United States v. Patterson ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                   No. 96-4712
    PATRICK PATTERSON, a/k/a Bubba,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Fayetteville.
    W. Earl Britt, District Judge.
    (CR-92-72, CA-96-315-1-5)
    Submitted: March 31, 1997
    Decided: August 25, 1997
    Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Gordon Widenhouse, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States
    Attorney, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Patrick Patterson was initially convicted pursuant to his
    guilty pleas of one count each of possession of crack cocaine with
    intent to distribute and using or carrying a firearm during and in rela-
    tion to a drug trafficking offense. After the Supreme Court's decision
    in Bailey,1 Patterson filed a § 22552 motion attacking his § 924(c)3
    conviction. The district court granted the motion, and, over Patter-
    son's objection, ordered a resentencing hearing. On resentencing, the
    district court enhanced Patterson's sentence for the drug conviction
    pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).4 On appeal, Patterson challenges the
    district court's jurisdiction to order a hearing on resentencing. Patter-
    son also challenges the application of the enhancement on evidentiary
    and constitutional grounds. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    Patterson asserts that he cannot be resentenced on his underlying
    drug conviction following his successful Bailey claim. We previously
    addressed this issue and decided to the contrary in United States v.
    Hillary, ___ F.3d ___, 
    1997 WL 61398
     (4th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) (No.
    96-7463) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to resentence
    a defendant on a surviving drug conviction after the defendant was
    granted collateral relief from his § 924(c) conviction based on Bailey).5
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Bailey v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    64 U.S.L.W. 4039
     (U.S. Dec.
    6, 1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492).
    2 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective
    Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    .
    3 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (1994).
    4 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
    1995).
    5 Hillary simply applied this court's decision in United States v.
    Hawthorne, 
    94 F.3d 118
    , 122 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that resentencing
    was appropriate in cases where the successful Bailey claim was raised on
    direct appeal), to cases on collateral review.
    2
    Patterson also raises claims concerning the constitutionality of USSG
    § 2D1.1, which we have found constitutional. See United States v.
    Apple, 
    962 F.2d 335
    , 338 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying the "clearly
    improbable" test); United States v. Bowman , 
    926 F.2d 380
    , 381-82
    (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 2D1.1 does not violate the Due Process
    Clause). Finally, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish
    a connection between the weapons found in Patterson's residence and
    his drug activities.
    We therefore affirm the findings and sentence of the district court
    on resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3