United States v. Mitre , 209 F. App'x 249 ( 2006 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5008
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    BRICEIDA MITRE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, District
    Judge. (CR-03-327)
    Submitted:   June 30, 2006                 Decided:   December 8, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John D. Brosnan, WATERS & WISE, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for
    Appellant.   Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Kevin R.
    Gingras, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Briceida     Mitre     appeals      the     sentence     imposed    on
    resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one
    kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),
    846 (2000), and conspiracy to import one kilogram or more of
    heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 952
    (a), 963 (2000).              Mitre was
    sentenced to 120 months in prison.            She timely appealed.
    In    her   first    direct    appeal,      Mitre   challenged     her
    conviction on three bases, including that the district court’s
    supplemental jury instruction in response to a question from the
    jury was plain error.        During its deliberation, the jury asked the
    court whether they had to find the drug quantity attributable only
    to Mitre or to the conspiracy as a whole.            The court instructed the
    jury that it “should determine what the Government has proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt that relates to the conspiracy.”                     At
    trial,   Mitre   did   not     object    to   the    instruction.     The     jury
    thereafter convicted Mitre of one kilogram or more on both counts.
    Mitre argued in her first appeal that the instruction
    failed to inform the jury that she could only be held responsible
    for the drug quantities of the other conspirators if they were
    reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.                  The
    panel, relying on United States v. Collins, 
    401 F.3d 212
    , 220 (4th
    Cir. 2005) (Collins I), held that the district court’s instruction
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    did not violate Mitre’s substantial rights and therefore she did
    not demonstrate plain error. However, because the panel found that
    her   sentence   violated    Booker,      the   case   was   remanded   for
    resentencing.    Mitre filed a petition for rehearing, which was
    denied.   Seven days before the mandate issued in Mitre’s case, the
    court, on petition for rehearing, reversed Collins I and issued a
    new opinion in United States v. Collins, 
    415 F.3d 304
     (4th Cir.
    2005) (Collins II).   Collins II reversed the prior panel decision
    holding that any error in the supplemental jury instruction was
    harmless and held that the improper jury instruction invalidated
    the quantity of drugs determined at trial and the conviction could
    only be upheld on a finding of a default quantity of drugs.
    Collins II, 
    415 F.3d at 311-15
    .
    At Mitre’s resentencing hearing, Mitre’s counsel argued
    that the mandate rule should not apply and the district court
    should apply Collins II when determining the amount of drugs
    attributable to Mitre.      Because the district court’s supplemental
    instruction was error, Mitre contended that, under Collins II, she
    should be sentenced using a default, lowest level, drug amount.
    The district court held that it was only permitted to reconsider
    the sentence in light of this court’s mandate with regard to Booker
    error. The district court therefore sentenced Mitre to the minimum
    statutory sentence under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).            The
    court did not make additional or renewed findings on drug quantity.
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    Therefore the 4.5 kilograms originally found by the district court
    as attributable to Mitre was still valid.
    Mitre argues that the district court violated her Sixth
    Amendment rights when it sentenced her based on drug quantity not
    found by a jury due to the erroneous jury instruction.         She
    contends that she should have been sentenced based on a default
    drug quantity, as outlined in Collins II.     She claims that the
    court should have imposed a sentence consistent with the default
    quantity under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2000) (penalty provisions found at
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    ) after considering the advisory guideline range.
    Mitre, however, bases her argument on the default, or lowest drug
    amounts found in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (2003).
    She claims that under USSG § 2D1.1, for less than five grams of
    heroin attributable and her established criminal history category
    of I, the advisory sentencing guidelines range would be 10-16
    months of imprisonment.
    The mandate rule is a “‘specific application of the law
    of the case doctrine.’”   United States v. Bell, 
    5 F.3d 64
    , 66 (4th
    Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 
    988 F.2d 247
    , 251 (1st
    Cir. 1993)).   Generally, “‘the doctrine [of the law of the case]
    posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision
    should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in
    the same case.’”   United States v. Aramony, 
    166 F.3d 655
    , 661 (4th
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    Cir. 1999) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
    
    486 U.S. 800
    , 815-16 (1988)).   The law of the case must be applied:
    “in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the
    trial court or on a later appeal . . . unless: (1) a
    subsequent   trial  produces  substantially  different
    evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a
    contrary decision of law applicable to the issue, or
    (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
    work manifest injustice.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 
    845 F.2d 66
    , 69 (4th
    Cir. 1988)); see S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn. v. Riese, 
    356 F.3d 576
    , 583 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing “mandate rule, which has been
    characterized as a more powerful version of the law of the case
    doctrine”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We conclude that the mandate rule applies because there
    is no exception to bar its application.     Although, in upholding
    Mitre’s conviction in her first direct appeal, we cited Collins I
    for the proposition that the error complained of did not affect
    Mitre’s substantial rights, the reversal of the Collins case in no
    way affects the controlling authority governing Mitre’s case.
    Collins involved harmless error review, while Mitre involves plain
    error review.
    The different requirements for harmless error and plain
    error make it clear that the outcome in Collins II does not dictate
    the outcome of Mitre.    The fact that the Government in Collins
    failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
    of was not substantial does not compel the conclusion that Mitre
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    met her burden of proof in showing that a similar error was
    substantial.   And, even if it did, plain error review further
    requires the court to find that the error “seriously affect[ed] the
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
    United States v. Carr, 
    303 F.3d 539
    , 543 (4th Cir. 2002).   That is
    not the case here where the defendant has been found responsible
    for 4.5 kilograms of heroin and even remand for resentencing to the
    statutory default would yield a sentence between zero and twenty
    years, a range consistent with the defendant’s existing sentence of
    ten years. We therefore conclude that the mandate rule applies and
    even if it did not, Mitre cannot demonstrate plain error resulting
    from an erroneous jury instruction under Collins.
    Even if the mandate rule did not apply, and the district
    court had considered Collins II, there is no Sixth Amendment error
    in Mitre’s sentence. The statutory penalty provisions of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C) (2000) would have been applicable because the
    default drug amount would be less than 100 grams of heroin.    The
    statutory range would then be zero to twenty years of imprisonment.
    As noted above, Mitre’s ten-year sentence falls within that range.
    On resentencing, the district court believed that it was
    bound by the jury verdict of one kilogram of heroin in determining
    the statutory sentencing range.       That range, under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(i) is a minimum of ten years and maximum of life
    imprisonment. Even if the district court mistakenly concluded that
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    it   was     operating   under    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(i),    such   a
    conclusion would not be reversible error.                 The guideline range,
    based on a drug quantity of 4.5 kilograms of heroin, was 151-188
    months of imprisonment--a range above the sentence imposed.*
    We therefore affirm Mitre’s sentence.           We dispense with
    oral       argument   because    the   facts    and    legal   contentions   are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    *
    We note that Mitre’s argument that the court is bound by the
    default level of quantity found in the sentencing guidelines is
    faulty. After Booker, the district court may still determine the
    amount of drugs attributable to the defendant, which may be above
    the amount authorized by the jury verdict. However, the guideline
    range based on that drug quantity is advisory.
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