United States v. Havely ( 2004 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                             No. 04-4040
    DAMON A. HAVELY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
    Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.
    (CR-03-293-PJM)
    Submitted: June 28, 2004
    Decided: July 27, 2004
    Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Kelli C. McTaggart, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
    Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weis-
    man, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
    Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. HAVELY
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Damon A. Havely appeals his convictions and two-year term of
    probation for misdemeanor possession of marijuana within a National
    Park, in violation of 
    36 C.F.R. § 2.35
    (b)(2), and being a minor in pos-
    session of alcohol in a National Park, in violation of 
    36 C.F.R. § 2.35
    (a)(2)(ii), as a result of a traffic stop conducted on January 12,
    2003. Havely was convicted in a bench trial before a magistrate
    judge. Havely appealed to the district court pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3402
     (2000). The district court affirmed Havely’s convictions and
    sentence. Havely appealed to this court pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    (2000), challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support each
    count of conviction.
    First, Havely argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he
    possessed the drugs found inside the vent of a car in which he was
    the passenger. The verdict "must be sustained if there is substantial
    evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to sup-
    port it." Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).
    "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact
    could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Bur-
    gos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996). With this standard in mind, we
    find that the evidence was sufficient. When the officer was first at the
    vehicle, asking the driver to exit the car, he did not smell anything
    unusual, although it was apparent that the heat had been on in the car.
    Upon returning shortly thereafter to question Havely, the heat was
    blowing very hard and the officer smelled "the strongest smell of mar-
    ijuana that I’ve ever smelled in a motor vehicle." Havely was seated
    close to the vent where the drugs were found, and the magistrate
    judge reasonably concluded that Havely placed the drugs there.
    Next, Havely argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
    prove he was under 21 years of age, an element of the minor in pos-
    UNITED STATES v. HAVELY                          3
    session of alcohol charge. See 
    36 C.F.R. § 2.35
    (a)(2)(ii). Because
    Havely did not raise this claim at trial, our review is for plain error.
    To meet the plain error standard, (1) there must be an error; (2) the
    error must be plain, meaning obvious or clear under current law; and
    (3) the error must affect substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-34 (1993). Even if these criteria are met, the error will
    not be noticed unless it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or pub-
    lic reputation of the proceedings. 
    Id. at 736
    . When "overwhelming
    and essentially uncontroverted" evidence supports the challenged
    judicial finding, there is "no basis for concluding that the error seri-
    ously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings." United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 633 (2002)
    (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). An officer testified
    that Havely stated his date of birth, which showed he was under 21.
    However, "an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorrobo-
    rated confession," Smith v. United States, 
    348 U.S. 147
    , 152 (1954),
    or inculpatory admissions. Opper v. United States, 
    348 U.S. 84
    , 91
    (1954). The Government did not introduce a birth certificate, driver’s
    license, passport, or any other evidence to corroborate Havely’s age.
    Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Government failed
    to produce "substantial independent evidence which would tend to
    establish the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93.
    The Government’s failure to present evidence on which a reasonable
    factfinder could make the required finding of guilt beyond a reason-
    able doubt as to an element of the crime satisfies the first three Olano
    prongs. See United States v. Cedelle, 
    89 F.3d 181
    , 185 (4th Cir. 1996)
    (citing United States v. David, 
    83 F.3d 638
    , 642-47 (4th Cir. 1996)).
    Nevertheless, we decline to notice the error. Havely does not assert
    that he actually was over the age of twenty-one at the time of the inci-
    dent, and in fact, counsel for Havely admitted before the district court
    that his client was under twenty-one at the time of the incident.
    Moveover, the Judgment in a Criminal Case lists Havely’s date of
    birth as March 2, 1982 — thus making him roughly twenty years and
    ten months old at the time of the offense — and Havely has not
    sought to correct this aspect of the judgment or challenge it in any
    way. Given that "overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted" evi-
    dence supports the challenged judicial finding, there is "no basis for
    concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings." Cotton, 
    535 U.S. at
    633
    4                     UNITED STATES v. HAVELY
    (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we
    decline to notice the error and affirm Havely’s conviction for being
    a minor in possession of alcohol.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED