United States v. Torres , 112 F. App'x 903 ( 2004 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-4004
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    MARGARITO TORRES, a/k/a Mago,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
    Judge. (CR-03-265)
    Submitted:   September 17, 2004           Decided:   November 2, 2004
    Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Andrew R. MacKenzie, BARRETT & MACKENZIE, L.L.C., Greenville, South
    Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, OFFICE OF
    THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Margarito Torres appeals his conviction and 120-month
    sentence imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
    and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of
    methamphetamine.       Torres’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), raising one issue but
    stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for
    appeal.   Torres has filed a pro se supplemental brief.            We affirm.
    Counsel questions whether the district court erred in its
    assessment    of   a   two-point   enhancement    under    U.S.    Sentencing
    Guidelines    Manual   §   3B1.1(c)    (2002),   for   Torres’    role   as   an
    organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity.
    Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district
    court did not plainly err in applying the enhancement.             See United
    States v. Osborne, 
    345 F.3d 281
    , 284 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating
    standard of review).
    In his pro se supplemental brief, Torres raises several
    claims.   First, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing
    and voluntary.     Because Torres did not move in the district court
    to withdraw his guilty plea, we review his challenge to the
    adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error.           United States v.
    Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 524-25 (4th Cir.) (providing standard of
    review), cert. denied, 
    537 U.S. 899
    (2002).            We find that Torres’
    guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered after a thorough
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    hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.                  Torres was properly
    advised as to his rights, the offense charged, and the minimum and
    maximum sentence for the offense.            The court also determined that
    there was an independent factual basis for the plea and that the
    plea was not coerced.         See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    ,
    31 (1970); United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 119-20 (4th Cir.
    1991).    We therefore find no plain error.
    Torres also asserts in his pro se supplemental brief that
    counsel provided ineffective assistance.             However, “[i]neffective
    assistance claims are not cognizable on direct appeal unless
    counsel’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the record.”
    United States v. James, 
    337 F.3d 387
    , 391 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
    denied, 
    124 S. Ct. 1111
    (2004).         Because Torres has failed to meet
    this   high     standard,     we   decline    to    address    his    ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record    for    any    meritorious     issues      and     have     found    none.
    Accordingly, we affirm Torres’ conviction and sentence. This court
    requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
    to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
    review.    If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
    counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may    move    in   this   court    for   leave     to   withdraw   from
    representation.        Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
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    was served on the client.     We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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