United States v. Marin-Colon , 215 F. App'x 287 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4678
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO MARIN-COLON, a/k/a Amado
Marcial-Hernandez, a/k/a Miguel
Torres-Salinas, a/k/a Javier Salinas-Gonzales,
a/k/a Julio Colon,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00013-WLO)
Submitted: January 3, 2007 Decided: January 31, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury,
Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Angela
H. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Marin-Colon appeals the sentence imposed by the
district court following his guilty plea to two counts of illegal
reentry by a convicted felon who had been previously deported, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2000). On appeal, Marin-
Colon contends that the district court erred in determining that
his inconsistent statements to the probation officer constituted
obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(USSG) § 3C1.1 (2005). Finding no error, we affirm.
Marin-Colon asserts that the inconsistent information he
provided to the probation officer during the presentence interview
was not “willful” or “material” under USSG § 3C1.1, and that the
district court failed to differentiate between the falsity of the
statements and their materiality. Marin-Colon contends that at all
times during this case, he has identified himself by his true name,
and that he never denied the use of the numerous aliases listed in
the presentence report, thereby allowing for a “full account” of
his criminal history.
Pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1, a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice will be imposed if the defendant:
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct
or impede, the administration of justice during the
course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing
of the instant offense of conviction, and the obstructive
conduct related to the defendant’s offense of conviction
and any relevant conduct; or a closely related offense.
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Conduct to which this adjustment applies includes “providing
materially false information to a probation officer in respect to
a presentence or other investigation for the court.” USSG § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.4(h)). “Material” information is further defined as
“information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect
the issue under determination.” USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.6).
Whether information is material is a factual matter determined by
the district court, and is subject to review by this court under
the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Hicks,
948 F.2d 877, 886 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Gormley, 201 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The threshold for
materiality . . . is conspicuously low.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
While Marin-Colon contends that he has identified himself
by his true name at all times during this case, the district court
noted that his date of birth could not be established, and in light
of the dozen different aliases previously used by Marin-Colon,
there was still a question as to his actual identity.
Additionally, when the information provided by Marin-Colon to the
probation officer was compared with a presentence report from an
earlier criminal trial, as well as with the pretrial report that
was prepared after his arrest, there were conflicting statements
regarding his date of birth, place of birth, the names and ages of
his parents and siblings, and whether he was married or had
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children. As a result, the probation officer concluded that the
defendant’s true identity, date of birth, family history, and
marital status could not be determined.
A defendant’s true identity is material to a presentence
investigation, even if the false information provided does not
affect the probation officer’s recommendation. See United
States v. Restrepo, 53 F.3d 396, 397 (1st Cir. 1995) (sufficient
that misrepresentations had the potential to affect the
investigation); see also United States v. Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d
788, 792 (8th Cir. 1995) (failure to provide truthful identity
hampered preparation of the presentence report and precluded
determination as to criminal history). Marin-Colon asserts that he
has given his “true name” throughout the proceedings, but the
probation officer could not verify this fact due to the numerous
aliases and the inconsistent personal information provided by
Marin-Colon. While it is possible that Marin-Colon did give his
actual name, the false information provided to the probation
officer hampered her investigation and her attempts to ensure that
a complete and accurate presentence report was provided to the
district court for sentencing.
Because Marin-Colon’s true identity was a material fact
in the probation officer’s investigation, the false information
that he provided had the potential to obstruct her efforts and
therefore qualifies as materially false information under USSG
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§ 3C1.1. Additionally, we find that in light of the “extremely
evasive” answers provided to the probation officer and Marin-
Colon’s concession at sentencing that the information provided was
not accurate, these actions were also willful. Therefore, we
conclude that the district court properly enhanced Marin-Colon’s
sentence for obstructing justice.
Accordingly, we affirm Marin-Colon’s sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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