Udugampola v. Dalkon Shield Trust ( 1999 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
In Re: A. H. ROBINS COMPANY,
INCORPORATED,
Debtor.
DR. A. UDUGAMPOLA, J.P.,No. 98-1825
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST,
Trust-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior District Judge;
Blackwell N. Shelley, Bankruptcy Judge.
(CA-85-1307-R)
Submitted: December 29, 1998
Decided: February 8, 1999
Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
A. Udugampola, Appellant Pro Se. Orran Lee Brown, Sr., DALKON
SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Dr. A. Udugampola asserted that his wife developed an infection
and died as a result of her use of the Dalkon Shield. He elected to
resolve his claim under Option 1 of the Claims Resolution Facility
(CRF). Under Option 1 he was entitled to payment of $300. He
accepted this payment as "full settlement and as valuable consider-
ation for the release of all claims . . . arising out of the use by another
person of the Dalkon Shield." On the face of the $300 check that the
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (Trust) issued and Dr. Udugampola
cashed was written, "Settlement of Dalkon Shield Claim." On the
back of the check above the claimant endorsement signature line was
an additional release: "I have read and executed the release agreement
regarding my Dalkon Shield claim and hereby accept this payment in
full and final settlement of my Dalkon Shield claim and in accordance
with the terms of such release."
Despite his release, Dr. Udugampola filed a motion seeking an
additional $100,000 in compensation. He stated that he elected Option
1 only because it was the most convenient option available to him.
Further, he alleged that he chose that option because his wife's medi-
cal records were unavailable and he could not pursue other options.
Finally, he contended that his financial and medical straits warranted
the additional compensation.
The district court denied the motion upon the determination that
Dr. Udugampola's circumstances did not justify repudiation of the
contract. Dr. Udugampola timely appealed.
"The law strongly favors settlement of litigation, and there is a
compelling public interest and policy in upholding and enforcing set-
tlement agreements voluntarily entered into." Hemstreet v. Spiegel,
Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The parties may not repudi-
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ate a valid agreement once it is reached. See id. Because settlement
agreements are considered contracts, see United States v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975), and contract construc-
tion is a question of law, we review the district court's order de novo.
See Nehi Bottling Co. v. All-American Bottling Corp. , 8 F.3d 157, 162
(4th Cir. 1993).
Here, Dr. Udugampola agreed to settle his claim for $300. As part
of the settlement, he signed a release stating unambiguously that he
was releasing his claim against the Trust and others. There was no
coercion or material misrepresentation by the Trust. The release was
valid, binding, and supported by adequate consideration. We therefore
affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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