United States v. Haynsworth ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 95-5163
JOSIAH EDGAR HAYNSWORTH, a/k/a
Tex, a/k/a Brother Edgar,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
(CR-94-378-JFM)
Argued: April 5, 1996
Decided: September 11, 1997
Before ERVIN, Circuit Judge, PAYNE, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation,
and KELLAM,* Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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*Senior Judge Kellam participated in the consideration of this case,
but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by
a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Gary Wilmer Christopher, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert Reeves Har-
ding, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Josiah Edgar Haynsworth was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2423after pleading guilty to six counts of transporting underage boys out-
of-state for the purpose of prohibited sexual conduct. Haynsworth
challenges the district court's determination that his offenses were
accomplished by the use of "force," as that term is used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a), triggering a four-level enhancement in his sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.4(a). He also contends that the district court failed to
properly articulate the basis for its decision as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c). We disagree with both challenges and affirm the district
court.
The district court went to great lengths to explain why it deter-
mined that "force" was used in these instances of sexual abuse. We
are convinced that the factors the district court relied upon--the situs
of the offenses; the abuses of trust; the disparity in size, age, and
strength of offender and victims--are probative and supportive of the
finding of the use of force in these circumstances.
That conclusion is bolstered by the statutory language of § 2241(a)
and its legislative history. Section 2241(a) segregates "force" in sub-
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section (1) from "threats" of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnap-
ping in subsection (2). That disjunction plainly evidences
congressional intent to demarcate between any amount of force, no
matter how slight or how utilized, and threats of significantly violent
force. This statutory construction is supported by the legislative his-
tory of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, which created§ 2241. That Act
specifically sought to modernize federal rape laws, and, in particular,
it intended to minimize requirements that it be shown that an offender
had used force since an expectation of resistance was anathema to the
public policy behind the offenses. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-594 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6188, 6191. We therefore con-
clude that the factors relied upon by the district court, in conjunction
with the modernizing statutory scheme and its legislative intent, sup-
port the finding of the use of "force" in this case and, accordingly, the
four-level enhancement in Haynsworth's sentencing.*
We believe that Haynsworth's contention that the district court
inadequately articulated the reasons for the imposition of the sentence
to be meritless. Indeed, intertwined with its explication of those rea-
sons, the district court repeatedly expressed sympathy for Haynsworth
himself, essentially describing him as the "victim" of a "malady" that
caused him to prey upon young boys. Although we do not necessarily
share the concern evinced by the district court for Haynsworth, it is
our duty to assure ourselves that the district court neither erred in its
factual findings nor misinterpreted the law. We conclude that the
ambiguity or lack of clarity that Haynsworth reads into the district
court's statements in open court are nothing more than the lower
court's expressions of concern for Haynsworth, judicial integrity, and
principled decision-making.
For these reasons, the sentence imposed upon Haynsworth is
AFFIRMED.
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*We believe that the case law from other circuits is equivocal as to the
circumstances of this case and do not rely upon it for our disposition.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 104 F.3d 193, 197 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2470 (1997); United States v. Bordeaux, 997 F.2d 419,
421 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fulton, 987 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 & n.2 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1990).
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