United States v. Johnson , 110 F. App'x 319 ( 2004 )


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  •                            UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                               No. 03-4573
    RUSSELL EDWARD JOHNSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    William L. Osteen, District Judge.
    (CR-02-296)
    Submitted: August 30, 2004
    Decided: September 27, 2004
    Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Robert I. O’Hale, CLIFFORD, CLENDENIN, O’HALE & JONES,
    L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wag-
    oner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                     UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    A jury convicted Russell Edward Johnson of possession of a fire-
    arm by a convicted felon, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000)
    (counts one and four); assault on a federal agent, 
    18 U.S.C. § 111
    (a)(1), (b) (2000) (count two); brandishing a firearm during a
    crime of violence, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (count three);
    possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(D) (2000) (count five); and possession of firearms in further-
    ance of a drug trafficking crime, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i) (count
    six). He was sentenced to a total of thirty-two years imprisonment.
    We affirm.
    On appeal, Johnson first contends that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to dismiss the two counts of the superseding
    indictment charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
    because his civil rights had been restored under North Carolina law.
    Specifically, he argues that, since he was not prohibited under North
    Carolina law from possessing the subject weapons at his residence
    and lawful place of business after his civil rights had been restored,
    the counts should be dismissed. While 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(20) (2000)
    prevents federal prosecution for felon in possession of a firearm
    where the defendant has had his civil rights restored on the predicate
    felony, where, as here, the defendant was restricted by his felon status
    under state law from possessing firearms outside his home or busi-
    ness, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) prohibits him from possessing any guns,
    even those permitted under state law. See Caron v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 308
    , 315-17 (1998) (affirming federal firearms convictions
    where defendant had not regained all firearm rights, even though the
    weapons he possessed were not proscribed by Massachusetts state fel-
    ony firearm laws). We therefore conclude that the district court did
    not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
    Also in regard to his convictions for possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon, Johnson argues that the district court abused its dis-
    cretion in denying his motion to present an entrapment by estoppel
    defense. This Court reviews a district court’s pretrial decision to
    refuse to allow a defendant to present an affirmative defense for abuse
    UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON                          3
    of discretion. United States v. Osborne, 
    935 F.2d 32
    , 38-39 (4th Cir.
    1991). Because Johnson does not allege that he relied on statements
    by federal officials, we find that the district court did not abuse its dis-
    cretion in refusing to allow him to present this defense. See United
    States v. Clark, 
    986 F.2d 65
    , 69 (4th Cir. 1993) (statements made by
    a person who is not a federal government official cannot establish the
    defense of entrapment by estoppel).
    Next, Johnson maintains that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to dismiss these same counts on the ground that the 1995
    amendment of the North Carolina firearms statute violates the Ex Post
    Facto Clause as applied to him. This Court reviews a district court’s
    ruling on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause bars a criminal prosecu-
    tion de novo. United States v. Wilson, 
    210 F.3d 230
    , 233 (4th Cir.
    2000). We find this argument foreclosed by our decision in United
    States v. Farrow, 
    364 F.3d 551
     (4th Cir. 2004). In Farrow, we specif-
    ically held that the retroactive application of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14
    -
    415.1 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
    Id. at 555
    ; see also
    United States v. O’Neal, 
    180 F.3d 115
     (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
    1975 amendment to North Carolina’s firearms disability statute
    increasing the disability period to five years did not violate the Ex
    Post Facto Clause).
    Johnson also argues that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress. In that motion, Johnson argued that Detective
    Rogers’ affidavit did not establish a fair probability that contraband
    or evidence would be found at Johnson’s residence, and therefore the
    issuance of the search warrant violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment
    rights.
    This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a
    motion to suppress for clear error, while reviewing the legal determi-
    nations de novo. United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th Cir.
    1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, review of the
    evidence is made in the light most favorable to the Government.
    United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    , 547 (4th Cir. 1998). In
    reviewing the propriety of issuing a search warrant, the relevant
    inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing
    judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable
    cause to issue the warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983).
    4                      UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
    The facts presented to the issuing judge need only convince a person
    of reasonable caution that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
    found at the place to be searched. Texas v. Brown, 
    460 U.S. 730
    , 742
    (1983).
    If a warrant is found to be defective, the evidence obtained from
    the defective warrant may nevertheless be admitted under the good
    faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 922-23 (1984). Evidence seized pursuant to a defective war-
    rant will not be suppressed unless: (1) the affidavit contains knowing
    or reckless falsity; (2) the magistrate acts as a rubber stamp for the
    police; (3) the affidavit does not provide the magistrate with a sub-
    stantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause; and (4)
    the warrant is so facially deficient that an officer could not reasonably
    rely on it. United States v. Wilhelm, 
    80 F.3d 116
    , 121-22 (4th Cir.
    1996); United States v. Hyppolite, 
    65 F.3d 1151
    , 1156 (4th Cir. 1995).
    Where, as here, the challenge is to both the probable cause determi-
    nation and the conclusion that the good faith exception applies, this
    Court will ordinarily address the good faith determination first, unless
    the case involves the resolution of a novel question of law necessary
    to provide guidance to police officers and magistrates. United States
    v. Legg, 
    18 F.3d 240
    , 243 (4th Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
    Craig, 
    861 F.2d 818
    , 820 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Principles of judicial
    restraint and precedent dictate that, in most cases, we should not reach
    the probable cause issue if . . . the good-faith exception of Leon will
    resolve the matter."). Having reviewed the materials submitted in the
    joint appendix in light of Johnson’s argument, particularly the tran-
    scripts of the hearing on the motion, we conclude that the district
    court did not err in applying the good faith exception in this case.
    Johnson further argues that the district court abused its discretion
    in refusing to allow him to introduce expert testimony from a psy-
    chologist that Johnson misperceives reality when placed under acute
    stress. He further alleges that he should have been allowed to intro-
    duce evidence that he was taking prescription drugs and was prone to
    panic attacks at the time he assaulted the officers. Johnson did not,
    and does not, contend he was insane at the time of the offense or that
    he did not have the capacity to formulate the requisite mental state.
    He simply argues that he should have been allowed to present this
    UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON                        5
    evidence so that the jury could determine whether he acted in defense
    of himself and/or his father.
    This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
    of discretion. United States v. Leftenant, 
    341 F.3d 338
    , 342 (4th Cir.
    2003), cert. denied, 
    124 S. Ct. 1183
     (2004). In United States v. Wor-
    rell, 
    313 F.3d 867
     (4th Cir. 2002), this Court acknowledged that the
    Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA") expressly prohibits the use of
    any "[m]ental disease or defect" as a defense unless it demonstrates
    that the defendant "was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
    the wrongfulness of his acts." 
    Id. at 872
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 17
    (2000)). The court concluded, however, that "the IDRA does not pro-
    hibit psychiatric evidence of a mental condition short of insanity
    when such evidence is offered purely to rebut the government’s evi-
    dence of specific intent, although such cases will be rare." 
    Id. at 874
    .
    We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refus-
    ing to allow the psychologist’s testimony based on our decision in
    Worrell. In Worrell, we specifically concluded that the IDRA bars
    psychiatric evidence relating to a defendant’s mental condition if such
    evidence is in the nature of a legal justification or excuse for other-
    wise criminal conduct, but permits this type of evidence if, rather than
    justifying a defendant’s conduct, it negates an essential element of the
    government’s prima facie case. 
    313 F.3d at 873
    . In this case, as in
    Worrell, the psychologist’s proposed testimony was not relevant to
    the issue of specific intent. The district court therefore did not abuse
    its discretion in excluding the psychologist’s testimony.
    With respect to his conviction for possession of marijuana with the
    intent to distribute and the resulting § 924(c) conviction based on that
    offense, Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his
    motion for acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient evidence
    presented of his intent to distribute marijuana. Specifically, Johnson
    freely admits to the plethora of evidence supporting his possession of
    the marijuana; however, he argues there was insufficient evidence to
    support the intent to distribute. He points to the absence of certain
    indicia of distribution such as cell phones, drug ledgers, and packag-
    ing materials.
    This Court reviews de novo the district court’s decision to deny a
    motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Romer, 
    148 F.3d 6
                       UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
    359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). When the motion is based on insufficient
    evidence, the conviction must be sustained if the evidence, viewed in
    the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient for a ratio-
    nal trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     If substantial evidence exists to sup-
    port a verdict, the verdict must be sustained. United States v. Burgos,
    
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Glasser v. United
    States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942)). Intent to distribute may be inferred
    from a drug quantity larger than that needed for personal use. United
    States v. Wright, 
    991 F.2d 1182
    , 1187 (4th Cir. 1993). We find suffi-
    cient evidence in this case to support the jury’s finding of an intent
    to distribute marijuana. Moreover, it was the jury’s exclusive preroga-
    tive to credit or discredit his testimony; credibility determinations are
    not subject to review by this Court. United States v. Saunders, 
    886 F.2d 56
    , 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
    In his last argument, Johnson challenges the imposition of a
    twenty-five-year consecutive sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)
    (C)(i), (D)(ii), which requires the court to impose no less than twenty-
    five years’ imprisonment in the case of a second or subsequent con-
    viction under § 924(c). Johnson maintains this was error because both
    § 924(c) violations were listed in the same indictment and the offense
    conduct for both occurred simultaneously. Johnson appears to
    acknowledge that this Court held that a conviction on a second fire-
    arms count, although charged in the same indictment as the first,
    gives rise to the enhanced sentence. United States v. Raynor, 
    939 F.2d 191
    , 193-94 (4th Cir. 1991). He seems to rely rather on the fact that,
    in this case, the offense conduct giving rise to the two § 924(c) con-
    victions occurred simultaneously. This argument is meritless. Because
    both § 924(c) convictions can be charged in the same indictment, and
    because both convictions were based on separate conduct (i.e., assault
    on a federal agent and possession with intent to distribute marijuana),
    we find that the district court did not err in imposing the mandatory
    twenty-five-year consecutive sentence.
    Accordingly, we affirm Johnson’s convictions and sentence. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED