United States v. Bowers ( 2003 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            No. 02-4665
    SETH ABLE BOWERS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
    W. Craig Broadwater, District Judge.
    (CR-02-4)
    Submitted: February 27, 2003
    Decided: March 18, 2003
    Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Robert E. Barrat, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
    E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Robert H. McWilliams, Jr.,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Randolph J. Bernard, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                      UNITED STATES v. BOWERS
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Seth Able Bowers pled guilty to possession of a firearm by an
    unlawful drug user, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(3) (2000), and was sentenced
    to a term of fifty-four months imprisonment. Bowers contests his sen-
    tence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by penaliz-
    ing him three times for the same conduct by making an adjustment
    for obstruction of justice, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1
    (2001), denying him an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,
    USSG § 3E1.1, and imposing a sentence above the low point of the
    guideline range. We affirm.
    Bowers was released on bond after his indictment but, shortly
    before his guilty plea, he was arrested after he was stopped for speed-
    ing, gave a false name, and was found to be driving with a revoked
    license. A few days later, he overdosed on heroin and was hospital-
    ized. In his interview with the probation officer following his guilty
    plea, Bowers failed to disclose his recent arrest or overdose. He sub-
    sequently failed to report to the probation officer as directed and dis-
    appeared. He was located and arrested a month later and his bond was
    revoked.
    We first note that conduct may be considered under more than one
    guideline provision unless such double counting is expressly forbid-
    den by the guidelines. United States v. Crawford, 
    18 F.3d 1173
    , 1179-
    80 (4th Cir. 1994). In Bowers’ case, the district court was permitted
    to consider his conduct under each guideline that it applied.
    We review the district court’s factual determination that a defen-
    dant obstructed justice for clear error. United States v. Hudson, 
    272 F.3d 260
    , 263 (4th Cir. 2001). The adjustment applies when a defen-
    dant has provided "materially false information to a probation officer
    in respect to a presentence report," and when the defendant has
    escaped or attempted "to escape from custody before trial or sentenc-
    ing." USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(h), (e)). Lying to a probation
    officer about drug use while on pre-trial release does not constitute
    conduct warranting this adjustment. Id. at comment. (n.5(e)).
    UNITED STATES v. BOWERS                         3
    Under Application Note 5, Bowers’ false assertion that he had not
    used drugs and failure to disclose his heroin overdose cannot be
    treated as obstruction of justice within the meaning of § 3C1.1. How-
    ever, providing false information concerning prior criminal conduct
    may be treated as obstruction of justice, United States v. Magana-
    Guerrero, 
    80 F.3d 398
    , 400-01 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
    Thomas, 
    11 F.3d 1392
    , 1399-1401 (7th Cir. 1993), and the district
    court may infer that a defendant’s failure to disclose relevant informa-
    tion is a conscious misrepresentation if circumstances so indicate.
    Magana-Guerrero, 
    80 F.3d at 400
     (defendant failed to disclose prior
    use of aliases and convictions for illegal entry).
    Moreover, Bowers’ failure to report to the probation officer and his
    disappearance required that time and effort be expended to find and
    arrest him and to revoke his bond at a hearing before the district court
    judge. On these facts, we conclude that the district court did not
    clearly err in finding that he had obstructed justice. See United States
    v. Witherell, 
    186 F.3d 1343
    , 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (defendant
    obstructed justice by failing to comply with conditions of bond, thus
    necessitating her arrest, a revocation hearing, and a detention hear-
    ing).
    Pursuant to the commentary in Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1, a
    defendant who engages in conduct resulting in an adjustment for
    obstruction of justice is not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance
    of responsibility unless his is an "extraordinary case." Bowers failed
    to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances in the district court
    and has not done so on appeal. Having found that Bowers obstructed
    justice, the district court did not clearly err in refusing to reduce his
    sentence for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Ruhe, 
    191 F.3d 376
    , 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (setting out standard of review).
    The district court’s exercise of its discretion as to where it will
    impose sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is not
    generally reviewable on appeal. United States v. Speed, 
    53 F.3d 643
    ,
    647 (4th Cir. 1995). Bowers claims that the district court departed
    upward when it imposed a sentence of fifty-four months instead of
    imposing sentence at the bottom of the guideline range because the
    government had agreed to, and did, recommend a sentence at the bot-
    tom of the range. However, under the terms of the plea agreement, the
    4                     UNITED STATES v. BOWERS
    government’s recommendation was not binding on the court. The
    court did not depart from the guideline range. Rather, it imposed a
    sentence within the range in a proper exercise of its discretion.
    We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED