Jones v. Scotland County ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1689
SHEPARD JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
MICHAEL BROWN,
Plaintiff,
versus
WAYNE BRYANT, Sheriff, individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Scotland
County,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
SCOTLAND COUNTY,
Defendant,
No. 04-1706
SHEPARD JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
MICHAEL BROWN,
Plaintiff,
versus
WAYNE BRYANT, Sheriff, individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Scotland
County,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
SCOTLAND COUNTY,
Defendant,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CA-01-936)
Submitted: December 23, 2004 Decided: January 31, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James H. Locus, Jr., Fayetteville, North Carolina, for
Appellant/Cross-appellee. Cecil W. Harrison, Jr., David L.
Woodard, POYNER & SPRUILL, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee/Cross-appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Shepard Jones appeals the district court’s award of
attorney’s fees and denial of his motion for equitable relief in
his Title VII case. Jones filed a civil action against Defendants,
Scotland County* and Scotland County Sheriff, Wayne Bryant, under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jones alleged that he was
wrongfully discharged in retaliation for his opposition to
discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII and the First
Amendment. The jury found Bryant individually liable for violating
Jones’ rights under Title VII, and found in favor of Bryant on
Jones’ First Amendment claim. The jury awarded Jones $25,000 in
damages. Following the trial, Jones’ counsel moved for attorney’s
fees and costs in excess of $150,000, as well as equitable relief.
The district court ultimately granted approximately $16,000 in fees
and denied Jones’ request for equitable relief. Jones now appeals.
On appeal, Jones asserts that the district court
erroneously calculated reasonable attorney’s fees by failing to
assess the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), and adopted by
this Court in Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th
Cir. 1978). On cross appeal, Bryant asserts that Jones is not
entitled to any fees.
*
On October 25, 2004, this court granted Appellees’ motion to
dismiss Scotland County as a party to this appeal.
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This court reviews a district court’s decision awarding
or denying attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. See Johnson v.
City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2002). When attorney’s
fees and costs are permissible, a federal court determines the
award by first determining the lodestar amount (reasonable hourly
rate multiplied by hours reasonably expended), applying the
Johnson/Barber factors when making the lodestar determination. See
Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 73-74 (4th Cir. 1995); Daly
v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1078 (4th Cir. 1986). However, “a request
for attorneys’ fees, which is so exorbitant as to shock the
conscience of the court, may be denied without an analysis of the
[Johnson/Barber] factors.” Sun Pub. Co., Inc. v. Mecklenburg News,
Inc., 823 F.2d 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1987). We conclude that, given
the facts of this case, counsel’s request for more than $150,000 in
fees so shocks the conscience that the district court was not
required to analyze the request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the
factors enunciated in Johnson and Barber. Nonetheless, despite
counsel’s exorbitant request, we conclude that the district court’s
award of $16,000 in fees was not an abuse of discretion. See City
of Aiken, 278 F.3d at 336.
Jones also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his request for equitable relief in the form
of the removal of “all negative inferences” from his personnel file
and a permanent injunction prohibiting Bryant from disclosing any
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purged information. The district court has “broad equitable
discretion to fashion remedies to make the plaintiff whole for
injuries resulting from a violation” of Title VII. Brinkley-Obu v.
Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 356 (4th Cir. 1994). A
decision to grant or deny an injunction likewise rests within the
discretion of the district court. See Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc.
v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 1998). After
careful review of the relevant law and the facts before us, we find
no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s denial of equitable relief. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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