United States v. Narcisse ( 2003 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 02-4788
    KEVIN LAMAR NARCISSE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
    (CR-02-100)
    Submitted: March 18, 2003
    Decided: March 28, 2003
    Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Charles H. Harp, II, Lexington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
    Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                     UNITED STATES v. NARCISSE
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Kevin Lamar Narcisse appeals his conviction and twenty-four
    month sentence for knowingly making false statements in the acquisi-
    tion of firearms in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6) and 924(a)(2).
    On appeal, Narcisse raises four issues: (1) insufficiency of the evi-
    dence to support his convictions; (2) the improper admission of evi-
    dence concerning where the firearms purchased by Narcisse were
    recovered; (3) the district court’s failure to find Narcisse a "minor
    participant" in the offense; and (4) the district court’s failure to give
    Narcisse a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
    Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    Narcisse’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred
    by declining to grant his motion for acquittal due to insufficiency of
    the evidence. To determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
    support a conviction, this Court considers whether, taking the evi-
    dence in the light most favorable to the Government, any reasonable
    trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
    able doubt. Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942). This
    Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the
    witnesses. Rather, the jury verdict must be upheld if there is substan-
    tial evidence to support the verdict. Id.; United States v. Murphy, 
    35 F.3d 143
    , 148 (4th Cir. 1994). A defendant challenging the suffi-
    ciency of the evidence to support his conviction faces a heavy burden.
    United States v. Beidler, 
    110 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). In light
    of trial testimony supporting the jury’s verdict, including evidence
    that Narcisse purchased fifteen guns from federally licensed firearm
    dealers with money given to him by Rayshawn Rucker; that Rucker
    could not purchase the guns himself because he was on probation; and
    that several of the guns were recovered in various cities along the East
    Coast in connection with crimes, Narcisse’s claim of insufficiency of
    the evidence fails.
    Next, Narcisse argues the Government’s rebuttal evidence, estab-
    lishing that the firearms purchased by Narcisse were recovered out-
    side of North Carolina, was not relevant to whether he made false
    statements in the acquisition of those firearms. Narcisse also argues
    UNITED STATES v. NARCISSE                       3
    that this evidence was highly prejudicial and misleading because it
    made Narcisse appear to be involved in the illegal distribution of the
    firearms, although his conduct was limited to their purchase only. A
    district court’s rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence
    will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Bostian, 
    59 F.3d 474
    , 480 (4th Cir. 1995). This Court will find an
    abuse of discretion only if the district court’s evidentiary ruling was
    arbitrary or irrational. United States v. Achiekwelu, 
    112 F.3d 747
    , 753
    (4th Cir. 1997). Evidence is relevant and may be admitted if it tends
    to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
    mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
    be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also Fed. R. Evid.
    402. Even if evidence is relevant, it can only be admitted if its proba-
    tive value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
    Despite Narcisse’s claims, evidence of the recovery of the firearms
    outside of North Carolina was, in fact, relevant to prove that he was
    purchasing guns for others, and to disprove his assertion that the guns
    would be returned to him. To the extent Narcisse also complains that
    he was prejudiced by testimony that several handguns he purchased
    were ultimately used by others engaged in criminal activity, we note
    that this evidence was not introduced in the Government’s case in
    chief, but was elicited by defense counsel during cross-examination
    of two Government witnesses. We accordingly reject Narcisse’s chal-
    lenge to the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
    Narcisse’s third argument is that he should have received a reduc-
    tion in his offense level for being a minor participant as defined by
    U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (2000). This Court
    reviews a district court’s determination regarding the defendant’s role
    in the offense for clear error. United States v. Daughtrey, 
    874 F.2d 213
    , 218 (4th Cir. 1989). A defendant seeking a mitigating adjustment
    under § 3B1.2 bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
    evidence that he is entitled to the adjustment. United States v.
    Palinkas, 
    938 F.2d 456
    , 460 (4th Cir. 1991). A defendant may play
    a minor role if he is less culpable than most other participants but has
    more than a minimal role. USSG § 3B1.2 comment. (n.3). However,
    the court should not only compare the defendant’s culpability to that
    of the other participants, but also measure it against the elements of
    the offense of conviction. United States v. Reavis, 
    48 F.3d 763
    , 769
    4                      UNITED STATES v. NARCISSE
    (4th Cir. 1995). The critical inquiry is thus not just whether the defen-
    dant has done fewer bad acts than [his] codefendants, but whether the
    defendant’s conduct is material or essential to committing the offense.
    Palinkas, 
    938 F.2d at 460
    . Having fully considered the evidence and
    the district court’s ruling, we conclude that the district court did not
    commit clear error in refusing to find Narcisse was a minor partici-
    pant.
    Finally, Narcisse asserts the district court erred by denying him a
    downward adjustment for his acceptance of responsibility. The denial
    of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is a factual determi-
    nation reviewed for clear error. United States v. Miller, 
    77 F.3d 71
    ,
    74 (4th Cir. 1996). The determination of the district court on review
    is due great deference. United States v. Nale, 
    101 F.3d 1000
    , 1005
    (4th Cir. 1996) (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1,
    comment. (n.5) (1993)). The burden is on the defendant to establish
    by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the adjust-
    ment. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 
    879 F.2d 1234
    , 1238-39 (4th
    Cir. 1989). Application note 2 of USSG § 3E1.1 states that the down-
    ward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is not intended to
    apply to a defendant who puts the Government to its burden of proof
    at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted,
    and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Although applica-
    tion note 2 to section 3E1.1 states that the reduction is available to a
    defendant who goes to trial solely to assert and preserve issues unre-
    lated to his factual guilt, this exception does not apply in Narcisse’s
    case.
    The district court found that Narcisse was not eligible for a two
    level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Narcisse put
    the Government to the effort and expense of trial, and because the
    court had difficulty with the story that Narcisse thought those guns
    were going to be his. In fact, even at sentencing Narcisse continued
    to claim that he honestly believed the guns would be returned to him.
    At no time during his trial or sentencing did Narcisse take responsibil-
    ity for his criminal actions; therefore, the district court did not err in
    denying Narcisse a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsi-
    bility.
    Accordingly, we affirm Narcisse’s conviction and sentence. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    UNITED STATES v. NARCISSE                    5
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED