United States v. Alex White, III , 707 F. App'x 766 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4714
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEX WHITE, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District Judge. (2:15-cr-00311-RMG-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2017 Decided: September 19, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hannah Rogers Metcalfe, METCALFE & ATKINSON, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alex White, III, entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012), and was sentenced to
70 months’ imprisonment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Appellate counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court erred in
denying White’s motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle as the result of a traffic
stop and subsequent inventory search. Finding no error, we affirm.
“When a district court has denied a motion to suppress, we review the court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error[,] view[ing] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government . . . .” United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 381
(4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “We owe particular deference to a district court’s
credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and
weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Patiutka,
804 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Counsel first contends that the traffic stop was unreasonable because the police
officer did not have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. “When a
police officer stops a car and detains its occupants, the traffic stop amounts to a ‘seizure’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437,
440 (4th Cir. 2016). “Therefore, to pass constitutional muster, the stop must not be
unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In order
for a traffic stop to be reasonable, “the officer [must] ha[ve] a constitutionally adequate
2
basis for initiating” it, such as “reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 440-41.
The district court found credible the officer’s testimony that he stopped White’s
vehicle because it swerved across a solid traffic line, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-
5-1810(a)-1900(a) (2006). The officer’s testimony was consistent with the incident
report and warning ticket issued to White. Further, White failed to present any evidence
that the traffic violation did not occur or that otherwise rebutted the officer’s testimony
regarding the traffic stop. Nor does the record support White’s suggestion below that the
officer intentionally acted to ensure that the stop was not video-recorded. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the traffic stop was supported by
“a constitutionally adequate basis.” White, 836 F.3d at 440.
Counsel next claims that the police department’s inventory search policy is
facially unconstitutional. “A warrantless search may . . . be valid, and the evidence
obtained from that search may be admissible, if the search falls within one of the narrow
and well-delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,” such as
“the inventory search exception.” United States v. Matthews, 591 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For the inventory search exception to apply,
the search must have been conducted according to standardized criteria, such as a
uniform police department policy. . . .” Id. at 235 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). The existence of a standardized policy can be proven by written rules or
testimony on standard practices. Id. “[S]tandardized criteria must sufficiently limit a
searching officer’s discretion to prevent his search from becoming a ruse for . . .
3
rummaging . . . to discover incriminating evidence,” providing “discretion only to the
extent necessary to . . . protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police,
to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police
from danger.” Id. at 235, 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Matthews, we rejected appellant’s argument that the inventory search policy
lacked standardized criteria on how to handle closed containers because, while the policy
did not specifically address closed containers, it required “a complete inventory to be
taken on all impounded or confiscated vehicles including the interior, glove compartment
and trunk.” Id. at 237-38. We also determined that the policy sufficiently curtailed
officer discretion because it required officers to (1) search particular areas, (2) lock
valuables in the trunk of the vehicle, and (3) complete and file an inventory form. Id. at
238.
White has not shown that the policy did not sufficiently limit the officer’s
discretion in searching his vehicle. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443,
2451 (2015). Similar to the policy in Matthews, the police department’s written
inventory policy here (1) prohibited officers from removing door panels or air ducts
without probable cause, (2) required officers to secure inventoried items in the trunk, and
(3) required officers to fill out and sign an inventory sheet. While the written policy does
not specify which areas of the vehicle to search or whether to search closed but unlocked
containers, the searching officer testified that an inventory search encompassed items in
plain view, including unlocked glove compartments and center consoles, but not locked
containers. We conclude that the inventory search policy constituted a standardized
4
policy that sufficiently limited the officer’s discretion and is therefore facially
constitutional.
Finally, counsel contends that the officer failed to follow the policy and conducted
the inventory search in bad faith. “Standardized search procedures must be administered
in good faith for their attendant searches to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” United
States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 739 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“That is, an inventory search conducted pursuant to standardized procedures is valid so
long as the purpose of the inventory is not to gather incriminating evidence against the
owner.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the
inventory search is conducted pursuant to standardized procedures, the relevant inquiry is
not whether the searching officer “complied with all the written directives . . . but
whether . . . he acted in accordance with standard procedures more generally.” Id. at 740.
As discussed above, the officer’s search of the laptop case and its contents was
justified under the department’s inventory search policy. While the officer did not list
every item found in the vehicle, he generally complied with standard procedures in
conducting the search. See id. Further, while White argued that the inventory search was
conducted in bad faith for the purpose of gathering evidence against him, it was
reasonable for the officer to conduct an inventory and have the car towed because neither
White nor his passenger could drive the car and it was stopped in a hazardous location.
See Matthews, 591 F.3d at 235 n.7. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err
in denying White’s motion to suppress.
5
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform White, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If White requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on White. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6