at 1527. Article II of the Treaty, as amended,
    provides a list of crimes for which extradition"shall be granted . . .
    if they are punished as crimes or offenses by the laws of both States."
    Supplementary Convention, Feb. 12, 1970, U.S.-Fr., art. II, 22 U.S.T.
    408, 409 ("Treaty Supp."). Although mail fraud and wire fraud were
    not covered by Article II of the original Treaty, they are covered by
    the 1970 supplement to the Treaty, see id., art. II, ¶ 18,2 and thus
    extradition for those counts "shall be granted" under the explicit terms
    of the Treaty if the crimes are also punished as crimes or offenses by
    France.3
    French law apparently provides that requests for extradition are ini-
    tially considered by the Paris Court of Appeals, which issues a recom-
    mendation known as "Enacting Terms." The "Enacting Terms" are
    then forwarded to the Prime Minister, who makes the decision upon
    which, if any, of the offenses to grant extradition. Appellant's Br. at
    9 (citing Law of March 10, 1927, Arts. 13-17). The Prime Minister
    then issues a Decree of extradition, at which point the proceedings of
    the Paris Court are "absorbed" into the decree and "deprived of any
    autonomous existence." A party may take an appeal from the Decree
    itself, but no appeal was taken in this case.
    The Paris Court found that all four crimes with which Billman was
    charged -- conspiracy, racketeering, mail fraud, and wire fraud --
    were "unknown in French penal law." J.A. at 143-44. Thus, in its
    view, Article II of the amended Treaty did not provide authority for
    extradition as to those particular crimes. But the Paris Court also
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 Adding "Use of the mails or other means of communication in con-
    nection with schemes devised or intended to deceive or defraud the pub-
    lic or for the purpose of obtaining money or property by false pretenses"
    to the list of crimes covered by Article II. 22 U.S.T. at 409.
    3 RICO and conspiracy are concededly not covered, and Billman was
    not prosecuted for those counts of the indictment.
    3
    reviewed the evidence supporting the wire fraud counts, and found
    that although "French law does not punish these actions as such," the
    conduct giving rise to the charges does support the French crime of
    "abus de confiance," or "breach of trust." J.A. at 144-45; 170-71. Sim-
    ilarly, the Paris Court found that the evidence supporting the mail
    fraud counts constituted the French crime of "escroquerie," or "fraud."
    J.A. at 146; 172. Extradition for the latter two categories of crimes
    was thus permitted, according to the Paris Court, under Article II of
    the Treaty, paragraph 7 ("breach of trust" or"abus de confiance et
    detournements") and paragraph 8 ("obtaining money or other property
    by false pretenses" or "escroquerie"). See Supp. Treaty, art. II, ¶¶ 7,
    8, 22 U.S.T. at 409, 413. The Paris Court therefore issued an order
    recommending in favor of extradition, "but only with respect to the
    infractions termed breach of trust and fraud, and hence to the exclu-
    sion of the infractions termed conspiracy, criminal organization, mail
    fraud and wire fraud, in connection with which the Criminal Court
    believes it would be inappropriate to approve the request." J.A. at
    150. The Prime Minister adopted the recommendation of the Paris
    Court and, through an Extradition Decree, granted extradition "only
    for the offenses called swindle [fraud] and fraudulent misuse of funds
    [breach of trust]." J.A. at 176.4
    Both the opinion of the Paris Court and the Extradition Decree
    were thus self-contradictory: extradition was not granted for the mail
    and wire fraud counts, but it was granted for those same counts
    because the conduct giving rise to those counts was also criminal
    under French law. Billman filed a motion in federal district court
    seeking release from custody in France, in which he argued that since
    the Decree only authorized prosecution for "swindling" and "fraudu-
    lent misuse of funds," he could not be held because those were not
    crimes listed in the United States code nor charged in the indictment.5
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 The different language is a result of a different English translation,
    not an alteration from the recommendation of the Paris Court. Both the
    Paris Court and the Extradition Decree granted extradition for the crimes
    of "escroquerie" and "abus de confiance," J.A. at 174, 178, which, for
    consistency, we translate as "fraud" and "breach of trust."
    5 The Government argues that the"doctrine of specialty" confers a right
    to enforce the terms of the extradition decree only upon the extraditing
    4
    While that motion was pending, the United States Government
    sought clarification of the Paris Court's order and of the Extradition
    Decree by filing, through the Attorney General of France, a "request
    for interpretation" with the Paris Court. Appellee's Br. at 8; J.A. at
    260. The Paris Court issued a decision in which it clarified its earlier
    opinion and, by implication, the identical language of the Extradition
    Decree based upon that opinion, stating that the Conspiracy and
    Racketeering counts were not extraditable offenses, but that the mail
    and wire fraud counts were, because, although they"do not exist as
    such under French law, [Billman's actions] nonetheless . . . constitute
    the offenses of breach of trust and fraud provided for and repressed
    under the French Code." J.A. at 271. Based on the clarifying opinion
    of the Paris Court, the district court denied Billman's motion for
    release. Billman's attempts to avoid the clear import of the decision
    by the Paris Court are unavailing.
    First, Billman asserts that the Extradition Decree unambiguously
    denied extradition for the mail and wire fraud counts, and that, pursu-
    ant to Article VI of the Treaty, that denial is unreviewable in Ameri-
    can courts. While Billman is correct in asserting that the decision of
    _________________________________________________________________
    nation, not the individual extradited. While we need not address this
    argument because we find Billman's challenge without merit in any
    event, we note that, at the very least where, as here, the Treaty itself vests
    the defendant with a right to raise the doctrine of specialty, then the chal-
    lenge must be permitted. See United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan,
    
    74 F.2d 220
     (2nd Cir. 1934); see also Fiocconi v. Attorney General of
    United States, 
    462 F.2d 475
    , 478 n.4 (2nd Cir.) (referring to the French
    treaty as conferring such a right), cert. denied, 
    409 U.S. 1059
     (1972);
    Khan, 
    993 F.2d at 1373-75
     (implicitly interpreting similar provision in
    the extradition treaty between the United States and Pakistan as confer-
    ring such a right); cf. Rauscher, 
    119 U.S. at 422
     (stating that a court can-
    not decline to give force to a "specialty" provision in an extradition treaty
    which does not explicitly confer a right in the defendant himself, "with-
    out an implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and
    of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition" (emphasis
    added)); Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 478 (recognizing that the Court in
    Rauscher rejected the argument that an extradition treaty "confers no
    rights [to raise a violation of the doctrine of specialty] on persons who
    have been . . . extradited unless this has been spelled out").
    5
    the French government is unreviewable in the courts of the United
    States, see Johnson v. Browne, 
    205 U.S. 309
     (1907) (holding, with
    regard to a similar provision in another treaty, that "[w]hether the
    crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter for the
    decision of the [surrendering] authorities, and such decision was final
    by the express terms of the treaty itself"), he is incorrect in asserting
    that the Extradition Decree is unambiguous.6 In fact, as described
    above, it is self-contradictory, and neither Article VI of the Treaty nor
    Browne require the United States courts to accept Billman's interpre-
    tation of the ambiguous extradition decree.
    Second, Billman claims that only the Extradition Decree, not the
    opinions of the Paris Court, is binding under French law and under
    the terms of the Treaty. While French law apparently does provide
    that the "Enacting Terms" of the Paris Court are absorbed into the
    Extradition Decree and deprived of any autonomous existence, that
    proposition does not address the question whether the subsequent
    opinion by the Paris Court, essentially interpreting the ambiguous
    Extradition Decree,7 is similarly without force absent a subsequent
    _________________________________________________________________
    6 Billman's argument that the Decree is unambiguous is based on his
    erroneous claim that the United States sought extradition for the crimes
    of "escroquerie" and "abus de confiance" in its original extradition
    request in addition to the four crimes actually charged in the indictment,
    and that that part of the request, and only that part, was granted. Reply
    Br. at 4. The part of the extradition request to which Billman refers
    explicitly addresses the racketeering count of the indictment, both by
    name and code section, see J.A. at 129; the translation of that request
    replaced "racketeering" with "escroquerie et abus de confiance," J.A. at
    133, because there is no French word for racketeering. Both the Paris
    Court and the Extradition Decree clearly rejected the request for extradi-
    tion on the Racketeering Count, but used the same phrases "escroquerie"
    and "abus de confiance" to describe the actions underlying the wire and
    mail fraud counts. If we were to accept Billman's disingenuous charac-
    terization, which has its origin solely in the confusion generated by the
    imprecise translations, then we should, presumably, disallow the mail
    and wire fraud prosecutions but allow Billman to be prosecuted for rack-
    eteering, translated as "Escroquerie et abus de confiance" in the original
    extradition request -- the very terms used in the Extradition Decree to
    describe the crimes for which extradition was being granted.
    7 The Paris Court appears to have"clarified" only the "Enacting
    Terms," not the Extradition Decree itself, see J.A. at 266-72, but the
    Extradition Decree was phrased in identical terms, see supra, note 4.
    6
    amendment to the Extradition Decree itself. The Treaty provides that,
    for extraditions from France, the interpretation of the French govern-
    ment is final. See Treaty, art. VI, 37 Stat. at 1530 ("If any question
    shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provisions of this
    article, the decision of the authorities of the Government on which the
    demand for surrender is made shall be final."). Billman emphasizes
    the word "government," Appellant's Br. at 11, in a misguided attempt
    to argue that the decision of the Prime Minister, as against the Paris
    Court, is what is binding, essentially misreading Article VI of the
    Treaty as a kind of separation of powers clause, when the clause
    clearly addresses which of the two governments -- the United States
    or France -- shall be the final interpreter of an extradition decision.8
    The United States submitted its request for clarification of the con-
    tradictory Extradition Decree to the French Ministry of Justice (i.e.,
    the relevant department of the executive branch of the French govern-
    ment), which forwarded it to the Paris Court. Billman was represented
    by his attorney at the hearing before the Paris Court. The clarification
    issued by the Paris Court can therefore properly be deemed the "deci-
    sion" of the French government which would be unreviewable under
    Billman's characterization of Article VI of the Treaty. That decision
    clearly permits prosecution on the mail and wire fraud counts, and the
    district court therefore properly denied Billman's motion for release
    from custody.
    We have also reviewed Billman's several claims regarding the
    scope of the indictment, evidentiary issues, and the sufficiency of the
    _________________________________________________________________
    8 Moreover, although the United States does not make the argument,
    the language from Article VI on which Billman relies appears to apply
    only to offenses that come "within the provisions" of Article VI itself,
    namely, "offence[s] of a political character." 37 Stat. at 1530; see also
    Supp. Treaty, art. VI, ¶ 4, 22 U.S.T. at 410 ("Extradition shall not be
    granted . . . If the offense for which the individual's extradition is
    requested is of a political character, or if he proves that the requisition
    for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him
    for an offense of a political character. If any question arises as to whether
    a case comes within the provisions of this subparagraph, the authorities
    of the Government on which the requisition is made shall decide.").
    7
    evidence, and find them to be equally without merit. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    8