McClosky v. Prince George's Cnty ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JUDITH L. MCCLOSKY; SHAWN
    RICHARD MCCLOSKY, SR.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
    MARYLAND,
    No. 95-2913
    Defendant-Appellee,
    and
    PARRIS N. GLENDENING; DAVID
    MITCHELL; JOHN MOSS; GERALD
    SPECK,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
    Deborah K. Chasanow, Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-93-2369-DKC)
    Argued: October 30, 1996
    Decided: December 18, 1996
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and LUTTIG,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Gerald Solomon, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD SOLO-
    MON, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. Jay Heyward
    Creech, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James
    D. Milko, Harisha J. Bastiampillai, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD
    SOLOMON, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. John A. Bie-
    lec, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Judith L. McClosky brought this action alleging that Prince
    George's County, Maryland unlawfully discriminated against her
    because of her gender when it did not select her for a position with
    the K-9 Unit in the Special Operations Division of the Prince
    George's County Police Department. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2
    (West 1994). A jury returned a verdict in favor of Prince George's
    County.1 McClosky contends on appeal that the district court errone-
    ously limited the testimony of her expert witness. We affirm.
    I.
    McClosky, a youth services investigator for the Prince George's
    County Police Department, applied for a transfer to the K-9 Unit. A
    board consisting of five police officers was formed to interview the
    candidates for positions in the K-9 Unit. The board ranked the appli-
    cants and submitted the rankings to the bureau chief, who reviewed
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 McClosky also brought a joint claim with her husband for loss of con-
    sortium under Virginia law. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Prince
    George's County on this claim, and the McCloskys appeal it as well.
    Additionally, McClosky sought to recover against Prince George's
    County and various other defendants for age discrimination and inten-
    tional infliction of emotional distress; these causes of action are not at
    issue on appeal.
    2
    the list and approved the top four applicants for transfer into the K-9
    Unit. Of the 36 applicants who were interviewed by the board,
    McClosky, the only female candidate, was ranked 17th.
    At trial, McClosky called Dr. Michael Tiktinsky as an expert wit-
    ness in psychology and statistics. Tiktinsky testified that a statistical
    analysis of the hiring practices of the Special Operations Division
    revealed a pattern of discrimination against women. Tiktinsky also
    testified regarding the proper procedure for conducting a nondiscrimi-
    natory evaluation of employment applicants. He reviewed the ratings
    system used to rank candidates for the K-9 Unit and concluded that
    the interview process was subjective and therefore provided board
    members who were inclined to discriminate with an opportunity to do
    so. The district court, however, refused to let Tiktinsky testify that the
    interview process was "invalid" because it allowed board members to
    ask the candidates subjective questions.
    II.
    McClosky argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow
    Tiktinsky to testify that the ranking process employed by the board
    was not valid, precluding her from showing that the process was
    merely a pretext for discrimination. After a careful review of the
    record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
    Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 
    920 F.2d 1185
    , 1187 (4th Cir.
    1990) (explaining that we review evidentiary rulings on expert testi-
    mony for abuse of discretion). We note that, in fact, the district court
    allowed Tiktinsky to criticize at length the ranking method used by
    the board. We do not perceive how allowing Tiktinsky to make the
    simple declaration that the selection process used by the board was
    "invalid" would have added to the substance of his testimony.2
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 McClosky generally complains that the ruling of the district court pre-
    cluded Tiktinsky from "attacking" the validity of the interview process;
    however, she failed to proffer Tiktinsky's proposed testimony. Thus, to
    the extent McClosky intended that Tiktinsky "attack" the validity of the
    interview process beyond offering the conclusory opinion that the inter-
    view process was "invalid," she failed to preserve the issue for review.
    Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); United States v. Clements, 
    73 F.3d 1330
    , 1336
    (5th Cir. 1996).
    3
    McClosky also argues that the failure of the district court to allow
    Tiktinsky to testify regarding the validity of the interview process was
    error because it prevented her from showing that Prince George's
    County had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination
    against women over time. We disagree. McClosky's argument is
    undercut by the fact that she was permitted to present expert testi-
    mony that the selection ratio of women to men by the Special Opera-
    tions Division evidenced a "pattern and practice" of discrimination
    against women. Moreover, pattern and practice evidence has little, if
    any, relevance in an individual disparate treatment action such as this
    one. See Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 
    919 F.2d 1247
    , 1252 (7th Cir.
    1990).
    We have considered McClosky's other arguments and conclude
    that they are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    4