United States v. Williamson , 250 F. App'x 532 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4686
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BROCK VANALLEN WILLIAMSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00194-BR)
Submitted: September 26, 2007 Decided: October 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bridgett Britt Aguirre, Fuquay-Varina, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brock Vanallen Williamson appeals his conviction and
thirty-three-month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2000). Williamson contends that the firearm was
discovered through an illegal search, as the officer who found the
weapon had no reasonable or articulable suspicion that would
justify looking under the mattress where the firearm was found.
Williamson also asserts that any statements he made regarding the
firearm should also be suppressed, as the officers’ questioning of
him was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search.*
After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties’ submissions,
we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Williamson’s motion to suppress.
Legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion to
suppress are reviewed de novo, while factual findings are reviewed
for clear error. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 429 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). The evidence is construed
“in the light most favorable to the . . . prevailing party below.”
United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
*
Because we conclude the search was lawful, we need not
address the admissibility of Williamson’s statements made after he
was arrested and the firearm was found.
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Police may conduct a search of the area near the place of
an arrest in order to protect themselves from possible harm.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). A search incident to
arrest is permissible without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, but is limited to spaces “immediately adjoining the
place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched.” Id. Any further searching requires “articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene.” Id.On appeal, Williamson contends that the search of the
bedroom where the firearm was discovered was not reasonable under
Buie, as there were no articulable facts or inferences that would
have led the officer to look under the mattress. In Buie, the
protective sweep occurred after the suspect had been taken into
custody, as the officer was looking for other individuals who might
still be in the house. 494 U.S. at 328. However, in this case,
the officers searching the second floor bedroom were not aware that
Williamson had already been arrested by officers on the first
floor. As the Supreme Court noted in Buie, it is only after the
suspect has been found that the justification for searching other
areas of the residence disappears. Id. at 332-33. Therefore,
because the officers on the second floor had no knowledge that
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Williamson was in custody, they could justifiably continue “to
search anywhere in the house that [the suspect] might have been
found.” Id. at 330 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-
603 (1980)).
Because the requirements for a protective sweep under
Buie do not apply to the present case, the search carried out by
the upstairs entry team did not need to be based on any
“articulable facts” related to a possible “individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
Rather, after seeing Williamson enter the premises, the officers
had the right to search anywhere in the house where he might be
found. See id. at 333. As for whether the officer reasonably
believed that Williamson or any other individual might be found
under the mattress, Deputy United States Marshal Tex Lindsay
testified that looking under a mattress was “common practice” for
searching a bedroom and that he had previously discovered a suspect
hiding under a mattress. Based on this past experience, the
district court held that Lindsay could have reasonably believed
that an individual may have been hiding under the mattress. See
Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988)
(reasonableness standard under Fourth Amendment is based on whether
officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting him). Viewing the evidence in the
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light most favorable to the Government, we find that the district
court did not err in denying Williamson’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm Williamson’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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