United States v. Stanley , 256 F. App'x 583 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4386
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM MARTIN STANLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (0:05-cr-01249-CMC)
Submitted: September 5, 2007 Decided: November 29, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mario A. Pacella, STROM LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Robert
F. Daley, Jr., C. Todd Hagins, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Martin Stanley appeals his conviction and 120-
month sentence for possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), 924(e)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
He challenges the district court’s decision to allow his attorney
to withdraw, the court’s denial of his request to represent
himself, and the reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
On the day after jury selection for Stanley’s trial, the
district court held a status conference to determine the
ramifications of calling newly-identified Government witnesses.
One potential witness was represented by another attorney in the
same federal public defender’s office as Stanley’s attorney.
Stanley’s attorney expressed concern about the conflict of interest
that arose from having clients represented by attorneys in the same
office with opposing interests. Stanley’s attorney informed the
court that it was standard practice in such cases for both
attorneys to withdraw. Following a thorough discussion of the
conflict and possible measures to avoid it, the district court
ruled that there was an “irreconcilable conflict” and it was
necessary to postpone the trial and appoint new counsel to
represent Stanley.
Stanley objected to postponing the trial. He said he
“would rather just continue by [himself] if it’s going to be that
much trouble.” He also said that to avoid a continuance, he would
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waive the conflict, or have a new attorney proceed directly to
trial without additional time to prepare. The court held that
Stanley’s request was not a genuine request to proceed pro se, but
rather, an attempt to avoid a continuance by any means. Stanley
expressed his frustration with the amount of his bond, and said
that he would not object to the continuance if the court would
reduce his bond so that he could go home in the interim. He
claimed that he had the ability to represent himself, “if need be.”
The district court ruled that, despite Stanley’s objections, the
case would have to be continued. Approximately six weeks later,
following a two-day trial, Stanley was convicted.
A Presentence Report was prepared prior to sentencing.
The probation officer determined that Stanley’s base offense level
was twenty, which was adjusted upward two levels for obstruction of
justice.1 His total offense level of twenty-two, together with a
criminal history category of VI, yielded an advisory guideline
range of 84 to 105 months.
The Government filed a motion for an upward departure or
variance. The district court denied the motion for an upward
departure, but granted the motion for a variance. The court ruled
that a two-level variance to a level twenty-four was appropriate,
1
This adjustment was based on Stanley’s submission of a false
affidavit and persuading others to submit false affidavits stating
that he was not living at the residence in question when the gun
was found.
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with a resulting guideline range of 100 to 125 months. The court
imposed a sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum for a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(1) Disqualification of Defense Counsel
When confronted with a potential conflict of interest,
the district court is obligated to independently determine whether
the continued representation by counsel impedes the integrity of
the proceedings and whether the attorney should thus be
disqualified. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161-64 (1988).
For this purpose, the court “must have sufficiently broad
discretion to rule without fear that it is setting itself up for
reversal on appeal either on right-to-counsel grounds if it
disqualifies the defendant’s chosen lawyer, or on ineffective
assistance grounds if it permits conflict-infected representation
of the defendant.” United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1324
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160).
Stanley claims that the district court’s decision to
allow defense counsel to withdraw was an abuse of discretion
because less drastic measures were available and because the
government did not, in the end, call the witness who was
represented by Stanley’s counsel’s fellow federal public defender.
These arguments are without merit. See Williams, 81 F.3d at 1324-
25 (upholding district court’s decision to disqualify an attorney
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who represented other members of a conspiracy); see also United
States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 2003) (public defender was
entitled to withdraw where prosecution witness was also a client of
public defender’s office). Even if an alternative procedure would
have been within the court’s discretion, Stanley has not
established that it was an abuse of discretion to select
disqualification over another remedy. See Williams, 81 F.3d at
1325 (“[W]hile the use of [auxiliary counsel instead of
disqualification] might have been within the court's discretion,
declining to use it cannot be held an abuse of that discretion.”).
(2) Denial of Request to Proceed Pro Se
Stanley next claims that the district court erred in
denying his request to proceed pro se. The district court’s denial
of a defendant’s pretrial motion to proceed pro se is reviewed de
novo.2 See United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3
(4th Cir. 1997). Although a defendant has a right to represent
himself, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 & n.15 (1975),
his assertion of the right must be (1) clear and unequivocal; (2)
2
The Government maintains that the court’s decision to deny
Stanley’s request should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion
because it occurred after “meaningful trial proceedings” had
commenced. See United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th
Cir. 1979) (request to proceed pro se must be made before the
commencement of meaningful trial proceedings; thereafter the
decision is discretionary). However, under either standard, the
district court did not err.
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knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (3) timely. See United
States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2000).
In making his request, Stanley indicated that his real
desire was to persuade the district court not to postpone his
trial. He did not express any dissatisfaction about being
represented by counsel, nor any reason, apart from avoiding delay,
for the request. To avoid continuing the trial, Stanley said he
was willing to waive the conflict of interest, to have a new
attorney proceed directly to trial without additional time to
prepare, or to postpone trial and be represented by new counsel if
he could return home to await trial. Because Stanley’s request to
proceed pro se was not unequivocal, the district court did not err
in denying it.3
(3) Sentence
Finally, Stanley contends that his variance sentence of
120 months, fifteen months above the top end of the advisory
3
Stanley also asserts that the court committed reversible
error by denying his request without conducting a Faretta colloquy.
However, the purpose of such a colloquy is to ensure that a
defendant does not embark on self-representation without being made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of doing so. See Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835. Because the district court concluded that
Stanley’s request was a reflection of his disappointment with the
court’s decision to postpone his trial, rather than a genuine
request to proceed pro se, there was no need to engage in such a
discussion.
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guideline range, is unreasonable. This court will affirm the
sentence imposed by the district court as long as it is within the
statutorily prescribed range and reasonable. United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005). In sentencing a defendant,
the district court must: (1) properly calculate the guideline
range; (2) determine whether a sentence within that range serves
the factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);
(3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) explain its
reasons for selecting the sentence, especially a sentence outside
the advisory range. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). Even if the
sentence exceeds the advisory guideline range, it will generally be
deemed reasonable “if the reasons justifying the variance are tied
to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
The district court considered the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a), and identified § 3553(a)(1), the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant, and § 3553(a)(2)(C), the need to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant, as the most significant
factors supporting a variance. With respect to the nature of the
offense, the court noted that while Stanley was convicted based
only on the firearm found in the search of the house, the evidence
showed that Stanley had persuaded his wife to make a previous
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fraudulent purchase so that he could acquire a gun, demonstrating
a “very similar type of pattern.” The court also remarked on
Stanley’s “significant and sustained prior criminal record” and
noted:
I see and have observed from Mr. Stanley’s conduct in
this case that he has a very strong view about the
rightness or wrongness of his conduct, and he is not able
to accept responsibility at all for the things he has
been found guilty of and the things he has done in
connection with his involvement in this offense. And
there is a history in his case of [being] unable to
comply with prior court orders and prior sentences in the
past as well.
Because the district court considered the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors and based its decision on uncontroverted facts
showing a pattern of similar offenses, blame, and disrespect for
the law, Stanley’s sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Stanley’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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