United States v. Morgan ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4748
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL A. MORGAN, a/k/a Steve,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00042-FPS-JE)
Submitted: January 23, 2007 Decided: February 6, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott C. Brown, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L.
Potter, United States Attorney, John C. Parr, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael A. Morgan was charged in a multi-defendant indictment
and eventually convicted of conspiracy to distribute in excess of
50 grams of cocaine base (Count 1), two counts of aiding and
abetting the distribution of a controlled substance within 1,000
feet of a protected location (Counts 2 and 5), distribution of
cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a protected location (Count 3),
and possession and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking crime (Count 13). On appeal, Morgan primarily
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions on Counts 2 and 13. Finding no error, we affirm.1
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of a criminal
conviction on direct review, “[t]he verdict of the [jury] must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). “Substantial evidence is evidence
that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Count 2 (aiding and abetting distribution) arises from a
controlled undercover drug transaction that occurred on May 5,
1
Morgan also contends that the district court committed
several sentencing errors. We have considered these arguments and
find them to be without merit.
2
2005, in “Bud’s Club,” which was one of Morgan’s drug-distribution
locations. During this video-recorded transaction, Morgan’s co-
defendant Terri Blankenship sold a quantity of cocaine to a
confidential informant.
Morgan argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction on this count because the video purportedly shows
Blankenship obtaining the cocaine from a third-party, rather than
Morgan, before the transaction was completed and because
Blankenship did not specifically testify that she obtained the
cocaine from Morgan. We reject this argument. Blankenship
testified that she frequently dealt drugs from Bud’s Club and that
Morgan was her supplier for these transactions. See J.A. 277.
Moreover, the jury was permitted to observe the video of this
specific transaction and determine for itself the extent of
Morgan’s involvement. Based on this record, we find no basis to
overturn this conviction. See generally United States v. Wilson,
135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing elements of aiding
and abetting).
Count 13 (possession and discharge of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime) arises from an August 11,
2005, incident that occurred in front of a residence from which
Morgan was dealing drugs.2 During this incident, Morgan and Eddie
2
The conspiracy for which Morgan was convicted (Count 1) is
the underlying drug trafficking crime.
3
Taylor, who was there to purchase crack cocaine, became involved in
an argument outside the residence. Morgan eventually went inside,
obtained a firearm, returned outside, and shot at Taylor.
Morgan argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
this conviction because it does not establish that he used the
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or that
he possessed the firearm in furtherance of such a crime. We
disagree. The government presented evidence that Morgan confronted
Taylor during this incident after Taylor had talked openly about
being there to purchase drugs. See J.A. 251. Moreover, the
government presented evidence that Morgan was aware that Taylor had
worked as an informant for law enforcement. See J.A. 296-97, 540.
We find that this evidence, combined with the location of the
firearm (inside the drug house), is sufficient to support the
conviction. See generally United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701,
705 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing sufficiency of evidence to
establish firearm possession in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Morgan’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4