United States v. Reid ( 1999 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                    No. 98-4513
    WILLIAM HENRY REID, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.
    Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-97-748)
    Submitted: February 16, 1999
    Decided: April 7, 1999
    Before ERVIN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Benjamin Thomas Stepp, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S
    OFFICE, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Harold Watson
    Gowdy, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    William Henry Reid, Jr., appeals from his conviction and sentence
    imposed after a jury trial of being a convicted felon in possession of
    a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 922
    (g)(1) (West 1994 &
    Supp. 1998). Reid's counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), raising several issues but stating that
    in his view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Reid was
    informed of his right to file a supplemental informal brief and has
    done so. We affirm.
    The Government's evidence at trial established that when Spartan-
    burg County Deputy Sheriff Kevin Bobo went to Reid's residence to
    arrest him on several outstanding traffic offense warrants, Bobo
    observed in plain view what he had reason to believe were items
    stolen from the home of an elderly woman whose house Reid had pre-
    viously rented. Bobo obtained a search warrant and returned later that
    same day with other officers to search for the stolen goods. In the pro-
    cess of conducting the search, officers found two firearms in the
    drawer of a dresser in Reid's bedroom.
    At the close of the Government's case, Reid's counsel moved for
    a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, which the district
    court denied. Because the evidence was sufficient to support a convic-
    tion under § 922(g)(1), the district court did not err in denying Reid's
    Rule 29 motion. See 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 922
    (g)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29;
    United States v. Blue, 
    957 F.2d 106
    , 107 (4th Cir. 1992); United
    States v. Brooks, 
    957 F.2d 1138
    , 1147 (4th Cir. 1992).
    The presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended that Reid
    receive a four-level upward adjustment under U.S. Sentencing Guide-
    lines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) (1997), for possession of a firearm in
    connection with the felony offense of grand larceny. The district court
    overruled Reid's objection, finding the adjustment warranted based
    on the grand larceny as well as evidence that Reid possessed mari-
    juana with intent to distribute. The evidence was sufficient to show
    that the firearms were possessed in connection with the offense of
    possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, thus warranting the
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    adjustment on that basis. See USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5); Smith v. United
    States, 
    508 U.S. 223
    , 238 (1993); United States v. Regans, 
    125 F.3d 685
    , 686-87 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    118 S. Ct. 1398
     (1998); United States v. Nale, 
    101 F.3d 1000
    , 1003-04 (4th Cir.
    1996). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in applying
    the adjustment. See Nale, 
    101 F.3d at 1003
    .
    The PSR also recommended a two-point upward adjustment in
    Reid's offense level for obstruction of justice because Reid perjured
    himself at trial. The district court did not clearly err in applying this
    adjustment. See USSG § 3C1.1. Likewise, the district court did not err
    in adding two points to Reid's criminal history category under USSG
    § 4A1.1(e).
    The Government moved for an upward departure under USSG
    § 4A1.3(e), relying on Reid's numerous prior convictions and several
    serious pending charges. The court departed upwards from a criminal
    history category of IV to a category of V. The court did not abuse its
    discretion in determining Reid's guideline range based on a criminal
    history category of V. See USSG § 4A1.3(e), p.s.; United States v.
    Rybicki, 
    96 F.3d 754
    , 756-57 (4th Cir. 1996). Finally, because the
    record does not conclusively show that Reid received ineffective
    assistance of counsel, we decline to address this issue. See United
    States v. Smith, 
    62 F.3d 641
    , 651 (4th Cir. 1995).
    The remaining claims not raised by counsel but raised by Reid in
    his informal brief lack merit. Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    (1995), concerns the showing necessary to sustain a conviction under
    the "use" prong of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998),
    and does not affect the result of this appeal. Likewise, the record
    shows that police officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant in
    searching Reid's home.
    As required by Anders, we have examined the entire record and
    find no meritorious issues for appeal. Because the record discloses no
    reversible error, we affirm Reid's conviction and sentence. This court
    requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to peti-
    tion the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
    client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
    a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    3
    leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state
    that a copy thereof was served on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately set forth in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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