United States v. Artis , 132 F. App'x 483 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4879
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANDRE A. ARTIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-85)
Submitted: May 6, 2005 Decided: May 27, 2005
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Vince Gambale,
Assistant United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Andre A. Artis appeals his conviction for possession of
a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and having been
convicted of domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), (9) (2000).
Artis first contends that the district court erred by
granting the Government’s motion in limine to prevent a collateral
attack on his domestic violence conviction from being presented to
the jury. Whether a prior misdemeanor conviction for domestic
violence qualifies as a predicate offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(33)(B)(i)(II) (2000) is a question of law for the court to
decide. See United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir.
2003); United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2002)
("Because § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(I) is a legal definition, its
application presents a question of law to be decided by the trial
judge."); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621-22 (8th Cir.
1999) (concluding, as a matter of law, that a particular conviction
and waiver of rights satisfied the requirements of
§ 922(a)(33)(B)(i)). Accordingly, we hold that the district court
did not err by granting the Government’s motion in limine to
prevent the issue from going to the jury.
Artis also contends that the district court erroneously
concluded that his prior conviction for domestic violence qualified
as a predicate offense for the purposes of § 922(g)(9). Title 18
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U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000) provides that it shall be unlawful for a
person who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence (“MCDV”) to possess a firearm. However,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B) (2000), a person shall not be
considered to have been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence
unless, among other things, “the person, if he was entitled to a
jury trial in the MCDV case under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the MCDV case was tried, . . . knowingly and intelligently
waived the right to have the [MCDV] case tried by a jury, by guilty
plea or otherwise. United States v. Jennings, 323 F.3d 263, 265
(4th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations mark omitted);
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B) (2000).
It is undisputed that in 2003, Artis entered a guilty
plea in Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court of Virginia
(“J&DR court”) to one count of misdemeanor domestic violence.
Under Virginia law, a defendant appearing before a J&DR court has
no right to a jury trial in that court. Such a right exists only
where the defendant exercises his right to appeal the judgment to
a Virginia Circuit Court. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:13(a). Accordingly,
we hold that Artis did not have a right to a jury trial in J&DR
court, and that he did not invoke his right to a jury trial in a
Circuit Court of Appeals because he failed to file a notice of
appeal. We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion
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that Artis was not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of law.
Jennings, 323 F.3d at 265.
Finally, Artis contends that his uncorroborated
confession to possession of the firearm was insufficient to sustain
his conviction under § 922(g)(1). “The verdict of a jury must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” See Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). “[S]ubstantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
862 (4th Cir. 1996).
“[A]n accused may not be convicted on his own
uncorroborated confession,” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147,
152 (1954), or inculpatory admissions. Opper v. United States, 348
U.S. 84, 91 (1954). See also United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841,
844-45 (4th Cir. 1968). There must also be “substantial
independent evidence which would tend to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement.” Opper, 348 U.S. at 93; see also
United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir. 1992). The
corroborating evidence is adequate if it “supports the essential
facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their
truth.” Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. Viewing the evidence in the light
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most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain Artis’ conviction for violating § 922(g)(1).
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80.
We find Artis’ remaining claims to be without merit and
affirm his conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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