United States v. Satterfield ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4787
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LUTHER EARL SATTERFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:04-cr-00173-D)
Submitted: September 28, 2007 Decided: November 8, 2007
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Jude Darrow, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George
E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luther Earl Satterfield appeals his conviction and
sentence for conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent
to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 846 (2000) and distribution of
more than fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). On appeal, Satterfield argues that the district court
plainly erred by not dismissing the charges against Satterfield on
statutory or constitutional speedy trial grounds and by admitting
evidence of a kidnapping committed by Satterfield’s drug
trafficking associates, abused its discretion by refusing to give
a requested supplemental instruction in response to a jury question
regarding Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, and clearly erred by applying a two-
level sentencing enhancement for being an organizer or manager
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(c) (2005)
(USSG). Finding no error, we affirm.
Satterfield asserts for the first time on appeal a speedy
trial violation in the district court; therefore the claim is
reviewed for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Satterfield’s brief
primarily asserts a statutory speedy trial error, and makes a short
reference in closing to violation to his constitutional speedy
trial rights.
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Under the Speedy Trial Act, an indictment must be filed
within thirty days from the date on which a defendant is arrested,
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2000), and the trial must commence within
seventy days of the filing date of the indictment or the date of a
defendant’s initial appearance, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3161(c)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Certain delays are
excludable when computing the time within which a defendant must be
indicted or his trial must commence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9)
(2000). Satterfield argues that his indictment should be
dismissed. However, because Satterfield did not object to the
alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act prior to the trial
commencing, he is deemed to have waived the right to dismissal of
the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (2000). Satterfield argues
that even if he waived his statutory right to a speedy trial, the
district court had a duty sua sponte to reject the waiver and
dismiss the indictment. However, where the Speedy Trial Act
violation is completed prior to trial or the entry of a guilty
plea, the defendant is deemed to have waived the completed
violation by declining to move to dismiss the indictment. See
Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1986 (2006).
To the extent Satterfield claims his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial was violated, this claim is without merit.
In determining whether a pretrial delay violated a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right, a court must balance four considerations:
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(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the
extent of prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 530 (1972). The Supreme Court has explained that the first
factor actually involves two inquiries. Doggett v. United States,
505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). The first question is whether the
delay is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry. The Court
has answered this question affirmatively when the delay approaches
one year. Id. at 651-52 & n.1. Second, courts must consider,
together with other relevant factors, “the extent to which the
delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
examination of the claim.” Id. at 652. The delay between the
return of Satterfield’s indictment and his trial was approximately
seventeen months, and is sufficient to trigger the speedy trial
inquiry. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52.
In order to prevail on his claim, Satterfield must
establish “that on balance, [the] four separate [Barker] factors
weigh in his favor.” United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148
(4th Cir. 1995). First, the seventeen-month delay was certainly
lengthy, perhaps uncommon, but is not an extraordinary delay.
Second, the reason for the delay appears to be mostly related to
Satterfield’s strategy to wait for the United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), decision and the eventual fallout of legal
precedent interpreting the landmark case. Satterfield does not
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dispute that the Government attempted to contact him several times
to ascertain whether he intended to plead guilty or proceed to
trial once he withdrew his guilty plea. Third, Satterfield never
asserted his right to a speedy trial prior to raising the argument
on appeal. Finally, although Satterfield alleges prejudice due to
loss of his liberty and alleged inability to litigate his case, he
does not establish any particularized prejudice, such as loss of
witnesses or specific indication of witness memory loss. We
therefore conclude that Satterfield has not established a statutory
or constitutional speedy trial error.
Next, Satterfield argues that the district court erred by
admitting evidence regarding a kidnapping of Stevie Hester by
Satterfield’s co-conspirators. He argues that the evidence was
“unfairly prejudicial and monopolized the trial,” and was
impermissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Satterfield did not object
at trial to the admission of evidence about his co-conspirators’
commission of a kidnapping. Therefore, review is for plain error.
See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-32.
Rule 403 excludes otherwise relevant evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Fed.
R. Evid. 403. “Prejudice, as it is used in Rule 403, refers to
evidence that has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
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one.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The mere fact
that the evidence will damage the defendant’s case is not enough —
the evidence must be unfairly prejudicial, and the unfair prejudice
must substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.”
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 341 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), vacated on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005).
“Rule 403 judgments are preeminently the province of the
trial courts. We thus review a district court’s admission of
evidence over a Rule 403 objection under a broadly deferential
standard.” United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 603 (4th Cir.
1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
district court’s ruling is overturned only under extraordinary
circumstances, where the district court’s discretion has been
plainly abused, and it acted arbitrarily or irrationally. United
States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990). The evidence
is reviewed in the “light most favorable to its proponent,
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial
effect.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Satterfield objects to the weight of the evidence and
cites to multiple pages of testimony to establish undue prejudice.
However, defense counsel elicited the bulk of the evidence
regarding the kidnapping. In addition, on appeal Satterfield
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contests the testimony his attorney elicited on direct and re-
direct examination of his own witness, Stevie Hester, and objects
to Hester’s testimony on cross-examination by the Government. In
his closing argument, Satterfield argued that Hester’s testimony
proved that co-conspirator William Perry was not a credible witness
and therefore his testimony regarding all conspiracy events should
be discounted.
As the foregoing facts demonstrate, Satterfield engaged
in repeated questioning as to the kidnapping and presented his own
witness to elicit evidence regarding the kidnapping. He therefore
should not be allowed to benefit through his own invited error.
See United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 904 (4th Cir. 1996)
(explaining invited error).
Regardless, there is no Rule 403 error, plain or
otherwise, as the kidnapping evidence was relevant because it was
probative of Satterfield’s drug distribution activities within the
conspiracy. The Government’s intention was to prove that
Satterfield distributed to other conspiracy members. The evidence
was not unduly prejudicial because Satterfield himself elicited
most of it as part of his trial strategy.
Finally, Satterfield assigned error to the district court
for failing to weigh the probative value of the evidence by the
danger of unfair prejudice. The district court did not err in this
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regard because it is not required to weigh the evidence under Rule
403, sua sponte, if there is no objection made by counsel.
Next, Satterfield challenges the district court’s
response to a jury question. In response to the jury’s question of
“What is Rule 35,” the court declined defense counsel’s invitation
to read or supply the text of Rule 35(b) to the jury. Instead, the
court answered the question directing the jury to make their
decision “based on the evidence presented in this case and my jury
instructions considered as a whole. . . . It is up to you to
remember what evidence has been presented in this case concerning
Rule 35 and consider such evidence in the context of all of the
evidence and my jury instructions considered as a whole.” (J.A.
951). In its initial jury instructions, the court advised the jury
that the testimony of individuals who have entered into plea
agreements should be “received with caution and weighed with great
care.” (J.A. 911).
The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental jury
instructions are a matter within the discretion of the district
court and should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1990). We have held
that when evaluating the adequacy of supplemental jury instructions
given in response to a question asked by the jury during
deliberations, it must ask “whether the court’s answer was
reasonably responsive to the jury’s question and whether the
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original and supplemental instructions as a whole allowed the jury
to understand the issue presented to it.” See Taylor v. Virginia
Union University, 193 F.3d 219, 240 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Stevens, 38 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also
United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the proper inquiry when examining a district court’s
response to a jury’s request for clarification on a charge is
whether the court addresses the jury’s inquiry fairly and
accurately without creating prejudice).
Satterfield argues that the district court’s refusal to
provide the jury with a definition of Rule 35, or with the text
itself, prejudiced him. During trial, defense counsel argued that
the witnesses may receive additional reduction of their sentences,
and questioned witnesses regarding the possibility of future
reductions. Defense counsel made an issue of the Government
witnesses’ credibility and contends that the jury could not fully
evaluate credibility without understanding the mechanism for a
further reduction of sentence after Satterfield’s trial. The
Government contends that the court did not abuse its discretion
because merely providing the text of Rule 35 would have been
confusing to the jury, the proper inquiry was the witnesses’
understanding of the benefits of cooperation, and therefore
Satterfield’s ability to conduct his defense was not impaired.
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We conclude that the district court’s supplemental jury
instruction was adequate. The original instruction, coupled with
the supplemental instruction, allowed the jury to understand that
witness testimony by a co-conspirator, or someone who has entered
into a plea agreement with the Government, should be weighed with
care because of the inducements of sentence reduction. On cross-
examination of the Government’s witnesses, defense counsel elicited
testimony regarding the expectations of sentence reduction, which
was the key consideration. The legal terminology of Rule 35 was
not relevant compared with the witnesses’ understanding of the
possibility of further sentence reduction in exchange for
cooperation. Therefore, the court addressed the jury’s inquiry
fairly and accurately without creating prejudice. See Martinez,
136 F.3d at 977.
Last, Satterfield received a two-level sentencing
enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(c) for being an organizer,
leader, manager or supervisor of criminal activity. He challenges
the court’s factual finding that he was a leader or manager
claiming that he was acting alone and did not exert any managerial
control or supervise others.
The district court’s determination that the defendant’s
conduct warrants a sentence enhancement is reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2002).
A defendant qualifies for a two-level role adjustment if he was a
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leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity
that did not involve five or more participants and was not
otherwise extensive. Id.; USSG § 3B1.1(c). For a role adjustment
to be given because a defendant was a leader, the defendant must
have controlled others. United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 426
(4th Cir. 2002).
The district court determined that Satterfield controlled
how drugs were distributed to his dealers Oakley, Perry, Terry, and
Thorpe. The court specifically found that fronting cocaine to
another dealer was indicative of control. In this matter, the
evidence contained in the PSR demonstrated that Satterfield
exercised control over several associates in the distribution of
cocaine base. He not only distributed to at least four individuals
as identified by the district court, but Oakley and Perry testified
that he occasionally engaged runners to deliver the drugs. The
evidence also showed that Satterfield fronted drugs to others.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly
err in its application of § 3B1.1.
We therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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