United States v. Boyd , 209 F. App'x 285 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5034
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ERIK LAMONT BOYD, a/k/a Erik Boyd,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 05-5035
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    DEMETRIUS ALVIN BOYD, a/k/a Demetrius Boyd,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 05-5047
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ANTHONY DEWAYNE GILLIS, a/k/a Toney Gillis,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 05-5048
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    LIONEL   CORNELIUS   JOHNSON,      a/k/a     Leonel
    Johnson,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (CR-05-98-HEH)
    Submitted:   October 6, 2006                 Decided:   December 8, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    J. Paul Gregorio, INNSBROOK LAW GROUP, P.C., Glen Allen, Virginia,
    for Appellant Anthony D. Gillis; Claire G. Cardwell, STONE &
    CARDWELL, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Lionel C.
    Johnson; Robert J. Wagner, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Erik L. Boyd; Dennis M. Martin,
    BROWN MARTIN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Demetrius A.
    Boyd.   Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, John S. Davis,
    2
    Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    3
    PER CURIAM:
    Erik Boyd, Demetrius Boyd, Anthony Gillis, and Lionel Johnson
    (collectively, Defendants) appeal their convictions and sentences
    for various drug and firearm crimes.             For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    I.
    Gillis, his brothers Erik Boyd and Demetrius Boyd, and his
    friend   Johnson   were   involved    in     a    crack   cocaine     trafficking
    conspiracy    between   1998   and   2004.        At   trial,   the   Government
    presented testimony from several witnesses who were customers of
    the Defendants.
    One of the early customers was Robin Williams.                 She had been
    a neighbor of Gillis and his brothers, and she bought crack cocaine
    from Demetrius Boyd three or four times per month for a four to six
    month period.      She also bought crack cocaine from Gillis and
    Johnson.
    Edward Roy was a regular customer of the Defendants.                    Roy
    bought crack cocaine from Johnson three or four times a week for
    several months.    For a period of about eighteen months, Roy bought
    crack cocaine from Gillis.           Demetrius Boyd and Erik Boyd were
    present for a few of these transactions.               Roy also bought crack
    cocaine from the Boyds between five to seven times.                   Roy traded
    4
    silverware, a television, a VCR, paintings, and tools to Gillis for
    crack cocaine.
    The    Defendants’   other   customers    who   testified   at   trial
    included Mark Holmes, who bought crack cocaine from each of the
    Defendants; Calvin Johnson, who bought crack cocaine from Gillis,
    Erik Boyd, and Johnson; and Anthony Johnson, who bought crack
    cocaine from Gillis and Lionel Johnson.
    According to Gillis’s estranged wife, Doris (Thompson) Gillis,
    Gillis sold crack cocaine from their home.              On four or five
    occasions, Johnson brought “eight balls” of crack cocaine to
    Gillis.     Johnson also helped Gillis cut and bag crack cocaine on
    the kitchen table.     Doris Gillis testified that her husband had
    between 13 to 15 customers.
    Gillis frequently traded crack cocaine for his customers’
    firearms.     In crack-cocaine-for-firearms exchanges, he obtained
    four shotguns and a rifle from Edward Roy, and a semiautomatic
    rifle from Steve Parker.          Gillis then took these firearms to
    Washington, D.C., where he engaged in a reverse transaction -- a
    firearms-for-crack-cocaine exchange -- to obtain supplies of crack
    cocaine.    Gillis also purchased firearms outright to use them in
    firearms-for-crack-cocaine exchanges to obtain supplies of crack
    cocaine.     On two occasions, Gillis purchased firearms from pawn
    shops and then told Doris Gillis that he was taking the firearms to
    D.C. to trade for crack cocaine.         On another occasion, Gillis had
    5
    his girlfriend purchase a firearm for him to take to the D.C. area
    to trade for crack cocaine.     Each time Gillis returned with crack
    cocaine.
    The crack cocaine trafficking conspiracy unraveled on January
    17, 2004, when Gillis and Johnson went to the home of Eugene and
    Brenda Thompson -- the parents of Doris Gillis -- to leave a
    package of drugs and guns for Erik Boyd to pick up later.         As
    Lionel Johnson sat behind the driver’s seat of a blue Escort,
    Anthony Gillis went to the back door of the home and told the
    Thompson’s other daughter, April Garriques, that he was leaving the
    package under her mom’s car and that Erik Boyd would be by later
    that day to retrieve it.     When April Garriques went out later to
    inspect what Gillis had left under the car, she saw guns and drugs
    in a white trash bag.    April Garriques called her sister Doris, who
    in turn called the police.     Deputy Danny Marks, a deputy with the
    Essex County (Virginia) sheriff’s department, arrived thereafter
    with Doris Gillis. Deputy Marks photographed the bag and then took
    it to the sheriff’s office, where he observed an investigator
    remove crack cocaine, a semiautomatic rifle, a shotgun, a sawed off
    shotgun, and a pistol.
    Later that day, Erik Boyd, Demetrius Boyd, and Johnson arrived
    at the Thompson’s home.    Erik Boyd went in the house to ask Eugene
    Thompson if there was a package left for him by Gillis, and Eugene
    Thompson answered in the negative.     Erik and Demetrius Boyd then
    6
    searched the house and surrounding property for the package. April
    Garriques heard Demetrius Boyd talking on a cell phone, saying
    “[t]he stuff’s not here.    Where is the stuff?”         (J.A. at 165.)
    On June 1, 2005, the Defendants were jointly indicted in the
    Eastern District of Virginia on a total of eighteen drug and
    firearm-related counts.    All of the Defendants were charged with
    involvement in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine (count 1),
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 846
     (West 1999), and with conspiracy
    to use and carry firearms during and in relation to a drug
    trafficking   offense   (count   16),   in   violation    of   
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c) (West 2000).       Gillis and Johnson were charged with
    possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (count 2), in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a)(1) (West 1999); with possessing
    certain firearms in furtherance of the crack cocaine distribution
    conspiracy (count 14), in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c); and
    with possession of an unregistered sawed off shotgun (count 15), in
    violation of 
    26 U.S.C.A. § 5861
    (d) (West 2002).             Erik Boyd and
    Demetrius Boyd were charged with attempted possession of crack
    cocaine (count 3), in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 846
    .           Gillis was
    also charged with making false statements in connection with a
    firearms purchase (counts 4, 7, 10), in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 922
    (a)(6) (West 2000); with making a false statement to a
    firearms dealer (counts 5, 8, 11), in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (a)(1)(A); and with possessing certain firearms in furtherance
    7
    of the crack cocaine distribution conspiracy (counts 6, 9, 12, 13,
    17, 18), in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 924(c).
    At the conclusion of the Government’s case-in-chief, the
    Defendants filed motions under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
    Criminal   Procedure   for   judgments   of   acquittal   based   on   the
    sufficiency of the evidence.       The district court denied these
    motions.
    The jury returned a guilty verdict convicting Gillis on counts
    1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18; Johnson on counts 1 and
    2; and Erik Boyd and Demetrius Boyd on count 1.           The jury found
    Gillis not guilty on counts 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16; Johnson not
    guilty on counts 14, 15, and 16; and Erik Boyd and Demetrius Boyd
    not guilty on counts 3 and 16.    The district court sentenced Gillis
    to 1748 months’ imprisonment, Johnson to 140 months’ imprisonment,
    Erik Boyd to 38 months’ imprisonment, and Demetrius Boyd to 90
    months’ imprisonment.    The Defendants timely noticed appeals.
    II.
    “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a [Rule 29]
    motion . . . for a judgment of acquittal.”      United States v. Smith,
    
    451 F.3d 209
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2006).       In evaluating the sufficiency
    of the evidence, we keep in mind that “a jury verdict ‘must be
    sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
    favorable to the Government, to support it.’”         United States v.
    8
    Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Glasser
    v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942)).     In the context of a
    criminal trial, “substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
    finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support
    a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id.
       Finally, “we must remain cognizant of the fact that the jury,
    not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and
    resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the
    evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury
    decides which interpretation to believe.”   
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Demetrius Boyd, Eric Boyd, and Lionel Johnson argue that the
    evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for being
    part of the crack cocaine distribution conspiracy because much of
    the evidence came from witnesses, such as felons and drug users,
    who   were not credible or reliable.   This argument fails because
    “[w]e do not review the credibility of the witnesses when we
    evaluate whether there existed sufficient evidence to support a
    conviction.”   United States v. Wilson, 
    115 F.3d 1185
    , 1190 (4th
    Cir. 1997). Moreover, the “uncorroborated testimony of one witness
    . . . may be sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .”   
    Id.
    Gillis contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
    his convictions for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking crime (counts 6, 9, 13) because, although witnesses
    9
    testified that Gillis possessed firearms with the expressed intent
    to take them to Washington, D.C. to trade them for crack cocaine,
    no evidence was introduced showing that Gillis actually took the
    firearms to D.C. and traded them for crack cocaine.              This argument
    is without merit.     Gillis was charged with possessing firearms “in
    furtherance   of     [a   drug      trafficking    crime],”      
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c)(1), with the predicate drug trafficking crime being the
    overarching crack cocaine distribution conspiracy. Gillis does not
    dispute that he possessed the firearms identified in these counts;
    rather, he contends that the evidence does not show that he
    possessed   the    firearms   “in    order   to   promote   or    advance   the
    conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.”           (Appellants’ Br. at 48,
    49.)   To sustain a conviction under § 924(c)(1) for possession of
    a firearm, the Government must present “evidence indicating that
    the possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward
    a drug trafficking crime.”       United States v. Lomax, 
    293 F.3d 701
    ,
    705 (4th Cir. 2002).      Here, the Government presented such evidence
    through the testimony of Gillis’s wife and girlfriend, which showed
    that Gillis possessed the firearms with the intent to take them to
    D.C. to trade them for crack cocaine and that he did, in fact,
    return with crack cocaine.          The evidence therefore showed that
    Gillis possessed the firearms in furtherance of the crack cocaine
    distribution conspiracy.
    10
    Gillis also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support    his   conviction          on    count   12     –-   possession       of   a   CZ
    semiautomatic         pistol    in        furtherance     of      the   crack    cocaine
    distribution conspiracy –- because there was no evidence that
    Gillis ever possessed the pistol.                   We disagree.           The evidence
    showed that Gillis signed the purchase form for the pistol, and the
    pistol was found three months later in a car driven by Gillis’s co-
    conspirator Demetrius Boyd.                 Based on this evidence, the jury
    reasonably could have concluded that Gillis possessed the pistol
    because he signed the purchase form and the pistol ended up in his
    co-conspirator’s possession.
    Relatedly, Gillis contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to support his convictions on counts 17 and 18 for possessing
    firearms    in    furtherance         of     the   crack       cocaine     distribution
    conspiracy because the firearms in those counts were obtained in
    Gillis’s    crack-cocaine-for-firearms                  trades,     and,    other    than
    receiving the firearms as payment for crack cocaine, there is no
    evidence showing that the firearms were possessed by Gillis in
    furtherance      of    the     conspiracy.         We    conclude       that    accepting
    possession of firearms as payment for crack cocaine is possession
    in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.                     Gillis’s willingness
    to accept possession of firearms as payment for crack cocaine
    furthered and advanced the conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine
    because it facilitated transactions that might not have otherwise
    11
    occurred.   See Lomax, 
    293 F.3d at 705
    ; see also United States v.
    Frederick, 
    406 F.3d 754
    , 764 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] defendant’s
    willingness to accept possession of a gun as consideration for some
    drugs he wishes to sell does promote or facilitate that illegal
    sale.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Gillis contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict
    him on count 15 –- possession of a sawed off shotgun —- because the
    jury acquitted him on count 14, which charged him with possessing
    certain firearms, including the sawed off shotgun, in furtherance
    of the crack cocaine distribution conspiracy.        Again, we disagree.
    Assuming there was an inconsistency in the jury’s verdict, “a
    defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is
    inconsistent with a jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count.”
    United States v. Thomas, 
    900 F.2d 37
    , 40 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
    United States v. Powell, 
    469 U.S. 57
     (1984)). Moreover, Edward Roy
    testified that he traded the shotgun to Gillis for drugs, and
    Gillis’s girlfriend testified that she saw the shotgun around the
    same time that Gillis had traded crack cocaine for other firearms.
    Finally,   we   reject   Gillis’s   remaining   challenges   to   his
    firearm convictions. These challenges center on the credibility or
    inconsistency of the Government’s witnesses, but the jury weighed
    the credibility of the witnesses and resolved the inconsistencies
    in testimony adversely to Gillis.        Burgos, 
    94 F.3d at 862
     (“[T]he
    jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the
    12
    evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and
    if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the
    jury decides which interpretation to believe.” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    III.
    Demetrius Boyd also contends that the district court abused
    its discretion by introducing evidence under Rule 404(b) of the
    Federal Rules of Evidence about two prior arrests of Boyd, in which
    firearms, and at one of those arrests drugs, were found in his car.
    Evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rule 404(b) if the
    evidence is (1) relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s
    character, (2) necessary to prove an element of the crime charged,
    and (3) reliable.   United States v. Queen, 
    132 F.3d 991
    , 997 (4th
    Cir. 1997).   If the prior act evidence meets these criteria, it may
    be admitted unless its probative value is “substantially outweighed
    by confusion or unfair prejudice.”     
    Id.
    We conclude that the district court properly admitted evidence
    of Demetrius Boyd’s prior arrests. Demetrius Boyd was charged with
    conspiracy to distribute drugs and with conspiracy to use and carry
    firearms in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. The district court
    correctly concluded that possession of drugs and firearms “directly
    link[ed] him with the conspiratorial design and the unlawful
    confederation . . . .”   (J.A. at 139F.)
    13
    IV.
    Johnson and Eric Boyd appeal their sentences of 140 months’
    imprisonment      and    38   months’   imprisonment,        respectively.         The
    Defendants were sentenced after the Supreme Court’s decision in
    United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), and the district
    court recognized that the sentencing guidelines were advisory only.
    A.
    Johnson contends that the district court violated his Sixth
    Amendment rights because the district court calculated Johnson’s
    advisory sentencing guideline range after finding him responsible
    for distributing 49 grams of crack cocaine, even though the jury
    did not find him responsible for a particular amount but found him
    responsible      for    distributing    between   5     to    49   grams    of    crack
    cocaine.       This argument is without merit.               In United States v.
    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
     (4th Cir. 2005), we directed district courts
    to proceed under Booker’s remedial scheme by calculating the
    advisory guideline range after making the appropriate findings of
    fact.    
    Id. at 546
    .      Therefore, the district court did not violate
    Johnson’s Sixth Amendment rights by determining the drug quantity
    attributable to him.          See United States v. Morris, 
    429 F.3d 65
    , 72
    (4th    Cir.   2005)    (“The    remedial     portion    of    Booker      held   that
    decisions about sentencing factors will continue to be made by
    judges, on the preponderance of the evidence, an approach that
    14
    comports with the [S]ixth [A]mendment . . . .” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).   We therefore affirm Johnson’s sentence.
    B.
    Erik   Boyd   contends   that    the   district    court   erred   in
    determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him for purposes
    of calculating the advisory sentencing guideline range.         We review
    the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
    conclusions de novo.    United States v. Allen, 
    446 F.3d 522
    , 527
    (4th Cir. 2006).
    Erik Boyd’s Presentence Report (PSR) determined that he was
    responsible for distributing 1.6 grams of crack cocaine, based on
    the trial testimony of Calvin Johnson, Mark Holmes, and Edward Roy.
    The PSR calculated the total amount by adding together Erik Boyd’s
    sales to Calvin Johnson (1 purchase of .20 grams), Mark Holmes (2
    purchases of .20 grams), and Edward Roy (5 purchases of .20 grams).
    Erik Boyd objected to the PSR’s calculations, contending that
    Edward Roy was not a credible witness.      Erik Boyd noted that Edward
    Roy had testified at the preliminary hearing that he bought crack
    cocaine from Erik Boyd only “once or twice.”           The district court
    overruled Erik Boyd’s objections to the PSR, concluding that the
    trial evidence “amply supports” a finding that he sold Edward Roy
    1 gram of crack cocaine.
    15
    The   reliability      of     Roy’s      testimony   is    a   credibility
    determination    –-   an   issue    of     fact   for   the   district   court’s
    determination.    United States v. Carter, 
    300 F.3d 415
    , 425 (4th
    Cir. 2002).     Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the
    district court clearly erred in determining that the quantity of
    drugs attributed to Erik Boyd in the PSR was supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence.*
    Eric Boyd also contends that the district court erred in
    failing to credit him with acceptance of responsibility.                 Although
    Boyd elected to go to trial, rather than plead guilty, he relies on
    an application note for the sentencing guidelines that states, “In
    rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance
    of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises
    his constitutional right to a trial.”             U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual § 3E1.1 n.2 (2004).         The application note goes further to
    explain that this occurs when the defendant is asserting and
    preserving issues “that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to
    make a constitutional challenge to a statute or to challenge the
    applicability of a statute to his conduct).”                   Id.; see United
    States v. Holt, 
    79 F.3d 14
    , 17 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
    *
    Erik Boyd does not contend that the Government must prove
    quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. (Appellant’s Br. at 101 (“The
    government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
    quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for purposes of
    sentencing.”).)
    16
    defendant “could obtain a downward adjustment for acceptance of
    responsibility, even after putting the government through its
    burden of proving its case at trial, as long as [the defendant]
    went to trial to preserve issues unrelated to factual guilt”).
    Here, Boyd’s reasons for going to trial -- that the Government
    alleged that he was responsible for more drugs than he was willing
    to admit -- is directly related to factual guilt.             The district
    court therefore properly rejected Boyd’s claim for acceptance of
    responsibility because “[u]ntil the government actually proved
    [Boyd’s] guilt, there wasn’t the slightest hint of admission on his
    part.”    (J.A. at 1249-50.)       We affirm Erik Boyd’s sentence.
    V.
    After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was
    sufficient   to    support   the    Defendants’    convictions,   that   the
    district court did not err in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence of
    Demetrius Boyd’s prior arrest, and that the district court did not
    err in sentencing Lionel Johnson and Erik Boyd.               We therefore
    affirm the Defendants’ convictions and sentences. We dispense with
    oral    argument   because   the     facts   and   legal   conclusions   are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    17