Rhoades v. Greenbriar Corp , 24 F. App'x 175 ( 2001 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SHARON J. RHOADES,                       
    Plaintiff,
    and
    GREENBRIAR CORPORATION; AMERICAN
    CARE COMMUNITIES, INCORPORATED,                  No. 01-1616
    Defendants-Appellants,
    v.
    FLOYD B. RHOADES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
    W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.
    (CA-99-669-5-BR)
    Argued: November 1, 2001
    Decided: December 26, 2001
    Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Camden Robert Webb, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & WILLIS,
    P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. James T. Johnson,
    LEWIS & ROBERTS, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
    2                   GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES
    lee. ON BRIEF: M. Keith Kapp, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & WILLIS,
    P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. James A. Roberts, III,
    LEWIS & ROBERTS, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    In this diversity case, Greenbriar Corp. (Greenbriar) brings claims
    of fraud, constructive fraud, unfair trade practices, and indemnifica-
    tion against Floyd Rhoades, its former CEO and the former majority
    shareholder of American Care Communities, Inc., a North Carolina
    corporation (American Care-NC), which was acquired by Greenbriar
    in 1996. Greenbriar alleges that Floyd Rhoades breached his fiduciary
    duties to American Care-NC and Greenbriar in connection with an
    employment agreement which he negotiated with his wife, Sharon
    Rhoades, who at the time was a minority shareholder of American
    Care-NC. The district court found that Greenbriar was clearly and
    fully informed as to the terms of Sharon Rhoades’s employment
    agreement and ratified it. Accordingly, the district court granted sum-
    mary judgment in favor of Floyd Rhoades. Finding no reversible
    error, we affirm.
    I.
    A.
    In 1992, Floyd and Sharon Rhoades married. In 1993, Floyd
    Rhoades founded American Care-NC. Floyd Rhoades owned more
    than 70% of the company’s stock and served as both president and a
    director of the company. Sharon Rhoades owned 10% of the stock of
    American Care-NC and was the company’s Vice President for Opera-
    GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES                      3
    tions, as well as a member of the company’s board of directors. Gary
    Smith was a shareholder and the only other director of American
    Care-NC.
    In 1995, the Rhoadeses began experiencing marital difficulties, and
    as a result, they separated in February 1996. Between February and
    December 1996, they considered divorce, discussed the division of
    marital property, and discussed alimony. On December 11, 1996,
    Floyd Rhoades, but not Sharon, signed one of several drafts of a Sep-
    aration Agreement and Property Settlement, but no final agreement
    was reached until November 5, 1997. In the preliminary agreement of
    December 11, Floyd Rhoades promised to provide Sharon Rhoades
    with an employment contract with American Care-NC.1 Two days
    later, Floyd Rhoades, on behalf of American Care-NC, signed an
    Employment Agreement with Sharon Rhoades which altered her
    duties and which increased her salary from $80,000 to $125,000 for
    a period of three years. Under the contract, Sharon Rhoades was to
    report only to the President of the company who, until October 1998,
    was Floyd Rhoades. Smith was not informed of the employment
    agreement, nor was it approved by American Care-NC’s Board of
    Directors.
    During December of 1996, American Care-NC and Greenbriar
    completed the final stages of negotiating a merger of the two compa-
    nies. The merger resulted in Greenbriar assuming the obligations of
    American Care-NC.2 During the merger negotiations, Greenbriar was
    not aware that the Rhoadeses had discussed Sharon Rhoades’s
    employment agreement in the context of their divorce settlement. As
    the discussion in Part II below demonstrates, however, Greenbriar
    was fully informed of all material terms of the Sharon Rhoades
    employment agreement prior to the consummation of the merger.
    1
    The final agreement between the Rhoadeses included a personal guar-
    antee of Sharon’s employment agreement by Floyd Rhoades.
    2
    The merger was accomplished by merging American Care-NC into
    wholly-owned Greenbriar subsidiary American Care Communities, Inc.,
    a Nevada corporation.
    4                    GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES
    B.
    Sharon Rhoades filed her complaint in state court against Green-
    briar Corporation and American Care Communities, Inc. and Floyd
    Rhoades on August 1, 1999. This case was removed to the district
    court based on diversity of citizenship.3 On March 28, 2001, follow-
    ing discovery, the district court, in the portion of its order relevant to
    this appeal, granted summary judgment for Sharon Rhoades on her
    claims against Floyd Rhoades and Greenbriar and dismissed all of
    Greenbriar’s crossclaims against Floyd Rhoades. The judgment made
    Floyd Rhoades and Greenbriar jointly and severally liable to Sharon
    Rhoades for $111,642.44. Greenbriar timely appealed from both the
    grant of summary judgment in Sharon Rhoades’s favor and the dis-
    missal of its counterclaims against Sharon Rhoades and crossclaims
    against Floyd Rhoades. Greenbriar and Sharon Rhoades have settled
    their dispute, and Sharon Rhoades has been dismissed as a party to
    this appeal.
    Greenbriar argues on appeal that Floyd Rhoades’s motive for exe-
    cuting the employment agreement with Sharon Rhoades was a desire
    to reduce or eliminate alimony payments; that this motive was a mate-
    rial fact which was not disclosed to American Care-NC’s board of
    directors or to Greenbriar; that the terms of the agreement were not
    effectively disclosed to Greenbriar; and that as a result, Floyd
    Rhoades did not disclose material facts which he had a fiduciary duty
    to disclose regarding the transaction. Consequently, Greenbriar argues
    that it has established the predicate for its fraud, constructive fraud,
    unfair trade practices, and indemnification claims, and it argues fur-
    ther that it cannot be deemed to have ratified the employment agree-
    ment.
    II.
    This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
    all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
    3
    Floyd Rhoades is a citizen of California; Sharon Rhoades is a citizen
    of North Carolina; Greenbriar Corp. and its American Care Communi-
    ties, Inc. subsidiary are Nevada corporations whose principal places of
    business are in Texas. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
    GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES                      5
    prevailing party. See Providence Square Assoc., L.L.C. v. G.D.F.,
    Inc., 
    211 F.3d 846
    , 850 (4th Cir. 2000). All evidence of the non-
    movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
    in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255
    (1986).
    We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law on this
    matter, and we have had the benefit of oral argument. Our careful
    review persuades us that the district court correctly granted summary
    judgment in favor of Floyd Rhoades. See Rhoades v. Greenbriar
    Corp., No. 5:99-CV-669-BR(2) (W.D.N.C. March 28, 2001) (J.A. at
    535). Greenbriar’s president, James Gilley, testified that during
    November of 1996, he agreed with Floyd Rhoades that Sharon would
    be given an employment contract and that Floyd Rhoades, who later
    became CEO of Greenbriar on December 16, 1996, told him that this
    would involve increasing her salary. Gilley also stated that he was
    aware prior to the closing of the merger that Floyd and Sharon
    Rhoades were separated due to marital difficulties. Ronald Brown,
    Greenbriar’s merger attorney, reviewed the Sharon Rhoades employ-
    ment agreement prior to the consummation of the merger and for-
    warded what he referred to as "Greenbriar’s comments" regarding the
    agreement to American Care-NC’s attorney. (J.A. at 154.). American
    Care-NC’s attorney returned a copy to Brown showing Brown’s
    changes incorporated in blackline. A draft of the agreement was faxed
    to Greenbriar’s Chief Financial Officer, Gene Bertcher, as well as to
    Brown on December 12, 1996, marked "for your review." (J.A. at
    147.). The "merger binder" prepared for the merger between Ameri-
    can Care-NC and Greenbriar included a copy of the Sharon Rhoades
    employment agreement; the facsimile transmission line on this copy
    of the employment agreement suggests it was added to the binder on
    December 27. Greenbriar admits having received a copy of the binder
    before December 31, 1996. The merger binder was delivered to Floyd
    Rhoades as CEO of Greenbriar, as well as to Brown and Bertcher. It
    is therefore clear that Greenbriar had adequate notice, verbally and in
    writing, of all material facts regarding the employment agreement in
    question and thus must be deemed to have ratified American Care-
    NC’s obligation to Sharon Rhoades.4 Under North Carolina law,
    4
    We note that from the time of the merger until February 6, 1999,
    Sharon Rhoades continued to work for Greenbriar under the terms of the
    6                   GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES
    Greenbriar’s constructive fraud, fraud, unfair trade practices, and
    indemnification claims fail, as Greenbriar bases each of these claims
    on Floyd Rhoades’s alleged nondisclosure of material facts. Accord-
    ingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Floyd
    Rhoades on the reasoning of the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    employment agreement. In terminating Rhoades during February of
    1999, Greenbriar stated that her termination was "pursuant to" the
    employment agreement at issue in this case. (J.A. at 378.) Further,
    Greenbriar performed under the contract in question for a period of
    approximately two years and continued to perform for several months
    following Floyd Rhoades’s departure from Greenbriar.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1616

Citation Numbers: 24 F. App'x 175

Judges: Niemeyer, Williams, Gregory

Filed Date: 12/26/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024