United States v. Williams , 257 F. App'x 674 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4263
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH E. WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District
Judge. (1:04-cr-00160-LMB)
Submitted: November 21, 2007 Decided: December 12, 2007
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Geremy C. Kamens,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Research and
Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck
Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Patrick F. Stokes, Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph E. Williams appeals the district court’s order
imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. We affirm.
A jury convicted Williams of being a felon in possession
of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3)
and 924(e) (2000), and unlawful drug use while in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
After finding Williams guilty, the jury then determined Williams
deliberately and with malice shot and killed Gail Collins during
the commission of a robbery. Based upon the jury’s findings that
Williams used the gun to commit first-degree murder, the district
court enhanced his sentence.* The district court stated there was
“no question” the preponderance of the evidence established
Williams had used a firearm to murder Collins. The district court
therefore sentenced Williams to life imprisonment, the then
mandatory sentence under the guidelines.
Williams appealed. We affirmed his conviction, but
vacated his sentence and remanded for a resentencing hearing in
compliance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See
United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 740-41 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 314 (2006). On remand, the district court again
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
*
Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B), the
recommended sentence for a felon in possession of a firearm
increases when the gun is used to commit murder.
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On appeal, Williams challenges his sentence on three
grounds. First, he argues that the district court erred by relying
on the jury’s findings from the first sentencing hearing. Second,
he argues the evidence from trial and the sentencing hearing was
insufficient to prove that the firearm he possessed was the firearm
used to murder Collins. Third, Williams argues the sentence of
life imprisonment was unreasonable because the district court based
the sentence, in part, upon erroneous factual conclusions.
I. Whether the sentencing court erroneously relied upon the
jury’s findings
Williams argues the district court erred by relying on
jury findings from the first sentencing hearing. He contends the
effect of a sentence vacatur and remand from this court is to
nullify the entire initial sentencing proceeding, and thus the
district court had the responsibility to make the factual
determinations relevant to sentencing rather than relying on those
made by the jury. The Government responds this court did not
vacate the jury’s sentencing findings, and further, the district
court merely found those findings persuasive and made its own
factual findings.
Upon remand, neither party presented new evidence
regarding Collins’s death. When Williams objected to any reliance
on the jury findings made during the prior sentencing hearing, the
district court responded, “It is up to the Court to make the
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appropriate sentencing decision, but the factual findings of this
jury are, I think, at this point unassailable . . . .” The
district court further stated that “the case is back before this
Court on the factual record that’s been clearly established to
determine whether the 3553 factors, what the appropriate sentence
would be.”
“[T]he mandate of a higher court is ‘controlling as to
matters within its compass.’” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Spraque v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 168 (1939)).
[W]hen this court remands for further proceedings, a
district court must, except in rare circumstances,
implement both the letter and the spirit of the . . .
mandate, taking into account [our] opinion and the
circumstances it embraces. However, to the extent that
the mandate of the appellate court instructs or permits
reconsideration of sentencing issues on remand, the
district court may consider the issue de novo,
entertaining any relevant evidence on that issue that it
could have heard at the first hearing.
Bell, 5 F.3d at 66-67 (internal citations omitted).
We remanded this case solely due to the “statutory Booker
error [that] occurred because the district court treated the
Guidelines as mandatory.” Williams, 445 F.3d at 741. The district
court was bound upon remand only to reconsider its sentence, with
the sentencing guidelines viewed as advisory. We did not find any
other error in the sentencing proceedings, nor did either party
allege that any other error occurred. In applying the guidelines
as discretionary and resentencing Williams, the district court did
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not err by considering the jury findings from the original
sentencing hearing because those findings remained undisturbed.
II. Whether the evidence sufficiently proved Williams killed
Collins
Williams contends the district court erred by applying
the sentencing guidelines’ murder cross-reference provisions
because the evidence was not sufficient to prove the gun he
possessed was the gun used to kill Collins. He notes no eyewitness
testimony connected him or his gun directly to Collins’s death.
In reviewing a sentencing judge’s application of the
sentencing guidelines, this court reviews factual determinations
for clear error. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). “If the court’s
findings may rationally be said to be supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, they may not be disturbed on appeal.” United
States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1997).
In our previous consideration of this case, we recited in
great detail the evidence connecting Williams to the murder of Gail
Collins and see no need to do so again. See Williams, 445 F.3d at
727-29. There, we stated, “The evidence presented by the
government directly and quite compellingly tied Williams to the
murder of Gail Collins.” Williams, 445 F.3d at 732. We therefore
conclude the district court’s finding that Williams used his
firearm to murder Collins is supported by a preponderance of the
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evidence. Thus, the district court did not err by applying the
murder cross-reference provisions of USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) to
determine Williams’s guidelines sentence.
III. Whether Williams’s sentence was reasonable
Williams argues his sentence was unreasonable because the
district court based it, in part, upon incorrect factual findings.
Specifically, Williams argues the district court erred in its
tallies of the number of Williams’s prior convictions and of the
amount of time Williams had been out of prison before committing
the instant offense, and by failing to fully consider his efforts
at rehabilitation. The Government contends the sentence was
reasonable because the district court conducted a thorough analysis
and properly focused on the key factors supporting a life sentence.
This court reviews “‘a district court’s interpretation of
the applicable sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.’” United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d
304, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d
666, 679 (4th Cir. 2004)). A sentence within a properly calculated
advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); see also
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (upholding
presumption of reasonableness). This presumption can only be
rebutted by showing the sentence is unreasonable when measured
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against the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 3044 (2007).
Williams’s life sentence is within the range recommended
by the guidelines and is thus presumptively reasonable. Williams,
however, asserts that his sentence is unreasonable because the
district court made underlying factual findings that were
inconsistent with the record and neglected to consider his efforts
to better himself and other ex-convicts. Williams first challenges
the district court’s characterization of his past robbery
convictions as “numerous.” Williams argues the district court’s
reference to his “numerous” robbery convictions is factually
inaccurate because he had only three adult convictions and two
juvenile adjudications for robbery. We find that the use of the
term “numerous” to describe five acts of robbery does not reflect
that the district court misrepresented the extent of Williams’s
criminal history.
Williams also disputes the accuracy of the district
court’s conclusion that after a “window of three years” of “being
on the street,” he resumed his criminal activities. Williams
asserts that this summary is erroneous because he was released on
parole in 1996 and committed the instant offense in 2003. The
district court’s consideration of Williams’s time out of prison was
relevant under § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C). Section 3553(a)(1)
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provides that the sentencing court shall consider the defendant’s
history and characteristics, while § 3553(a)(2)(C) provides that
the sentencing court consider, among other factors, the need for
the sentence “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant.”
The district court’s comments at sentencing demonstrate
it was predominately concerned with Williams’s history of violent
crime. In the context of Williams’s adult criminal history,
starting with his first adult conviction in 1977 at the age of
eighteen and spanning twenty-six years to 2003 with the instant
offense, the court’s error was relatively insignificant. In light
of the district court’s focus upon Williams’s violent nature and
the need to ensure public safety, we have no doubt that the
district court’s miscalculation or misstatement regarding the
interval between Williams’s release on parole and his murder of
Collins had no impact upon the court’s assessment of the
appropriate sentence.
As for the evidence Williams presented at sentencing
regarding his efforts to rehabilitate himself and other
ex-convicts, this information was certainly relevant under
§ 3553(a). However, it does not demonstrate that his sentence was
unreasonable. See Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 379. This evidence
did not outweigh the seriousness of his offense and his chronic
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recidivism. For these reasons, Williams has failed to rebut the
presumption that his sentence was reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Williams’s life sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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