Nelson v. Uran ( 1999 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
LAURA NELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-2400
IRWIN W. URAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-98-1208-A)
Submitted: March 9, 1999
Decided: March 29, 1999
Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Stephen Atherton Northup, Timothy Stephen Baird, MAYS & VAL-
ENTINE, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Lewis T. Booker,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Richmond, Virginia; Richard R. Saunders,
Jr., SEVILA, SAUNDERS, HUDDLESTON & WHITE, Leesburg,
Virginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Irwin W. Uran appeals from the district court's order
denying his motion to set aside a Virginia state court default judgment
and granting Laura Nelson's motion to remand. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Nelson brought a state court con-
tract action in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County against Uran on
February 10, 1998. Because Uran disputed that he received proper
service of process under state law, two attorneys appeared on his
behalf on March 9, 1998, arguing that the court did not have personal
jurisdiction over Uran. The court found Uran's jurisdictional argu-
ment unavailing, and allowed Uran until May 26, 1998, to file respon-
sive pleadings. Because Uran failed to so respond, the court entered
a default judgment on June 19, 1998, against Uran and awarded Nel-
son $1,311,000 plus interest and late fees. On August 10, 1998, the
court ordered garnishee Merrill Lynch, where Uran was known to
have funds, to pay Nelson's counsel the amount of the judgment and
interest. Rather than appeal this default judgment to the proper Vir-
ginia forum, Uran removed the action to the district court on August
18, 1998, seeking the court to aside the state court's default judgment.
The district court denied Uran's motion to set aside and granted Nel-
son's motion to remand.1
In their briefs, the parties argue at length about the propriety of the
Virginia circuit court's ruling regarding whether it had personal juris-
diction over Uran. We cannot reach that issue, however, because the
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1 By order of this court on October 23, 1998, the money, then
$1,576,384.41, was deposited with the clerk of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, pending settlement of this
appeal. A bond for $500,000 also was ordered.
2
Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes it clear that federal courts do not
possess jurisdiction to hear claims adjudicated by state courts, even
if the claims are constitutional. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va.,
122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 66
U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1998) (No. 97-859); Suarez Corp.
Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1997). Lower federal
courts cannot sit in direct review of final state court decisions. See
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-84 n.16; Jordahl , 122 F.3d at 199. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests a district court of jurisdiction where
"entertaining the federal claim should be the equivalent of an appel-
late review of [the state court] order." FOCUS v. Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996). Further-
more, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not only review of
adjudications of the state's highest court, but also the decisions of its
lower courts. Id.If Uran wished to further contest the Circuit Court of Loudoun
County's ruling on personal jurisdiction and subsequent default judg-
ment, his remedy was to appeal that decision to the proper state court.
This court is without jurisdiction to redress his claim. See Jordahl,
122 F.3d at 199. Further, as noted by the district court, because Uran
attempts to overturn a final decision of another court raising the same
issues that were raised or could have been raised in that previous
action, he is res judicata barred in any event. The doctrine of res judi-
cata is designed to foreclose collateral attack such as is attempted here
and to ensure the integrity of judgments rendered by courts of compe-
tent jurisdiction. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189-90
(1947). The doctrine applies to default judgments. See Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 523-26 (1931)
(upholding a Missouri state court final default judgment with no
appeal). Also, the principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional
issues. See American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932);
see also Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life &
Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. We deny as
moot Uran's motion to strike Nelson's brief and Nelson's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of her motion for addendum. We dis-
3
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED2
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2 We note in passing that there are no facts in this case essentially dif-
ferent from those in Fleming v. Moore, 780 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1985), in
which we declined to review under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 the judgment of
a state court.
4