United States v. Moreno-Serafin , 251 F. App'x 185 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4959
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOSE RAMIRO MORENO-SERAFIN, a/k/a Jose Ramiro-
Moreno, a/k/a Jose Moreno,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (5:03-cr-00048-3)
Submitted: September 26, 2007 Decided: October 18, 2007
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric J. Foster, LAW OFFICE OF RICK FOSTER, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Jonathan Vogel, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Ramiro Moreno-Serafin pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, marijuana, and
methamphetamine, conspiracy to import cocaine, marijuana, and
methamphetamine, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The
district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Moreno-Serafin asserts that his speedy trial rights were
violated when the district court continued the case for more than
eighteen months, and that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm
Moreno-Serafin’s conviction and sentence.
Following his guilty plea, a presentence investigation
report was prepared, making a recommendation as to Moreno-Serafin’s
sentencing. Moreno-Serafin then moved to withdraw his plea,
asserting that he did not understand the plea and the consequences
of pleading guilty. In support of this assertion, he noted that
during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, Moreno-Serafin expressed
that he did not want to plead guilty to the three charges that
counsel stated he would. Moreno-Serafin was concerned that he
would be subject to a twenty-five year sentence. Defense counsel
explained to the court that Moreno-Serafin asked him to schedule a
change of plea hearing, that his sentencing exposure in the ten-to-
twelve-year range had been explained to Moreno-Serafin, and that
counsel had explained to Moreno-Serafin the possibility of a
- 2 -
sentence reduction under the safety-valve provision of the
guidelines. The court and counsel explained to Moreno-Serafin that
he would not be sentenced to ten years on each count, but rather
that the two charges, drug conspiracy and conspiracy to import
drugs, would be consolidated for sentencing, and that any sentence
on the money laundering conspiracy charge would likely run
concurrently; therefore, he would not be subject to a twenty-five
year sentence, as he feared. After this explanation, Moreno-
Serafin stated that he understood and that he wished to plead
guilty to the three counts.
The court then explained the charges and the possible
penalties, ascertained that Moreno-Serafin was aware of his trial
rights, and asked if Moreno-Serafin was admitting that he was
guilty of the three charges. Moreno-Serafin replied: “For
conspiracy, yes.” The court clarified that Moreno-Serafin
understood and was admitting his guilt of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute drugs, conspiracy to import drugs into
the United States, and conspiracy to launder money. Moreno-Serafin
answered in the affirmative.
Moreno-Serafin’s counsel also asserts that Moreno-Serafin
lacked an understanding of the consequences of his plea, as
demonstrated by his response to the court’s inquiry as to whether
anyone made him any promise of a lesser sentence to induce his
guilty plea. Moreno-Serafin responded, “The attorney.” The court
- 3 -
inquired whether that promise was the “possibility of a safety
valve lesser sentence” and Moreno-Serafin then asked, “What’s a
safety valve?” The court responded by asking Moreno-Serafin to
describe any promise of leniency that had been made to him.
Moreno-Serafin responded, “He simply told me that he would try to
help me [get the best sentence.]” After further inquiry of Moreno-
Serafin and counsel, the court accepted the guilty plea, finding
that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in
denying Moreno-Serafin’s motion to withdraw the plea. United
States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1996) (providing
standard); United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.
1991); see United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that the key factor is whether the plea hearing was
properly conducted). We have carefully scrutinized the Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 colloquy and find no error by the district court in
determining that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
See United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a properly conducted Rule 11 proceeding “raise[s] a
strong presumption that the plea is final and binding”). Thus, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Moreno-Serafin’s motion to
withdraw his plea.
A valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
defects. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United
- 4 -
States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993). The right to
a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act is non-jurisdictional.
See Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
cases); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1992).
Thus, by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, Moreno-Serafin
waived his right to claim a Speedy Trial Act violation.
Moreno-Serafin contends that these cases are contrary to
the Supreme Court’s dictate in United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563
(1989), in which the Court explained the exceptions to the
principle that a guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional claims.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that when “the defendant’s
right [is] ‘the right not to be haled into court at all upon the
[ ] charge,’ then ‘[t]he very initiation of proceedings against him
[operates] to deny him due process of law.’” Id. at 574-75 (quoting
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974)). However, the
cases to which this exception applied concerned claims of double
jeopardy violations, not violations of the right to a speedy trial.
See Broce, 488 U.S. at 574-75 (citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-
31; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 & n.2 (1975)).
As stated above, the right to a speedy trial is a non-
jurisdictional claim that may be waived and indeed is waived by an
unconditional guilty plea, such as that entered by Moreno-Serafin.
Thus, we need not resolve Moreno-Serafin’s speedy trial issue.
- 5 -
In conclusion, we affirm Moreno-Serafin’s conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 6 -