DeMarco v. University of North Carolina , 21 F. App'x 131 ( 2001 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SALVATORE DEMARCO,                    
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    through its Board of Governors;
    EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY, the                   No. 00-2440
    Department of Communications,
    Science and Disorders; RICHARD R.
    EAKINS, Chancellor; JAMES HALLOCK,
    Vice Chancellor; MICHAEL
    RASTATTER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.
    Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.
    (CA-99-62-4-H)
    Submitted: September 20, 2001
    Decided: October 19, 2001
    Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Janet I. Pueschel, PUESCHEL & ASSOCIATES, Raleigh, North Car-
    olina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General,
    2               DEMARCO v. UNIV.   OF   NORTH CAROLINA
    Sylvia Thibaut, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina,
    for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Salvatore DeMarco appeals the dismissal on res judicata grounds
    of his federal claims arising out of his termination from employment
    as a professor at East Carolina University. DeMarco’s federal action
    alleged due process violations under the United States and North Car-
    olina constitutions, wrongful termination under Title I of the Ameri-
    cans with Disabilities Act and North Carolina law, negligent and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of his First
    Amendment rights to free speech and association.
    DeMarco received written notification from Chancellor Richard
    Eakins that he was suspended from his position and Eakins intended
    to permanently discharge him. DeMarco challenged his discharge
    through the available state administrative proceedings. After exhaust-
    ing his administrative remedies, DeMarco petitioned the Wake
    County, North Carolina Superior Court for review. In his petition
    before the North Carolina court, DeMarco alleged due process viola-
    tions under both the United States and North Carolina constitutions,
    discrimination based on his disability, the decision to terminate his
    employment was arbitrary and capricious, and other errors of law.
    The North Carolina court affirmed the final agency decision and dis-
    missed DeMarco’s petition with prejudice on December 23, 1999.
    The state court found "no violation of any constitutional or statutory
    right of the Petitioner."
    DeMarco filed his suit in federal court on May 14, 1999. On
    motion by the Defendants, the district court dismissed DeMarco’s suit
    DEMARCO v. UNIV.   OF   NORTH CAROLINA                3
    as barred by the doctrine of res judicata on October 11, 2000. Federal
    courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgements where the
    state courts would do so. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1738
     (1994). Since North Caro-
    lina law would bar any further action by DeMarco, the full faith and
    credit doctrine precludes federal adjudication of his federal suit. See
    Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
    465 U.S. 75
    , 81 (1984);
    Rao v. County of Fairfax, 
    108 F.3d 42
    , 44 (4th Cir. 1997). Our review
    of the pleadings in the state case and the state court’s decision con-
    firms that the issues raised in the federal suit were adjudicated in the
    state suit. Keith v. Aldridge, 
    900 F.2d 736
    , 739 (4th Cir. 1990). We
    also find that all of DeMarco’s causes of action arise from the same
    transaction. See Meekins v. United States Transportation Union, 
    946 F.2d 1054
    , 1058 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the district court prop-
    erly concluded that DeMarco’s federal actions were barred under the
    doctrine of res judicata.
    For the first time on appeal, DeMarco challenges the veracity of
    unsworn testimony offered at his administrative hearing. This court
    will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in
    exceptional circumstances. See Grossman v. Commr., 
    182 F.3d 275
    ,
    280-81 (4th Cir. 1999); Hormel v. Helvering, 
    312 U.S. 552
    , 556
    (1941). Because no exceptional circumstances exist in this case, we
    decline to consider this claim.
    We affirm the district court’s finding that DeMarco’s federal suit
    is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We dispense with oral argu-
    ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED