United States v. Webster ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES WILLIE WEBSTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (2:03-CR-00218)
Submitted: August 8, 2007 Decided: August 24, 2007
Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John G. Hackney, Jr., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Monica K. Schwartz,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Willie Webster pled guilty to one count of
firearm possession, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2000). The district court found Webster was subject to
a 180-month mandatory minimum sentence as an armed career criminal.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000). The court sentenced Webster to
188 months’ imprisonment, remarking this was a “terribly long
sentence” but noting it was the shortest allowable sentence under
the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. We affirmed Webster’s
conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded to the district
court for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005).* See United States v. Webster, 198 F. App’x 334
(4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
On remand, the district court sentenced Webster to the
statutory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment. Webster appealed,
and his counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending there are no meritorious issues for
*
We vacated Webster’s sentence because the record provided a
nonspeculative basis for concluding the district court’s mandatory
treatment of the sentencing guidelines affected its selection of
the sentence imposed. See United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 668 (2005). Therefore, we
remanded for resentencing pursuant to Booker and White. We found
the district court did not commit Sixth Amendment error under
Booker, however, and we upheld Webster’s armed career criminal
designation. Pursuant to the mandate rule, the district court
appropriately declined to permit relitigation of sentencing
guidelines calculations on remand. See United States v. Bell, 5
F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993).
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appeal but asserting the length of the sentence violated his
client’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment in light of Webster’s advanced age and myriad medical
conditions. The Government avers the district court lacked
discretion to sentence Webster below the mandatory statutory
minimum penalty. Webster did not file a pro se supplemental brief,
despite being notified of his right to do so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Booker “did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot
depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence” except upon
the Government’s motion on the basis of substantial assistance.
United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 288 (2005). The district court appropriately
declined to sentence Webster below the mandatory minimum despite
considering Webster’s age and medical issues. See Robinson, 404
F.3d at 862 (stating 193-year sentence on remand “may seem
manifestly unjust given Robinson’s age and well-documented
intellectual limitations, [but] it is the result mandated by
Congress.”). Webster’s Eighth Amendment claim necessarily fails,
as proportionality review is unavailable “for any sentence less
than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” United
States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2001).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
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therefore affirm Webster’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Webster, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Webster requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Webster.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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