Forrest v. Transit Management of Charlotte, Inc. ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2245
GERALD D. FORREST,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF CHARLOTTE, INCORPORATED;
MCDONALD MANAGEMENT, d/b/a Charlotte Area
Transit, Subsidiary of Transit Management of
Charlotte,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
DAVID H. HINES; SCOTT CROMER-COLBURN,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior
District Judge. (3:03-cv-00605)
Submitted: July 11, 2007 Decided: August 15, 2007
Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gerald D. Forrest, Appellant Pro Se. John Brem Smith, SMITH LAW
FIRM, PC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Gerald D. Forrest appeals from the district court’s order
granting judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(a), to his former employer, Transit Management of Charlotte
(“Transit Management”). Forrest, who is African-American, filed an
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000), alleging that Transit Management engaged
in racial discrimination in the enforcement of employee
disciplinary measures. The district court granted judgment to
Transit Management on the ground that Forrest had failed to provide
any evidence of a sufficiently similar incident involving an
employee outside of the protected class who was disciplined in a
less severe manner. Finding no error, we affirm.
This litigation has its genesis in an incident occurring
in May 2003, in which Forrest, a supervisor, was involved in a
physical altercation with another employee, Derrick Stallings. A
few days later, Forrest was informed by Assistant General Manager
Scott Cromer-Colburn that he had to resign or face termination, due
to allegations that Forrest had assaulted Stallings. In his
complaint, Forrest contended that he was simply attempting to
defend himself from Stallings, and that no internal investigation
or review was performed regarding this matter. Additionally,
Forrest asserted that Transit Management gave “preferential
treatment” to white employees, as he listed a number of examples
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where white employees violated Transit Management’s rules or
policies but received less severe punishment.
On appeal, Forrest first contends that the district
court erred in granting Transit Management’s motion in limine.
This court reviews a district court’s ruling on a motion in limine
for abuse of discretion. See Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d
471, 480 (4th Cir. 1994). To establish a prima facie case under
Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his prohibited conduct
was comparable in seriousness to the misconduct of other employees.
See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993).
To meet this burden, a plaintiff must provide evidence of prior
employee incidents that were sufficiently similar “in light of the
harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the
culpability of the offender.” Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d
1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985).
Having reviewed the record in this case, we find that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Transit
Management’s motion in limine. While Forrest identified a number
of employees who had allegedly engaged in various levels of
misconduct, none of their actions rose to the level of assault on
another employee. See Moore, 754 F.2d at 1107. Additionally,
while Forrest did attempt to present testimony regarding an
altercation between two non-supervisory employees, these
individuals were not subject to the higher standard of performance
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that was applicable to Forrest as a supervisor. See Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (employees must be
subject to same standards to be comparable).
Forrest’s next claim is that the district court erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law to Transit Management, as he
asserts that he sufficiently established a prima facie case under
Title VII. This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, Wheatley v. Wicomico County, 390 F.3d
328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004), and views the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Corti v. Storage Tech. Corp.,
304 F.3d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 2002). “Such a motion is properly
granted if the nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an
essential element of his case with respect to which he had the
burden of proof.” Wheatley, 390 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
“Judgment as a matter of law is proper only if ‘there can be but
one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’” Ocheltree v.
Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986)).
The district court concluded Forrest failed to
demonstrate he was treated differently from an employee outside of
the protected class who engaged in misconduct comparable in
seriousness. The court found Forrest identified only one employee
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who had been involved in a physical altercation and held a
comparable supervisory position. However, at the time of that
incident, the circumstances of which were less than clear, the
offending employee had a different supervisor than Forrest. If
different decision-makers are involved, employees are generally not
similarly situated. See Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d
343, 350 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Shumway v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, because
a different supervisor was involved in the incident that Forrest
compares to his own, and Forrest failed to provide any evidence
that would allow for an adequate comparison between the two
decision-makers, we find the different outcomes of the two
incidents unpersuasive. This is especially so in light of both the
lack of clarity as to the facts of the prior confrontation and
uncontradicted testimony indicating that disciplinary decisions
were largely left to the discretion of each supervisor. See
Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.7 (11th
Cir.), modified on reh’g, 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998).
Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in granting
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Transit Management.
Finally, Forrest asserts that he was not convicted of any
criminal offense for his altercation with Stallings and that
Transit Management did not perform a thorough investigation,
instead basing their decision on assumptions and stereotypes.
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However, at trial, Forrest presented no evidence regarding his
altercation, as none of the individuals who testified actually
witnessed the incident or were involved in the subsequent
investigation. Therefore, we find Forrest’s claim is without
merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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