United States v. Stephens , 257 F. App'x 611 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-4183
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    LORENZO DESHON STEPHENS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (3:06-cr-00281)
    Submitted:   September 10, 2007        Decided:     December 10, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David M. Hicks, Whitney C. Tymas, Hicks Tymas, LLC, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney,
    Roderick C. Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Lorenzo Deshon Stephens was convicted by a jury of one
    count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
    distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
    Stephens   was   sentenced   by   the   district    court   to   327    months’
    imprisonment.     Finding no error, we affirm.
    On appeal, Stephens contends the district court erred in
    denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
    Stephens argues the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction.      We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 29
    motion under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. United States
    v. Brooks, 
    957 F.2d 1138
    , 1147 (4th Cir. 1992).             To determine if
    there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we consider
    whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government,   substantial    evidence    supports    the    jury’s     verdict.
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).            We review both
    direct and circumstantial evidence, and permit the “government the
    benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those
    sought to be established.”        United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
    To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    and to distribute a controlled substance, the government must
    establish that: (1) two or more persons agreed to possess with
    intent to distribute and to distribute the substance; (2) the
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    defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly
    and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy.           United States v.
    Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).           A defendant
    may be convicted of conspiracy without knowing all the conspiracy’s
    details, so long as he joins the conspiracy understanding its
    unlawful nature and willfully joins in the plan on at least one
    occasion.    
    Id. at 858. The
    evidence presented at trial established that during
    the time in question, a number of individuals, including Stephens,
    were involved in selling cocaine base in the Gilpin Court area of
    Richmond, Virginia.        Lisa Madison testified that she purchased
    cocaine base from Stephens for personal use as well as to resell.
    Stephens was present during some of the occasions in which Madison
    resold the drugs.      Madison additionally brought customers to
    Stephens in exchange for drugs.
    Troy Brockenbrough testified that he on occasion served
    as an intermediary between Stephens and the supplier.             In such
    instances,    Brockenbrough    would   receive   money    from   Stephens,
    purchase cocaine base from the supplier, and give the drugs to
    Stephens for distribution.       Eventually, Brockenbrough introduced
    Stephens to the supplier so that Stephens might deal directly with
    him.   Craig Bullock testified that he supplied Stephens with
    distribution quantities of cocaine base on multiple occasions.
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    Thus, construing the facts in the light most favorable to
    the Government, it appears that Stephens was involved in “‘a
    loosely-knit association of members linked . . . by their mutual
    interest in sustaining the overall enterprise of catering to the
    ultimate demands of a particular drug consumption market’”--the
    Gilpin Court area.    
    Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858
    (quoting United States
    v. Banks, 
    10 F.3d 1044
    , 1054 (4th Cir. 1993)).             We therefore
    conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
    verdict.    To the extent Stephens argues the Government’s case
    rested   almost   entirely   on   the    unreliable   testimony   of   the
    cooperating witnesses, it is not the province of this court to
    second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder. See
    United States v. Saunders, 
    886 F.2d 56
    , 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.   We deny Stephens’s motion for an extension of time to file
    a pro se supplemental brief.            We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
    the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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