United States v. Gartman ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                     No. 95-5701
    JIMMY RAY GARTMAN, SR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
    Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-95-253)
    Argued: March 7, 1997
    Decided: April 23, 1997
    Before HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, KISER, Chief United States
    District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by
    designation, and GOODWIN, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Goodwin wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Hamilton and Chief Judge Kiser joined.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Suzanne Elizabeth Coe, ARNOLD & COE, L.L.P.,
    Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. John Michael Barton,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Margaret B. Seymour, United States Attorney,
    Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    GOODWIN, District Judge:
    The defendant-appellant Gartman was convicted on all three counts
    of an indictment charging him with conspiring to murder federal
    employees, attempting to retaliate against a federal witness or
    infor-
    mant, and conspiring to murder a federally protected witness.* He
    appeals from the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of
    acquittal on all counts. He asserts that the evidence was
    insufficient
    to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Gartman was convicted in count I of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 1117
     by
    conspiring to murder Agent Ronald Grosse and Assistant United
    States
    Attorney Dean Eichelberger. Section 1117 provides in pertinent part
    that
    "[i]f two or more persons conspire to violate section . . . 1114 .
    . . of this
    title, and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect
    the object
    of the conspiracy, each shall be" guilty of a crime. Section 1114
    makes
    it unlawful to "kill or attempt to kill . . . any Assistant United
    States
    Attorney, . . . [or] any officer or employee of the Federal Bureau
    of
    Investigation . . . ." Gartman was convicted in count II of aiding
    and
    abetting an attempt to kill Robert Arnold in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1513
    . Section 1513 makes it unlawful to"kill[] or attempt to kill
    another person with intent to retaliate against any person for --
    (A) the
    attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any
    testi-
    mony given . . . or (B) providing to a law enforcement officer any
    infor-
    mation relating to the commission or possible commission of a
    Federal
    offense." Gartman was convicted in count III of violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     by conspiring to murder Sharon Gregory in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1513
    . Section 371 provides in pertinent part that "[i]f two or
    more per-
    sons conspire to commit any offense against the United States, . .
    . and
    one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
    con-
    spiracy, each shall be" guilty of a crime.
    2
    I.
    The defendant Jimmy Ray Gartman was unemployed and lived in
    a small house with his working wife. Chris Elkins (his nephew) and
    Elkins's friend Edwin Atwood visited Gartman regularly. During the
    late fall of 1994, Gartman spent "two or three" hours several times
    a
    week regaling these young men with vituperations directed at those
    persons whom he had cast as his enemies and persecutors -- former
    insurance investigator Robert Arnold; FBI agent Ronald Grosse;
    Assistant United States Attorney Dean Eichelberger; and federal
    wit-
    ness Sharon Gregory.
    Elkins and Atwood's trial testimony made Gartman's animus
    towards these four individuals explicable. As to Robert Arnold,
    they
    testified that Gartman long suspected Arnold of and blamed him for
    the killing of his youngest son, despite the acquittal on
    self-defense
    grounds of the son's ex-wife. Moreover, Arnold had investigated
    over
    50 allegedly fraudulent insurance claims filed by Gartman and his
    family and had turned over his information to the FBI before
    leaving
    the investigation business.
    Gartman's animus towards Grosse, Eichelberger, and Gregory
    resulted from several interrelated events surrounding the ensuing
    FBI
    and grand jury investigation into the alleged insurance fraud.
    Agent
    Grosse was the lead FBI investigator; AUSA Eichelberger was the
    attorney in charge; and Sharon Gregory was a federal witness
    against
    Gartman and his son Ray Gartman, Jr. Elkins and Atwood testified
    that Gartman felt persecuted by this investigation. Gartman, Jr.
    accused Gregory (his ex-girlfriend) of cooperating with the
    authorities
    in the grand jury investigation, assaulted her, was convicted of
    retali-
    ating against a federally protected witness in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (b), and was sentenced to 68 months imprisonment. Agent
    Grosse investigated the assault and AUSA Eichelberger prosecuted
    the case. Elkins and Atwood testified that Gartman blamed Gregory,
    Grosse, and Eichelberger for "setting up" his son on the assault
    con-
    viction.
    Gartman engaged in no more than verbal vilification of Arnold,
    Grosse, Eichelberger, and Gregory, however, until a December 1994
    meeting between Gartman, Elkins, and Atwood. Atwood testified that
    3
    during this visit Gartman stated that somebody needed to "take care
    of" Arnold. (J.A. 80). Gartman then went into his bedroom,
    retrieved
    some cash, and offered Elkins and Atwood $5,000 to kill Arnold
    (about $2,000 down, about $3,000 later). (J.A. 80-81, 198-200).
    Gart-
    man then went back into his bedroom and returned without the
    money. When he returned, he said that "he wouldn't mind taking care
    of" or "also wanted . . . to get rid of Ronald Grosse, Dean
    Eichelber-
    ger, and Sharon Gregory." (J.A. 82, 200). Elkins asked how much
    Gartman would pay. Atwood does not remember any specific
    amounts, but Elkins testified that Gartman would pay $30,000 each
    for Grosse and Eichelberger and $20,000 for Gregory. (J.A. 82,
    201).
    The next day, Elkins and Atwood told Gartman that they agreed to
    kill all four individuals, starting with Arnold:
    Q: You and Mr. Elkins agreed to kill four people; is that
    correct?
    A: Yes, sir.
    . . .
    A: We went back and I believe Chris stated to him that we
    would do it.
    Q: What was your understanding, what was the defen-
    dant's reaction when you told him we will do it?
    A: He seemed pretty happy.
    Q: What was your understanding, Mr. Atwood, as to what
    you and Chris had agreed with the defendant you were
    going to do?
    A: To initially kill Robert Arnold and if successfully com-
    pleted Dean Eichelberger, Ron Gross, and Sharon
    Gregory.
    Q: You were going to murder Robert Arnold and if you
    pulled that off murder the rest; is that correct?
    4
    A: Yes, sir.
    (J.A. 84, 85-86; testimony of Atwood).
    Q: Did you and Mr. Atwood discuss what the defendant
    had suggested to you?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: Did you and Mr. Atwood agree to do what the defen-
    dant had asked you to do?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: What was your understanding of what you and Mr.
    Atwood had agreed to do for the defendant?
    A: To kill these people.
    Q: Who are these people again?
    A: Sharon Gregory, Ronald Grosse, Dean Eichelberger,
    and Robert Arnold.
    Q: Who were you going to start with?
    A: Robert Arnold.
    Q: Why were you going to start with Robert Arnold?
    A: Because he wanted him first.
    Q: It was the defendant's idea?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: How much money were you going to get paid?
    A: For Ronald Arnold $5,000.
    5
    Q: For Dean Eichelberger?
    A: $30,000.
    Q: Ronald Grosse?
    A: $30,000.
    Q: Why were you getting paid so much more for that?
    A: Because of the importance of them people was so much
    more.
    Q: How about Sharon Gregory?
    A: $20,000.
    Q: Why were you getting paid so much more for her?
    A: Because she was a federal witness.
    Q: When did you and Mr. Atwood tell the defendant that
    you would in fact go forward with this plan?
    A: The next day, I believe.
    Q: What did you tell him?
    A: We told him we would do it. We didn't know who
    Robert Arnold was.
    (J.A. 202-03; testimony of Elkins).
    Elkins and Atwood testified that Gartman provided them with
    information to aid them in killing the four targets. Gartman told
    them
    the location of Arnold's place of business and suggested the manner
    in which Arnold should be killed. He told them that Grosse drove a
    blue Thunderbird with tinted windows and lived in Lexington County.
    They learned from Gartman that Eichelberger shops at Wal-Mart on
    6
    the weekends and he suggested that they should kill him there with
    a rifle. Gartman told them that Gregory worked at Bob Johnson's
    Auto Body, that she lived behind that business, and that they
    should
    kill her by placing a bomb under her house. (J.A. 201, 207-09).
    At Gartman's direction, Elkins and Atwood made botched attempts
    to carry out their end of the agreement. They obtained a semi-
    automatic pistol to first kill Arnold. Elkins, who was carrying the
    pis-
    tol, and Atwood met Arnold to arrange a test-drive with him in a
    car
    he was selling. Although Elkins and Atwood took a test drive,
    Arnold
    did not ride with them, foiling that killing scenario. They
    reported
    their blundered efforts to Gartman and plotted their next move.
    Again
    at Gartman's direction, Elkins and Atwood planned to call Arnold at
    a wrecker service he owned in an attempt to lure him out and kill
    him.
    After drinking several beers, Atwood put on a country accent and
    cal-
    led Arnold. However, Arnold asked skeptical questions and advised
    that he would not pick them up until after daylight, leading Elkins
    and
    Atwood to abort plan two. Elkins testified that despite their
    bungling,
    Gartman gave him $2000, which he split with Atwood. Both young
    men soon became nervous and Atwood reported the plot to the FBI.
    Shortly thereafter, Elkins and Atwood began cooperating with the
    authorities.
    II.
    Gartman first argues that this case involved four separate
    conspira-
    cies with four individual targets -- Arnold, Grosse, Eichelberger,
    and
    Gregory -- and that the only overt acts proved were in furtherance
    of a single conspiracy to kill Arnold. The issue, therefore, is
    whether
    there were four separate conspiracies or one conspiracy to kill
    four
    individuals.
    To answer the single/multiple conspiracy question, the government
    and the defendant each cite United States v. Leavis, 
    853 F.2d 215
    (4th
    Cir. 1988). The Leavis court provided that"[t]he question whether
    the
    evidence shows a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies . . .
    is
    one of fact and is properly the province of the jury." 
    Id. at 218
    .
    "A
    single conspiracy exists where there is ``one overall agreement,' or
    ``one general business venture'." 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). "Whether
    there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies depends upon
    the
    7
    overlap of key actors, methods, and goals." 
    Id.
     (citing United
    States
    v. Crockett, 
    813 F.2d 1310
    , 1216-17 (4th Cir. 1987); United States
    v.
    Little, 
    753 F.2d 1420
    , 1448 (9th Cir. 1984)).
    Although the indictment alleges in the preamble that there was one
    overall goal to Gartman's actions (Indictment ¶ 5, J.A. 2), it
    charged
    three counts -- conspiracy to kill Grosse and Eichelberger; aiding
    and
    abetting an attempt to kill Arnold; and conspiracy to kill Gregory.
    As
    the government explained to the trial court, three counts were
    charged
    because the conspiracy could not statutorily be charged in one
    count
    -- only Grosse and Eichelberger were federal employees, Gregory
    was a federal witness but not an employee of the United States, and
    attempt more closely fit the charged conduct relating to Arnold
    than
    did conspiracy. This fact does not prevent the jury from finding
    that
    one overall conspiracy existed: "Simply put, the fact that an
    indict-
    ment charges conspiracy in separate counts does not mean that the
    conspiracies charged necessarily must be separate and distinct."
    See
    United States v. Fisher, 
    3 F.3d 456
    , 460 (1st Cir. 1993). In
    Fisher, the
    defendant argued that the government could not make a "one big con-
    spiracy" argument because the indictment charged separate conspira-
    cies. 
    Id.
     The First Circuit rejected that argument and noted that
    "there
    is a complete lack of authority supporting the novel proposition
    Fisher
    asserts." 
    Id.
     Although the First Circuit noted that a defendant
    could
    always argue prejudicial variance, the government would not be pre-
    vented from arguing one big conspiracy because the purpose of the
    indictment is primarily to provide notice of the charges to the
    defen-
    dant, not as a means of assessing proof. 
    Id.
     at 460 & 460 n.10.
    Here,
    we also note that the indictment did assert "one big conspiracy" in
    the
    preamble; that Gartman did not offer an instruction at trial on
    single/
    multiple conspiracies; and that Gartman has not raised variance as
    an
    issue.
    We must sustain a jury verdict "if there is substantial evidence,
    tak-
    ing the view most favorable to the government, to support it."
    Glasser
    v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942). We must consider circum-
    stantial as well as direct evidence and allow the government the
    bene-
    fit of all reasonable inferences from facts proven to facts sought
    to be
    established. United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th
    Cir.
    1982). Construing the evidence -- including testimony from the
    alleged coconspirators Elkins and Atwood -- in the light most
    favor-
    8
    able to the government, we find there is substantial evidence to
    sup-
    port the jury's verdict.
    Here, the trial evidence was that there was a single conspiracy to
    kill all four individuals. First, both Elkins and Atwood testified
    repeatedly that their agreement with Gartman was to kill all four
    indi-
    viduals, starting with Arnold. (J.A. 82-83, 84-86, 146, 198,
    200-01,
    202-03). Additionally, Gartman's offer to have all four individuals
    killed was made at the same time -- during one conversation with
    Elkins and Atwood -- and followed complaints about all four
    individ-
    uals for their activities related to the insurance investigation.
    The
    Leavis factors also point to one conspiracy. The key actors --
    Gart-
    man, Elkins, and Atwood -- not only overlapped but were identical.
    Although the methods varied somewhat, the goal to be achieved was
    the same -- killing Gartman's enemies. Clearly, a jury could ratio-
    nally find that there was only "one overall agreement," and thus
    one
    conspiracy, to kill all four individuals.
    The proof also established overt acts in furtherance of the
    conspir-
    acy to kill Gartman's four enemies. Among the overt acts proved
    were the following: Gartman had conversations with Elkins and
    Atwood about the method, timing, and location of the murders;
    Elkins
    and Atwood obtained a gun to kill Arnold; they tried to lure Arnold
    out to kill him during a test-drive; they tried to lure Arnold out
    to kill
    him with a late night call to Arnold's wrecker service; and Gartman
    gave $2000 to Elkins and Atwood for their initial efforts. When a
    sin-
    gle conspiracy has multiple goals (i.e., killing four people), any
    overt
    act directed towards one of the goals (i.e., killing Arnold) is
    sufficient
    to sustain the overall conspiracy conviction. See United States v.
    Head, 
    641 F.2d 174
    , 181 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
    462 U.S. 1132
    (1983). Therefore, Gartman's conviction on counts I and III are
    affirmed.
    III.
    Gartman next argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
    his conviction on count II of the indictment for aiding and
    abetting
    an attempted retaliation against a federal witness or informant in
    vio-
    lation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1513
    . His conviction must be sustained if a
    rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gartman
    9
    intended to have Arnold killed in retaliation for Arnold providing
    information to the government relating to Gartman's alleged insur-
    ance fraud activities.
    The evidence that Gartman intended to have Arnold killed because
    of his insurance fraud investigation and for turning his files over
    to
    the FBI included the following: There was testimony from both
    Elkins and Atwood that Gartman "hated" Arnold both for his son's
    death and for the insurance investigation. (J.A. 69-70; 194).
    Elkins
    also testified that Gartman was aware that Arnold had been the
    origi-
    nal investigator into the alleged insurance fraud and that Arnold
    had
    turned his files over to the FBI: "Q: What did[Gartman] tell you
    about insurance fraud investigations? A: He told me he was being
    investigated because Robert Arnold had initially been the
    investigator
    of it. He had turned his files over to the FBI." (J.A. 191). Atwood
    tes-
    tified that during the original conversation with Gartman about
    killing
    Arnold "[w]e were talking specifically about Robert Arnold at the
    time, about the fact that he possibly had something to do with his
    son's death. The investigation he did on insurance fraud. That
    some-
    body needed to take care of him." (J.A. 80). Finally, Gartman's
    request to murder Arnold came during the same conversation in
    which Gartman also sought to have the FBI agent and the AUSA
    investigating the insurance fraud and the grand jury witness who
    implicated him for insurance fraud murdered. Therefore, Gartman's
    conviction on count II is affirmed.
    IV.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm Gartman's conviction.
    AFFIRMED
    10