United States v. Morse , 97 F. App'x 430 ( 2004 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 03-4810
    TIMOTHY DARYL MORSE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
    Norman K. Moon, District Judge.
    (CR-02-66)
    Submitted: April 28, 2004
    Decided: May 18, 2004
    Before WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges,
    and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    J. Lloyd Snook, III, SNOOK & HAUGHEY, P.C., Charlottesville,
    Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,
    William F. Gould, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. MORSE
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Daryl Morse made a conditional guilty plea to two counts
    of possessing a firearm or ammunition after being convicted of a
    "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(9) (2000). On appeal, Morse alleges that: (1) the district
    court erred in finding that his prior Virginia conviction for assault and
    battery against a family or household member under 
    Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57.2
     (Michie 1996) was a predicate "misdemeanor crime of
    domestic violence" and (2) the district court erred in overruling his
    motion to dismiss on the grounds that § 922(g)(9), as applied to him,
    violates: (a) his right to notice that it was illegal for him to possess
    a firearm or ammunition, (b) the Commerce Clause, (c) the Tenth
    Amendment, and (d) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    We find that Morse’s conviction for assault and battery against a
    family or household member was properly considered a predicate
    crime for his § 922(g)(9) conviction. We note that Morse cohabited
    with the victim of his crime and thus would be considered a "family
    or household member" under Virginia law. See 
    Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-228
    , 18.2-57.2. The facts reveal that Morse struck the victim
    in the face after she informed him that she was leaving him for
    another man. Morse’s Virginia conviction and his conduct both meet
    the definition of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as set
    forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(33)(A) (2000).
    This court has rejected the argument that § 922(g)(9) is invalid
    because of notice concerns under the Fifth Amendment. United States
    v. Mitchell, 
    209 F.3d 319
    , 323-24 (4th Cir. 2000). Likewise, this court
    has found that § 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under
    the Commerce Clause. United States v. Gallimore, 
    247 F.3d 134
    , 138
    (4th Cir. 2001). We find that Morse has failed to show that
    UNITED STATES v. MORSE                        3
    § 922(g)(9) violates the Tenth Amendment. See United States v. Bos-
    tic, 
    168 F.3d 718
    , 723-24 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a Tenth Amend-
    ment challenge to 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(8)). Finally, Morse provides no
    authority for his equal protection claim. Other circuits have rejected
    this claim. United States v. Barnes, 
    295 F.3d 1354
    , 1368 (D.C. Cir.
    2002); United States v. Hancock, 
    231 F.3d 557
    , 565-67 (9th Cir.
    2000); United States v. Lewitzke, 
    176 F.3d 1022
    , 1025-27 (7th Cir.
    1999); United States v. Smith, 
    171 F.3d 617
    , 623-26 (8th Cir. 1999).
    Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
    als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
    cess.
    AFFIRMED