United States v. Gracius , 143 F. App'x 552 ( 2005 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4141
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ANTOINE GRACIUS, a/k/a Julian, a/k/a Antoine
    Gracias,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Salisbury. William L. Osteen,
    District Judge. (CR-97-114)
    Submitted:   August 31, 2005            Decided:   September 22, 2005
    Before WILLIAMS, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David B. Freedman, WHITE & CRUMPLER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
    for Appellant.     Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney,
    Clifton T. Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Antoine Gracius pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
    fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack), 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    (2000),   and   received   a   sentence    of   168   months   imprisonment.
    Gracius appeals his sentence,* contending that he is entitled to be
    resentenced in light of United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), because the district court plainly erred in sentencing him
    under a mandatory guideline sentencing scheme.           We affirm.
    In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
    guidelines scheme that provided for sentence enhancements based on
    facts found by the court violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125
    S. Ct. at 746-48, 755-56.       The Court remedied the constitutional
    violation by severing and excising the statutory provisions that
    mandate sentencing and appellate review under the guidelines, thus
    making the guidelines advisory.      Id. at 756-57.
    *
    Gracius’ first pro se appeal was dismissed as untimely.
    Gracius then filed a motion to vacate under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (2000), alleging that his attorney failed to file a notice of
    appeal as he requested. Relief was granted under United States v.
    Peak, 
    992 F.2d 39
    , 42 (4th Cir. 1993) (failure to note requested
    appeal is denial of Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
    counsel). However, due to a clerical error, the amended judgment
    order entered in October 2001 was not sent to Gracius’ attorney and
    he again failed to perfect an appeal.      In 2002, Gracius filed
    another § 2255 motion seeking to set aside the judgment.        The
    district court found that relief was warranted and entered a second
    amended judgment on January 11, 2005. Because the district court
    granted Gracius’ original § 2255 motion and reentered judgment to
    permit a direct appeal, the next § 2255 motion was not a second or
    successive motion within the meaning of § 2255. In re Goddard, 
    170 F.3d 435
     (4th Cir. 1999).
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    Subsequently, in United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    ,
    546 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that a sentence that was imposed under
    the pre-Booker mandatory sentencing scheme and was enhanced based
    on facts found by the court, not by a jury (or, in a guilty plea
    case, admitted by the defendant), constitutes plain error.     That
    error affects the defendant’s substantial rights and warrants
    reversal under Booker when the record does not disclose what
    discretionary sentence the district court would have imposed under
    an advisory guideline scheme.    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 546-56
    .
    In United States v. White, 
    405 F.3d 208
     (4th Cir. 2005),
    we held that treating the guidelines as mandatory was plain error
    in light of Booker, 
    id. at 216-17
    , but we declined to presume
    prejudice.    
    Id. at 217-22
    .   We held that the “prejudice inquiry,
    therefore, is . . . whether after pondering all that happened
    without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, . . . the
    judgment was . . . substantially swayed by the error.”   
    Id. at 223
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).      To make this
    showing, a defendant must “demonstrate, based on the record, that
    the treatment of the guidelines as mandatory caused the district
    court to impose a longer sentence than it otherwise would have
    imposed.”    
    Id. at 224
    .   When “the record as a whole provides no
    nonspeculative basis for concluding that the treatment of the
    guidelines as mandatory ‘affect[ed] the district court’s selection
    of the sentence imposed,’” 
    id. at 223
     (quoting Williams v. United
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    States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    , 203 (1992)), the error did not affect the
    defendant’s substantial rights.       
    Id. at 225
     (affirming sentence);
    see United States v. Collins, 
    412 F.3d 515
    , 524-25 (4th Cir. 2005)
    (finding that defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from being
    sentenced under mandatory sentencing guidelines).
    Here, the district court made no fact findings that
    increased Gracius’ sentence beyond those facts he admitted by
    stipulating that he was responsible for more than 1.5 kilograms of
    crack.    Therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.             The
    court    imposed   Gracius’   sentence   under   a   mandatory   sentencing
    guidelines scheme, which was plain error.             White, 
    405 F.3d at 216-17
    .    However, because the record contains no nonspeculative
    basis on which this court could conclude that the district court
    would have sentenced Gracius to a lesser sentence had the court
    proceeded under an advisory guideline scheme, Gracius has failed to
    demonstrate    that   the   plain   error   in   sentencing   him   under   a
    mandatory guidelines scheme affected his substantial rights.
    We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
    court.    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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