Jones v. Sprint International ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1180
THOMAS WILLIAM JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SPRINT INTERNATIONAL,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, District
Judge. (CA-95-1017-A)
Submitted: September 20, 1996 Decided: October 2, 1996
Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas William Jones, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Michels, Jr.,
MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Appellant appeals from the district court's order granting the
employer's motion for summary judgment in this Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) claim under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12117 (West
1995). After a hearing, the district court granted Appellee's
motion for summary judgment. Jones v. Sprint International, No. CA-
95-1017-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1996).
Notwithstanding his employer's reasonable accommodations, the
record reveals that Appellant failed to perform his job as legiti-
mately expected due to his excessive absenteeism. The record is
uncontroverted that Appellant's attendance was a necessary com-
ponent of his job and that although Appellant was given several
opportunities to remedy his unacceptable attendance, he failed to
do so. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the Appellee employer finding that Appellant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Business & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), scheme used in Title VII cases applies to ADA
claims; to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plain-
tiff must show at the time of discharge he was performing his job
at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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