Weldmichael v. Ashcroft , 80 F. App'x 881 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    ROBEL MEKONEN WELDMICHAEL,            
    Petitioner,
    v.                           No. 02-2406
    JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    (A78-416-150)
    Submitted: September 25, 2003
    Decided: November 19, 2003
    Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Genet Getachew, Brooklyn, New York, for Petitioner. Robert D.
    McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Evans, Assis-
    tant Director, Paul Fiorino, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
    D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                      WELDMICHAEL v. ASHCROFT
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Robel Mekonen Weldmichael, a native and citizen of Eritrea, peti-
    tions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    ("Board") affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s denial
    of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
    under the Convention Against Torture. For the reasons discussed
    below, we deny the petition for review.
    In his petition, Weldmichael first challenges the immigration
    judge’s determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for asy-
    lum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for
    relief, an alien "must show that the evidence he presented was so
    compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requi-
    site fear of persecution." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483-84
    (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that
    Weldmichael fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary
    result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that Weldmichael
    seeks.
    Additionally, we uphold the immigration judge’s denial of Weld-
    michael’s applications for withholding of removal and protection
    under the Convention Against Torture, both of which require the
    applicant to make a more stringent showing to qualify for relief. To
    qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate "a
    clear probability of persecution." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 430-31 (1987). To obtain relief under the Convention Against
    Torture, an applicant must establish that "it is more likely than not
    that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
    of removal." 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2) (2003). Because Weldmichael
    fails to show that he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher
    standards for withholding of removal or protection under the Conven-
    tion Against Torture.
    Finally, Weldmichael contends that the Board failed to engage in
    reasoned decision making when it affirmed the decision of the immi-
    gration judge without opinion, after review by a single Board mem-
    ber, in accordance with the procedure set out at 8 C.F.R.
    WELDMICHAEL v. ASHCROFT                        3
    § 1003.1(e)(4) (2003). In support of his claim, Weldmichael cites
    numerous federal appellate cases requiring the Board to articulate a
    reasoned basis for its decision. See, e.g., Mousa v. INS, 
    223 F.3d 425
    ,
    430 (7th Cir. 2000); Panrit v. INS, 
    19 F.3d 544
    , 546 (10th Cir. 1994).
    We find that by explicitly adopting the immigration judge’s decision
    as the agency’s final determination, the Board has fulfilled this
    requirement. Cf. Gandarilla-Zambrana v. Bd. of Immigration
    Appeals, 
    44 F.3d 1251
    , 1255 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Board’s
    practice of adopting, without further explanation, the reasoning of the
    immigration judge and stating that the immigration judge’s decision
    then becomes the sole basis for this court’s review).
    Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with
    oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED