United States v. Lewis ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4171
JAMES MICHAEL LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-96-505)
Submitted: August 28, 1997
Decided: September 18, 1997
Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Jack H. Lynn, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene
Josey, United States Attorney, Harold W. Gowdy, III, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
James Michael Lewis appeals his conviction entered on his guilty
plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). Lewis contends that
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge
from his indictment. In doing so, he asks this court to revisit our deci-
sion in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996), upholding
the constitutionality of § 922(g) in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which found
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), exceeded the Congress's power to
enact legislation under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Lewis
contends that the Wells decision was in error because it relied on
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). Lewis urges that
Lopez must be read as having overruled Scarborough as useful Com-
merce Clause precedent. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court has rejected the post-Lopez argument that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause. In Wells, 98 F.3d at 811, we
held that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zone statute at issue in Lopez,
the felon-in-possession statute contains the necessary jurisdictional
element and requires the government to prove a nexus between the
firearm and interstate commerce. Because of this crucial distinction,
the Commerce Clause requires only a "minimal nexus" with interstate
commerce to render the statute constitutional. See id. Contrary to
Lewis's contention, there is nothing in the Lopez decision that would
call into question the applicability of the "minimal nexus" standard to
a statute like § 922(g). See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387,
390 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3264(U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5610). Consequently, even were this
court at liberty to overrule the panel's decision in Wells, which we are
not, see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Director, OWCP, 5 F.3d 777, 779
(4th Cir. 1993), Lewis presents no compelling argument to do so. The
holding in Wells is in accord with all of the other courts of appeals
to consider the issue. See Wells, 98 F.3d at 811 (collecting cases).
Finding no merit to Lewis's sole issue for appeal, we affirm his
conviction. We grant Appellant's motion to dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.
AFFIRMED
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