Meredith v. Honeywell International, Inc. , 245 F. App'x 325 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2051
WILLIAM G. MEREDITH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
OAKLEY TANK LINES, INCORPORATED, as Subrogee
of William G. Meredith,
Petitioner,
versus
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:06-cv-00148-HEH)
Submitted: August 6, 2007 Decided: August 23, 2007
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David L. Epperly, Jr., EPPERLY & FOLLIS, P.C., Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. John D. Epps, Alexandra B. Cunningham, HUNTON &
WILLIAMS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
William G. Meredith appeals the district court’s
dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), of his personal
injury tort action against Honeywell International, Inc.
(“Honeywell”), on the ground that the action was barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act,
Code § 65.2-100 et seq. (the “Act”).1 The district court ruled
that at the time of his injury, Meredith was a statutory employee
of Honeywell and, therefore, his sole right and remedy was under
the Act. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The material facts of this case are undisputed.
Honeywell is in the business of manufacturing various products,
1
Section 65.2-302(A) of the Act provides:
When any person (referred to in this section
as “owner”) undertakes to perform or execute
any work which is part of his trade, business
or occupation and contracts with any other
person (referred to in this section as
“subcontractor”) for the execution or
performance by or under such subcontractor of
the whole or any part of the work undertaken
by such owner, the owner shall be liable to
pay to any worker employed in the work any
compensation under this title which he would
have been liable to pay if the worker had been
immediately employed by him [thus rendering
the worker a “statutory employee” of the
owner].
The Act excludes all other rights and remedies of such employees,
at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury. See Va.
Code Ann. § 65.2-307.
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chemicals, and materials, including caprolactam2 which is
transported from Honeywell’s Hopewell, Virginia plant to its Irmo,
South Carolina plant. Honeywell contracted with Oakley Tank
Services (“Oakley”), other independent companies, and had its own
drivers hauling caprolactam between plants. Specifically,
Honeywell contracted with Oakley to transport caprolactam from its
Hopewell plant to its Irmo plant, and then to return to the
Hopewell plant, occasionally carrying a load of “wash water” from
which Hopewell would recover additional caprolactam. Both
Honeywell drivers and contracted drivers followed the same
procedures when loading caprolactam from the Honeywell plant. A
driver parked his truck at a loading station, placed his keys in a
lock box, and provided paperwork to a Honeywell control operator
located in a control room. The driver could then wait in the
control room while the control operator loaded the truck with
caprolactam. Upon loading the truck and providing the driver with
completed documentation, the control operator would unlock the lock
box, allowing the driver to retrieve his keys and drive the truck
out of the plant. Meredith was a truck driver employed by Oakley
and, at the time of his accident, was working the run to transport
caprolactam from the Honeywell Hopewell plant to its Irmo plant.
Meredith followed the above-outlined procedure and, after
2
Caprolactam is a chemical intermediate used by Honeywell in
the manufacture of nylon.
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presenting his paperwork to the control operator, sat in a chair in
the Hopewell plant control room which collapsed beneath him,
resulting in his alleged injuries.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
erred in dismissing Meredith’s case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), based on its holding that Honeywell was Meredith’s
statutory employer. In support of his position, Meredith asserts
that: (1) he was not engaged in Honeywell’s trade, business, or
occupation; (2) he was an independent contractor; and (3) Honeywell
was not his statutory employer under the normal work test.
We find that the district court correctly held that
Meredith’s action was barred by the Act. It is undisputed that the
transportation of the caprolactam between Honeywell’s Hopewell and
Irmo plants was an essential part of the work that Honeywell
performed in the manufacture and processing of caprolactam.
Meredith’s job was to effect that transportation. At the time of
his injury, his truck was being unloaded and prepared for the
return trip, he had just presented required documentation to the
control operator, and then attempted to sit in the chair located in
the control room. The district court found that neither the act of
sitting,3 nor the fact that Meredith was not responsible for the
3
We note that it was an essential part of the entire process
of hauling the material that the driver complete his paperwork and
wait while his tanker truck was filled with caprolactam. While
Meredith contends that he ceased being Honeywell’s statutory
(continued...)
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actual unloading of the product,4 removed Meredith’s activity from
the trade, business, or occupation of Honeywell, and we agree.
Moreover, as the district court held, the operative factual
distinctions regarding the relationship between premises owner and
contractor for purposes of the applicability of the Act are whether
the transportation was intra-company, or between two separate
companies, with the former properly being held to be part of the
owner’s trade, business or occupation,5 and whether the product
delivered was independently manufactured, with such products being
3
(...continued)
employee while his truck was being refilled from the time he
presented his paperwork until the time he fell, he has offered no
case law to support such a proposition. Indeed, the contention
that Meredith ceased to be a statutory employee of Honeywell while
he was awaiting the filling of his truck is as frivolous as would
be a contention that he ceased being a statutory employee had he
been injured while stopping to catch his breath on his way to
submitting his paperwork, or during the time he was exiting his
truck after pulling into the Hopewell facility. The law does not
provide for such piecemeal differentiation, and we decline to
impose it in this case.
4
Citing Conlin v. Turner’s Express, Inc., 331 S.E.2d 453, 455
(Va. 1985) (whether driver assisted in the loading operation not
relevant to the determination of whether the contractor was engaged
in the manufacturer’s trade, business, or occupation).
5
Conlin, 331 S.E.2d at 455 (transportation of machinery and
parts between two plants was an “essential element” of the business
and thus the contractor’s activities were part of the “trade,
business or occupation” of the premises owner); Bowling v. Wellmore
Coal Corp., 114 F.3d 458, 461 (4th Cir. 1997) (transportation of
product between owner’s premises and its processing facility held
to be “an essential and integral part of its business”); Smith v.
Horn, 351 S.E.2d 14, 17 (Va. 1986) (transportation of product
between owner’s premises and its processing facility was part of
the contractor’s “trade, business or occupation”).
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held not to be within the defendant’s trade, business or
occupation.6 Here, the transportation of caprolactam from
Honeywell’s Hopewell plant to its Irmo plant, where the chemical
was processed and used to manufacture nylon, was an integral part
of Honeywell’s “trade, business or occupation” under the plain
language of Va. Code § 65.2-302(A). Plus, Meredith was not merely
delivering an independently manufactured product to a job site.
Rather, he was transporting material manufactured by Honeywell
between Honeywell’s manufacturing plants, which was, as the
district court held, an essential part of Honeywell’s business.
Nor does the fact that Honeywell had a contract with
Oakley the terms of which provided that Oakley was an independent
contractor, that neither Oakley nor its employees would be
considered Honeywell employees, and that Oakley would obtain
workers’ compensation insurance for its employees, alter the legal
obligations of the respective parties under the Act. As properly
6
The Virginia Supreme Court consistently has held that there
is no statutory employer/employee relationship where the injured
independent contractor was delivering a third-party’s or the
contractor’s own materials to the job site. See, e.g., Rice v. VVP
America, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Va. 2001); Crocker v.
Riverside Brick & Supply Co., 639 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 2007); Stevens v.
Ford Motor Co., 309 S.E.2d 319 (Va. 1983); Burroughs v. Walmont,
Inc., 168 S.E.2d 107 (Va. 1969); Buffalo Shook Co. v. Barksdale,
141 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 1965). See also Clean Sweep Prof’l Parking Lot
Maint., Inc., 591 S.E.2d 79, 83 (Va. 2004) (truck driver employed
by trucking company to deliver asphalt between defendant’s asphalt
plant and its worksite, injured at worksite, was engaged in
essential part of defendant’s work, distinguishing the case from
those where trucking company was “merely delivering its own
independently manufactured parts.”).
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noted by the district court, the Act explicitly provides that “no
contract or agreement, written or implied, . . . shall in any
manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any
obligation created by this title.” Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-300(A).
Thus, the contract does not protect Honeywell from its obligations
as a statutory employer under the Act, nor does it provide Meredith
with a loophole through which he can circumvent the exclusivity
provisions of the Act.
Finally, Meredith’s assertion that Honeywell was not his
statutory employer under the “normal work test” espoused by the
Virginia Supreme Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 187 S.E.2d
162, 167 (Va. 1972), is likewise without merit. While Honeywell
does not presently use its direct employees to transport
caprolactam along the precise interstate route followed by
Meredith, their drivers transport the same chemical, in the same
manner, using the same procedures and equipment, for the same
purpose, between the Hopewell plant and other Honeywell fiber
plants in Virginia. We find no error in the district court’s
conclusion that there is no legal distinction between the fact that
Meredith transported the caprolactam across state lines, and that
the Honeywell drivers transported the substance within Virginia.
The facts of this case establish that Honeywell was
Meredith’s statutory employer, and accordingly, his sole remedy was
under the Act. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal
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of Meredith’s tort action against Honeywell for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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