Rahrig v. Alcatel USA Marketing, Inc. , 217 F. App'x 189 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-2395
    KURT RAHRIG,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    ALCATEL USA MARKETING, INCORPORATED,
    Defendant - Appellee,
    and
    ALCATEL USA, INCORPORATED; NEWBRIDGE NETWORKS,
    INCORPORATED; ALCATEL NETWORKS CORPORATION;
    ALCATEL GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED;
    ALCATEL DATA NETWORKS; ALCATEL CARRIER DATA
    DIVISION; CARRIER INTERNETWORKING DIVISION;
    ALCATEL, a Republic of France corporation;
    ALCATEL USA, CORPORATION,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (CA-04-1545-1)
    Argued:   September 20, 2006             Decided:    December 18, 2006
    Before MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, N. Carlton TILLEY, Jr., United
    States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina,
    sitting by designation, and Thomas E. JOHNSTON, United States
    District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting
    by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Johnston wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Michael and Judge Tilley joined.
    ARGUED: Jay Joseph Levit, Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellant. M.
    Roy Goldberg, SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, L.L.P.,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.       ON BRIEF:    Christopher M.
    Loveland, SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, L.L.P., Washington,
    D.C., for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    JOHNSTON, District Judge:
    Appellant Kurt Rahrig filed the instant case in November 2004
    in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Appellee Alcatel
    USA Marketing, Inc. (“Alcatel”) removed the case to the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on
    December 23, 2004.           Mr. Rahrig thereafter filed a seven-count
    amended    complaint    on     February       4,   2005.      The   district   court
    dismissed five of the amended complaint’s seven counts on April 15,
    2005.    By order dated November 9, 2005, the district court granted
    Alcatel’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment against
    Mr. Rahrig.1     In this appeal, Mr. Rahrig seeks review of the
    district   court’s     entry    of   summary       judgment    on   his   breach   of
    contract count.        We affirm the district court’s finding that
    Alcatel did not breach its contract with Mr. Rahrig.
    I.
    The relevant facts in this appeal are undisputed.                    In 1999, a
    company later acquired by Alcatel, Newbridge Networks, Inc.,2 was
    1
    Following the district court’s April 15, 2005 Order,                         Mr.
    Rahrig’s counts for breach of contract (Count One)                                 and
    unconscionability (Count Four) remained. It is unclear from                        the
    record how Mr. Rahrig’s unconscionability claim was resolved,                      but
    he does not address this claim on appeal.
    2
    In this opinion, we refer only to Newbridge Network, Inc.’s
    successor, Alcatel.
    3
    a data networking manufacturer which designed and developed data
    networking products for high speed connectivity to the internet.
    In    July   1999,   Alcatel   hired   Mr.   Rahrig   as   a    regional
    salesperson for the northwestern United States. In connection with
    his hiring, Alcatel required Mr. Rahrig to sign a contract titled
    “U.S. Sales Compensation Plan Fiscal Year 2000” (hereinafter “the
    Plan”), which dictated certain terms of his employment.                 (J.A.
    106.)     Pursuant to the Plan, Mr. Rahrig was to be paid a $75,000
    base salary, plus commissions for sales which exceeded his annual
    sales quota.      Mr. Rahrig’s sales quota for Alcatel’s 2000 fiscal
    year was $2.925 million.
    During the 2000 fiscal year, Alcatel made approximately $125
    million in sales to New Edge Networks (“New Edge”), an internet
    supply company.      Mr. Rahrig was given “sales credit” for those
    sales.    (J.A. 126-27.)   Rather than pay Mr. Rahrig commissions for
    the full $125 million in sales above his $2.925 million quota,
    Alcatel reduced his commissions by raising his quota.               The sales
    quota adjustment term of the Plan provided, in relevant part, that:
    Incentive compensation is designed to reward individual
    effort and performance. This plan is designed to reward
    outstanding individual contributions. At the same time,
    it must be consistent with the company’s obligations to
    its   shareholders   to   control   expenses,   maximize
    profitability, invest in research and development and
    make capital expenditures in order to remain competitive
    in the future. It must also address the Company’s need
    to motivate all employees. . . . [T]his Plan must also
    ensure that sales credit incentive payments are not
    disproportionately large so as to unreasonably impair
    corporate profit.
    4
    . . .
    In the event that a windfall situation occurs in which
    effort   expended   or   involvement    of   the   sales
    representative is not proportional to revenue that would
    be derived at current quota or commission rates from an
    exceptionally large opportunity relative to quota,
    regional management reserves the right to adjust quota,
    or sales credit allocation for that transaction and
    thereafter.
    (J.A. 110.) (hereinafter “the Windfall Clause.”)
    The Plan also provided that “on 30 days notice, [Alcatel may]
    . . . adjust and modify this Plan, including individual [sales]
    quotas . . . as it deems necessary or appropriate.”              (J.A.
    106.)(emphasis added)(hereinafter “the 30 Days Notice Provision.”)
    By letter dated November 22, 1999, Alcatel notified Mr. Rahrig
    that:
    [T]he sales credit that you derived from sales to New
    Edge Networks is deemed a windfall as defined [by the
    Plan]. Accordingly, we intend to exercise the Company’s
    right to adjust your quota for the current fiscal year.
    In order to arrive at a sound business decision on this
    quota adjustment, we also need to consider your forecast
    of another large transaction for this customer.
    Consequently, the setting of your new quota will not
    happen immediately and will require some further
    management action in the near term.
    Nevertheless, we want to recognize your substantial
    success from last quarter promptly. Therefore, [Alcatel]
    will make a substantial commission payment to you in the
    gross amount of $200,000.00 USD on the commission run due
    11/26/99 (or as soon thereafter as possible), provided
    you agree to the following terms. This payment will be
    a sales credit payment as defined by and subject to all
    terms and conditions in the [Plan].       Any additional
    payments or necessary adjustments will be made after a
    new quota is negotiated and agreed upon.
    5
    (J.A. 126.) (hereinafter “the November Letter.”) Mr. Rahrig signed
    and   “accepted”   the   November    Letter   and     was   thereafter   paid
    $200,000.   Id.
    On February 28, 2000, Alcatel sent Mr. Rahrig a second letter
    stating that:
    [T]he sales credit that you derived this quarter is
    primarily from sales to New Edge Networks and is deemed
    a windfall as defined by [the Plan]. Accordingly, the
    Company intends to exercise its right to adjust your
    quota for the current fiscal year.      To appropriately
    reflect the sales opportunity in your territory, your
    Fiscal Year 2000 quota will be adjusted to $44,093,333.00
    USD, as provided by the Plan.
    Nevertheless, in recognition of your efforts and success
    in the last quarter, the Company, in accordance with the
    windfall provision, will make a substantial commission
    payment to you in the gross amount of $200,000.00 USD on
    the commission run due March 3, 2000 (or as soon as
    thereafter as possible), provided you agree to the terms
    in this letter.    This payment will be a sales credit
    payment as defined by and subject to all the terms and
    conditions in the [Plan].
    (J.A. 127.) (hereinafter “the February Letter.”)            Mr. Rahrig also
    signed and “accepted” the February Letter and was thereafter paid
    an additional $200,000.     Id.
    Mr. Rahrig did not contest Alcatel’s application of the
    Windfall Clause to his sales quota after receiving either the
    November or February Letters.       Mr. Rahrig voluntarily left Alcatel
    in January 2003.   He now seeks recovery of all “unpaid earned sales
    commissions” due under the Plan.         (J.A. 20.)
    During discovery, Edward Mamon, an Alcatel employee during the
    relevant period in this action, testified that he “believed” there
    6
    was an unpublished “cap” on sales commissions “somewhere around
    $500,000."   (J.A. 676, 701, 703.)         Mr. Mamon’s belief was based on
    “the [Alcatel] rumor mill.”     (J.A. 701.)
    Mr.   Rahrig   testified   that       although   he   was   aware    of   the
    Windfall Clause, Alcatel told him “[t]hat there were no ceilings”
    on compensation.    (J.A. 390.)   Thus, when Mr. Rahrig accepted the
    November and February Letters, he had no knowledge that Alcatel was
    “attempt[ing] to match up [his commissions] with the targeted and
    predetermined unpublished ceiling of $500,000.”             (J.A. 1068.)
    II.
    “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
    novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court and
    reviewing the facts and inferences drawn from the facts in the
    light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.”                      Evans v.
    Techns. Applications & Serv. Co., 
    80 F.3d 954
    , 958 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
    to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law.”   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
    
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23 (1986).
    “In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material
    fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all
    7
    justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor.”                         Am. Legion
    Post v. City of Durham, 
    239 F.3d 601
    , 605 (4th Cir. 2001).                      A mere
    scintilla of proof, however, will not suffice to prevent summary
    judgment; the question is “not whether there is literally no
    evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly
    proceed    to    find   a    verdict   for       the     party”   resisting    summary
    judgment.        Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 251
    (1986).     “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
    element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other
    facts immaterial.”          Celetex Corp., 
    477 U.S. at 323
    .
    The moving party bears the burden to show that there is no
    genuine issue of material fact, and the court “must assess the
    evidence as forecast in the documentary materials . . . in the
    light     most    favorable     to     the       party     opposing   the     motion.”
    Charbonnages de Fr. v. Smith, 
    597 F.2d 406
    , 414 (4th Cir. 1979).
    III.
    In this appeal, Mr. Rahrig contends that Alcatel violated the
    terms of the Plan by (1) adjusting his sales quota prior to 30 days
    notice and (2) using a cap to limit his commissions.
    a.
    As noted above, the Plan required “30 days notice” prior to
    Alcatel’s       adjustment     or    modification         of   “individual     [sales]
    quotas.”    (J.A. 106.)       Mr. Rahrig argues that Alcatel violated the
    8
    Plan in failing to give him 30 days notice prior to exercising the
    Windfall Clause.      That is, Mr. Rahrig contends the 30 Days Notice
    Provision prohibited Alcatel from adjusting his individual sales
    quota until 30 days after his receipt of the November Letter, i.e.,
    December 22, 1999.3
    The   district    court   rejected   this   argument,   finding   that
    Alcatel’s exercise of the Windfall Clause was simply an execution
    of a term of the agreement and not an “adjustment or modification
    of the entire [Plan].”     (J.A. 1191.)   Thus, the district court held
    that the 30 Day Notice Provision did not apply to Alcatel’s use of
    the Windfall Clause for the New Edge sales.
    This Court notes that Mr. Rahrig has not appealed the district
    court’s finding that Alcatel “properly applied the Windfall Clause
    on a retroactive basis.”       (J.A. 1190.)      The district court based
    its finding on the plain language of the Plan, which stated that
    Alcatel “reserves the right to adjust [individual sales] quota . .
    . for that transaction and thereafter.” (J.A. 1191.) Mr. Rahrig’s
    failure to challenge this finding is dispositive of his argument
    that Alcatel violated the 30 Day Notice Provision.
    The Plan is to be “interpreted accordance with” Virginia law.
    (J.A. 124.)   In Virginia, if “the terms of an agreement are clear
    and unambiguous, the language used will be taken in its ordinary
    3
    Mr. Rahrig also contends that his sales commissions would
    have been much greater if his original sales quota had remained in
    effect until December 22, 1999.
    9
    signification, and the plain meaning will be ascribed to it.”   See
    Marriott Corp. v. Combined Props. Ltd. P’ship, 
    391 S.E.2d 313
    , 316
    (Va. 1990).    A plain reading of the Plan reveals that Alcatel had
    the discretion to identify windfall situations that had already
    occurred, and then retroactively apply the Windfall Clause.   Thus,
    even assuming 30 days notice was required before an adjustment
    could be made to Mr. Rahrig’s individual sales quota, because the
    adjustment could be applied retroactively, Alcatel’s application of
    the adjustment to sales which occurred prior to December 22, 1999,
    was proper.
    b.
    Mr. Rahrig also argues that Alcatel breached the Plan by
    maintaining a secret, extra-contractual $500,000 cap on sales
    commissions.    Specifically, Mr. Rahrig believes that Alcatel’s use
    of a cap on his commissions violated the Windfall Clause because it
    failed to consider his “effort expended or involvement” in the New
    Edge sales.    (J.A. 110.)
    The district court did not address Mr. Rahrig’s argument
    regarding an alleged cap on sales commissions in its written
    opinion.      During the hearing on Alcatel’s motion for summary
    judgment, however, the district court specifically rejected this
    argument because: (1) the undisputed evidence showed that Mr.
    Rahrig received significantly more than $500,000 in commissions
    10
    from the New Edge sales, and (2) Alcatel nevertheless properly
    invoked the Windfall Clause according to its terms.
    As noted above, Mr. Mamon’s testimony about the existence of
    a $500,000 cap was based only on office rumors.   Such testimony is
    inadmissible hearsay and was properly not considered material
    evidence to deny Alcatel’s motion for summary judgment. Greensboro
    Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Greensboro, 
    64 F.3d 962
    , 967
    (4th Cir. 1995) (proffered evidence of un-attributed rumors is
    inadmissible hearsay; such evidence is neither admissible at trial
    nor supportive of an opposition to a motion for summary judgment).
    We also note that Mr. Rahrig’s fiscal year 2000 commissions
    greatly exceeded $500,000.4   Thus, any evidence that Alcatel had an
    unpublished $500,000 cap on commissions is contradicted by Mr.
    Rahrig’s own testimony.
    c.
    Finally, Alcatel argues that even assuming it violated the
    Plan’s 30 Day Notice Provision or improperly capped commissions at
    $500,000, Mr. Rahrig waived his right to additional commissions by
    “accepting” the November and February Letters.       (J.A. 126-27.)
    Under Virginia law, a waiver “is an intentional relinquishment of
    a known right.” Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive
    Return Serv., Inc., 
    595 S.E.2d 1
    , 6 (Va. 2004).   “Two elements are
    4
    According to Mr. Rahrig, he ultimately received        “total
    commissions . . . in FY2000 of $758,810." (J.A. 1043.)
    11
    necessary to establish waiver: knowledge of the facts basic to the
    exercise of the right and the intent to relinquish that right.”
    
    Id.
       The district court found that “Mr. Rahrig waived his right to
    challenge the application of the Windfall Clause because he signed
    the [November and February L]etters, accepted payments tendered in
    connection therewith, and ‘agree[d] to the terms’ in each letter.”
    (J.A. 1192.)
    We agree with the district court that Mr. Rahrig waived his
    right to challenge Alcatel’s adjustment of his sales quota by
    executing the November and February Letters.   Mr. Rahrig knew his
    sales commissions would be reduced by executing the November and
    February Letters, thus waiving his ability to bring his instant
    claim for breach of contract.
    IV.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    12