United States v. Cardenas-Rosas , 209 F. App'x 342 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5161
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    FERNANDO CARDENAS-ROSAS, a/k/a Luis Rodriguez-
    Fernandez,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
    District Judge. (CR-05-183)
    Submitted:   October 27, 2006          Decided:     December 15, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Anna
    Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Fernando       Cardenas-Rosas1     pled    guilty    to    charges     of
    obstruction of commerce by robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1951 (2000) (“Count One”); brandishing a firearm during and
    in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (“Count Two”); and theft of firearms, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (u) (2000) (“Count Three”).                         The
    district court sentenced Cardenas-Rosas to concurrent terms of 84
    months’ imprisonment on Counts One and Three and a consecutive term
    of 84 months’ imprisonment on Count Two, the statutory mandatory
    minimum for that offense.            See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1) (2000).
    Cardenas-Rosas appealed.       We affirm.
    Counsel     has    filed    a   brief     pursuant    to     Anders    v.
    California,    
    386 U.S. 738
       (1967),     contending       there    exist    no
    meritorious issues for appeal but suggesting the district court
    imposed an unreasonable sentence.            Cardenas-Rosas filed a pro se
    supplemental    brief.      The   Government        elected    not   to   file    a
    responsive brief.
    After United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a
    sentencing court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the
    sentencing guidelines.      See United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    ,
    1
    The indictment returned by the grand jury listed the name
    “Luis Rodriguez-Fernandez.”     This name is an alias used by
    Cardenas-Rosas. Upon the Government’s motion, and with the consent
    of the Appellant, the district court ordered the indictment amended
    to reflect Appellant’s true name, Fernando Cardenas-Rosas.
    - 2 -
    546 (4th Cir. 2005).     In a post-Booker sentencing, district courts
    must calculate the appropriate guideline range, consider the range
    in conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and
    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), and impose a
    sentence. United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 455-56 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).           However, “a district court
    need not explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.”
    United States v. Eura, 
    440 F.3d 625
    , 632 (4th Cir. 2006), petition
    for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. June 20, 2006) (No. 05-
    11659).     A   sentence    imposed   within     the   properly   calculated
    guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.            Green, 
    436 F.3d at 457
    ; see United States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 341-42 (4th Cir.
    2006)    (discussing   justifications     for    finding   sentence   within
    properly    calculated     advisory   guidelines       range   presumptively
    reasonable).
    On Counts One and Three, the district court sentenced
    Cardenas-Rosas toward the middle of the range of 77 to 96 months’
    imprisonment under the advisory sentencing guidelines.2            The court
    noted it was inclined to impose a sentence at the top of the range,
    given Cardenas-Rosas’ substantial prior criminal record, the nature
    of the offense, and the need for adequate deterrence.              Awarding
    Cardenas-Rosas credit for some assistance to the Government in the
    2
    Counts One and Three carried statutory maximum terms of
    twenty and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1951
    , 924(i)(1) (2000).
    - 3 -
    capture of a co-defendant, however, the district court imposed
    concurrent 84-month sentences.    Cardenas-Rosas fails to rebut the
    presumption that these sentences were reasonable.     On Count Two,
    the district court possessed no discretion to sentence below the
    statutory mandatory minimum of seven years’ imprisonment, because
    “Booker did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart
    below a statutorily provided minimum sentence.”     United States v.
    Robinson, 
    404 F.3d 850
    , 862 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 288
     (2005).
    In his pro se supplemental brief, Cardenas-Rosas mainly
    challenges the specific offense characteristic enhancements used to
    increase his sentence on Counts One and Three.3    Because Cardenas-
    Rosas did not object to these enhancements in the district court,
    this court reviews for plain error.      See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
    Four conditions must be met before we will notice plain error:
    (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain under current law;
    (3) the error must affect substantial rights, typically meaning the
    defendant is prejudiced by the error in that it affected the
    3
    Cardenas-Rosas also contends his sentence was enhanced for
    facilitating the escape of a co-defendant and his sentence was
    excessive compared to those of his co-defendants. In fact, the
    district court noted Cardenas-Rosas assisted to some degree in the
    individual’s capture and cited this assistance when sentencing
    Cardenas-Rosas to the middle of the guidelines range for the first
    and third counts.     Otherwise, the district court would have
    sentenced Cardenas-Rosas at the top of the range, in light of his
    prior record, the nature of the offense, and the need for
    deterrence.
    - 4 -
    outcome of the proceedings; and (4) the error must seriously affect
    the     fairness,    integrity,     or     public    reputation       of    judicial
    proceedings.       United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 733-37 (1993).
    Cardenas-Rosas received a two-point enhancement pursuant
    to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A)
    (2004) because the victim sustained bodily injury and a separate
    two-point        offense    level        enhancement       pursuant        to        USSG
    § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) because the victim was physically restrained to
    facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.
    Cardenas-Rosas claims he never touched the victim, a pawn shop
    teller who was forced into a back room at gun point, pushed to the
    floor, and had a towel placed in her mouth and her hands, feet, and
    mouth taped with duct tape. The record indicates Cardenas-Rosas at
    least    aided    and   abetted    this    activity;   consequently,            he   “is
    punishable as a principal.”         
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (2000).
    Cardenas-Rosas also received a one-point enhancement
    pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(6) because a firearm was taken and a
    two-point enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) because the
    amount of loss exceeded $50,000.                He claims he should not have
    received these enhancements because the items were recovered.
    “‘Loss’    means    the    value   of    the    property   taken,     damaged,         or
    destroyed.”       USSG § 2B3.1 comment. (n.3).             The record indicates
    over $50,000 worth of property was taken; similarly, the firearm
    was taken.       Therefore, these enhancements were also proper.
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    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.     We    therefore    affirm    Cardenas-Rosas’       convictions      and
    sentence.   We deny Appellant’s         motion to substitute attorney and
    counsel’s motion to withdraw.            This court requires that counsel
    inform Cardenas-Rosas, in writing, of the right to petition the
    Supreme   Court    of   the   United    States    for     further   review.      If
    Cardenas-Rosas requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
    believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move
    in this court for leave to withdraw from further representation.
    Any such motion filed by counsel must state that a copy thereof was
    served on Cardenas-Rosas.        We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before      the   court    and     argument    would    not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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