Progressive Church v. Progressive Church-Tallahassee ( 2022 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-1763
PROGRESSIVE CHURCH OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PROGRESSIVE CHURCH OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST-TALLAHASSEE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:19-cv-03541-JFA)
Submitted: September 30, 2022 Decided: October 12, 2022
Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Megan A. Rosenberg, Jennifer C. Rey, THE HOGAN LAW FIRM, LLC,
Brooksville, Florida; Louis D. Nettles, NETTLES LAW FIRM, Florence, South Carolina,
for Appellant. James Y. Becker, Costa M. Pleicones, Columbia, South Carolina, Sarah P.
Spruill, HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
The Progressive Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. (the “Church”) filed suit
against the Progressive Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ-Tallahassee, Inc. (the
“Tallahassee Congregation”) to determine the validity of a deed signed by the Presiding
Bishop of the Church purporting to transfer a parcel of real property where the Tallahassee
Congregation worshipped (the “Tallahassee property”) to the Tallahassee Congregation
without the permission of the Church’s Board of Bishops. The district court determined
that the deed was invalid and granted summary judgment in favor of the Church. The
Tallahassee Congregation appeals, arguing that the Board of Bishops was illegitimate, the
Church’s Constitution should be given no weight because the Church did not adhere to it,
and the Tallahassee Congregation paid for the purchase of the Tallahassee property. We
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment.
Calloway v. Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2020). “A district court ‘shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin.
Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A
genuine dispute exists “if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, this court “view[s] the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in
the light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Id. at 565 n.1 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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“[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play
in resolving church property disputes.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[R]eligious freedom
encompasses the power of religious bodies to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Id.
at 721-22 (cleaned up). “In assessing whether to exercise jurisdiction in a civil proceeding
involving a church, it is important to determine whether the church is of a ‘hierarchical’
nature. If the church is hierarchical, a civil court should defer to the final authority within
its hierarchy, declining even to determine . . . whether it has complied with church laws
and regulations.” Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 715 (4th Cir. 2002). In determining
whether a church is hierarchical, a court considers whether:
1) The corporations in question are organized under the state religious
corporations act governing the incorporation of religious societies that are
subordinate parts of larger church organizations.
2) Resolutions of the subordinate entity acknowledge the superiority of the
superior entity.
3) By-laws of the lower authority have been submitted to the higher for
approval.
4) The priest takes an oath to be obedient to the higher authority.
5) Provisions in the constitutions and by-laws of both the superior and
subordinate levels suggest a hierarchical relationship.
Id.Our review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the Church
operated as a hierarchical organization and that deference is owed to the Church’s highest
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authority. See id. The Church is incorporated under South Carolina’s act governing the
incorporation of religious organizations; the Church Constitution provides that the
organization operates on national, district, and local levels, provides for the collection of
fees from districts to be rendered to the national organization, and requires that member
churches adhere to the rules and bylaws of the Church; and upon their appointment, pastors
of local congregations agree to operate under the Board’s authority and pursuant to the
Church Constitution. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that the Church was a hierarchical organization.
The Board of Bishops is the highest authority within the Church, according to its
Constitution. See id. at 717 (looking to church’s governing documents to determine its
highest authority). At the time the deed purporting to transfer the Tallahassee property was
signed, the Board of Bishops had been properly appointed in compliance with the Church
Constitution; any alleged history of noncompliance with the Constitution by the Church is
irrelevant. And, while the Tallahassee Congregation claims that the 2019 election and
appointment of the Board of Bishops occurring before the deed was executed was
illegitimate, a civil court defers to the hierarchical authority in matters of internal church
government and will not scrutinize the Church’s appointments to the Board of Bishops.
See id. at 715. Although the Tallahassee Congregation argues that there is a question of
fact as to who supplied the funds for the original purchase of the property, this question is
immaterial because the record makes clear that the property was purchased by the Church,
the mortgage and property were titled in the Church’s name, and the Church Constitution
provided for the ownership of churches by the national Church organization.
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Because the Church is incorporated in South Carolina, South Carolina’s statute
governing nonprofit corporations applies to the Church’s operations. See Phoenix Sav. &
Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1970) (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) (stating that substantive issues in a diversity suit are
resolved according to state law). Turning to the validity of the transfer, South Carolina law
requires that every corporation have a board of directors, and that all corporate powers be
exercised and affairs of the corporation be managed by the board, unless the articles of
incorporation authorize another person to exercise particular powers. S.C. Code Ann. § 33-
31-801 (2006). “If religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious corporation is
inconsistent with the provisions of [South Carolina law governing nonprofit corporations],
the religious doctrine controls.” S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-180 (2006). Because the
Tallahassee property is located in Florida, Florida law governs the transfer of property.
Florida law requires either that the party transferring the property or “the party’s lawfully
authorized agent” sign the deed before two witnesses, Fla. Stat. § 689.01 (2021), or that an
instrument be “sealed with the common or corporate seal and signed in its name by its
president or any vice president or chief executive officer,” Fla. Stat. § 692.01 (2021).
Although the deed in this case was signed by the Presiding Bishop, the deed did not
contain a corporate seal, and therefore did not comply with the requirements of Fla. Stat.
§ 692.01. As such, to be effective, the deed must have been signed by the Church’s
lawfully authorized agent. See DGG Dev. Corp. v. Estate of Capponi, 983 So. 2d 1232,
1233-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a deed is ineffective on its face to convey
title if not properly executed in accordance with the conveyancing statutes). Neither the
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articles of incorporation nor the Church Constitution authorize the Presiding Bishop to
transfer property on behalf of the Church. Thus, the Board of Bishops has the sole power
to authorize such a transaction. Since the Presiding Bishop was not authorized by the Board
of Bishops to sign the deed, the transaction was not valid under Florida law. We conclude
that the district court did not err in granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment.
Finally, the Tallahassee Congregation filed a motion for an injunction pending this
appeal seeking to stop the Church from barring the Tallahassee Congregation members
from the Tallahassee property. A motion requesting such relief ordinarily must first be
made in the district court unless the moving party shows that the court has already denied
the requested relief or that moving first in the district court would be impracticable. Fed.
R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). Additionally, “[t]he party requesting a stay bears the burden
of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of [judicial] discretion” needed for
issuance of the stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009).
The Tallahassee Congregation did not first request injunctive relief in the district
court and has not met its burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of
this court’s discretion. Moreover, our decision renders the request for relief moot.
We affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment and deny the
Tallahassee Congregation’s motion for an injunction pending appeal. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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