United States v. Stroupe , 251 F. App'x 202 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4689
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BON ALEXANDER STROUPE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00221)
Submitted: October 18, 2007 Decided: October 22, 2007
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven T. Meier, MALONEY AND MEIER, L.L.C., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bon Alexander Stroupe pled guilty to charges of
conspiracy to manufacture and possession with the intent to
distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B)
(2000) (Count 1), and possession of pseudoephedrine, with the
intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting
same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (2000), 18 U.S.C. § 2(2000) (Count 2). The district court sentenced Stroupe to 181
months’ imprisonment, four years of supervised release on Count 1
and three years of supervised release on Count 2, to run
concurrently, and ordered payment of a $200 statutory assessment.*
Stroupe’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether Stroupe was
properly determined to be a career offender. Stroupe was given an
*
The probation officer calculated an advisory sentencing
guideline range for Stroupe of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment,
founded on a total offense level of 31 (after application of an
enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual “USSG”
§ 4B1.1 (2005), and a three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to USSG §§ 3E1.1(a), (b)),
and a criminal history category of VI. After careful consideration
of the facts and evidence, the district court made all the factual
findings appropriate for that determination and considered the
advisory sentencing range along with the other factors described in
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), prior to imposing
sentence. While the district court determined that the low end of
the guidelines range was appropriate, it then reduced Stroupe’s
sentence to 181 months based on time served in state prison.
- 2 -
opportunity to file a pro se brief, but has failed to do so,
despite two extensions of time, the latter of which expired on May
30, 2007.
While Stroupe challenges the use of prior breaking and
entering convictions as the predicate offenses used to support his
career offender status, he failed to offer any evidence to support
his conclusory assertion that it is “entirely possible” that the
homes into which he was convicted of breaking and entering were not
occupied. We find that the district court properly sentenced
Stroupe as a career offender. See United States v. Raynor, 939
F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991) (prior conviction for breaking and
entering constitutes predicate crime of violence offense for
purposes of career offender classification where offense involved
a residence, even if then currently unoccupied, where substantial
risk that physical force against person or property of another may
be used in committing the offense); see also USSG § 4B1.2.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Stroupe’s conviction and sentence. We
deny Stroupe’s motion to relieve his attorney at this juncture.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
- 3 -
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -