United States v. Huggins , 211 F. App'x 181 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4620
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
IRA ST ANTHONY HUGGINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 05-5130
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRAVON MIDDLETON, a/k/a Oran Middleton, a/k/a
Von Trayon Middleton,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CR-04-1098)
Submitted: November 15, 2006 Decided: December 28, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William L. Runyon, Jr., Charleston, South Carolina; Jill E. M.
HaLevi, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellants. Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ira St Anthony Huggins, Travon Middleton, and a third
individual were arrested when police executed a search warrant on
Huggins’ home on January 30, 2004. Huggins and Middleton
subsequently were each charged with several counts of a seven count
indictment.* Count One charged both Huggins and Middleton with
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine
base, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(2000). Counts Two and Six respectively charged Huggins and
Middleton with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). Counts Three and Seven
respectively charged Huggins and Middleton with possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
Following a jury trial, Huggins and Middleton were convicted on all
counts. The district court sentenced Huggins to 197 months’
imprisonment and Middleton to 180 months’ imprisonment.
Huggins and Middleton each appealed and these appeals
have been consolidated. Counsel filed a joint brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that in their
opinions there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
*
The third individual arrested with Huggins and Middleton also
was charged in this indictment. He pled guilty and is not the
subject of these consolidated appeals. We therefore do not address
the charges against him.
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questioning whether the district court improperly denied
Defendants’ joint suppression motion and their subsequent Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29 motions for judgment of acquittal. Counsel also
questioned whether Defendants’ sentences were valid. Huggins and
Middleton also filed pro se supplemental briefs raising additional
claims.
In their motion to suppress, Defendants sought a hearing
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), arguing that
the search warrant was obtained as the result of false material
representations by an unreliable confidential informant.
Additionally, they argued that the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrant should be suppressed because the executing officers
failed to follow proper federal and state procedures by leaving the
wrong search warrant at Huggins’ residence.
In order to establish that a Franks hearing is warranted,
a defendant must show “‘(1) that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,’ and (2) that the
statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” United
States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 171-72). We have reviewed the record and conclude that
the district court did not clearly err in finding that no false
information was included in the affidavit supporting the search
warrant and that Defendants were not entitled to Franks relief.
Defendants also claimed that the officers executing the
search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and failed to comply
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with Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(3) and South Carolina law by leaving
the wrong search warrant at Huggins’ home. Because this error
amounted to a non-constitutional violation, see United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000), and Defendants were not
prejudiced by the error, cf. United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d
449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no prejudice where search and
seizure would not have been different if officers had complied with
Rule 41 requirements), we find no error in the district court’s
denial of the suppression motion.
At the close of the government’s case, pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29, Huggins moved for judgment of acquittal on all
three counts with which he was charged. Middleton filed a motion
for judgment of acquittal on Counts One and Six. Defendants
asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support their
convictions. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, we find that there was substantial evidence to
support Defendants’ convictions. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Accordingly, we find that the district court’s
denial of the Rule 29 motions was correct.
In the Anders brief, counsel raised no specific issues
concerning Huggins’ sentence, but concluded it was valid. We have
reviewed Huggins’ presentence report (“PSR”) and the sentencing
hearing, and have found no reversible error.
Middleton received a fifteen year sentence--the mandatory
minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b), 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 (2000), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c). Before sentencing,
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Middleton asked the district court to consider a sentence below the
statutory mandatory minimum due to his difficult upbringing and the
fact that the third defendant received a probationary sentence.
However, absent circumstances not present here, “a district court
has no discretion to impose a sentence outside of the statutory
range established by Congress for the offense of conviction.”
United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 288 (2005).
We have thoroughly reviewed the issues raised in Huggins’
and Middleton’s pro se supplemental briefs and find that they do
not warrant relief. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Huggins’ and Middleton’s convictions
and sentences. This court requires that counsel inform Huggins and
Middleton, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If either Huggins or
Middleton requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on his client.
Huggins’ motion to terminate his counsel and proceed pro
se on appeal is denied. Middleton’s motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion for an extension of time to file a pro se
supplemental brief is granted. We deny as moot Huggins’ motion for
bail pending appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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