United States v. Moses , 140 F. App'x 448 ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-4806
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    DENINE MOSES, a/k/a BF,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Chief
    District Judge. (CR-03-54)
    Submitted:   May 31, 2005                  Decided:   July 25, 2005
    Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Joan A. Mooney, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
    E. Johnston, United States Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Denine Moses appeals his conviction pursuant to his
    guilty plea to aiding and betting the distribution of heroin within
    one thousand feet of a playground in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 860 and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (2000).        He
    asserts the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw
    his guilty plea. Moses also asserts the district court erred under
    United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005), by imposing a two-
    level enhancement pursuant to U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug
    offense.
    At the sentencing hearing, Moses claimed he was not
    guilty as to the count to which he pled guilty.   The district court
    judge found Moses’ testimony concerning whether his plea was
    knowing and voluntary not credible and denied Moses’ motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea.     After a recess, Moses recanted his
    previous testimony, admitted to engaging in the charged conduct,
    and sought to withdraw the motion to withdraw his guilty plea that
    the court just denied.   The district court reconsidered the motion
    and permitted Moses to withdraw it.
    We conclude that because Moses was permitted to withdraw
    his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he has waived any issue
    concerning the court’s denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty
    plea.   See United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 733 (1993); United
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    States v. Davis, 
    121 F.3d 335
    , 338 (7th Cir. 1997); U.S. v.
    Rodriguez, 
    311 F.3d 435
    , 437 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v.
    Griffin, 
    84 F.3d 912
    , 924 (7th Cir. 1996).
    Next, Moses argues the district court erred under Booker
    and   Blakely    by   imposing   a   two-level   enhancement   under   USSG
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug
    offense. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that Blakely applies to
    the federal sentencing guidelines and that the mandatory guidelines
    scheme that provided for sentence enhancements based on facts found
    by the court violated the Sixth Amendment.         Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
    746-48, 755-56 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court).             The Court
    remedied the constitutional violation by severing and excising the
    statutory provisions that mandate sentencing and appellate review
    under the guidelines, thus making the guidelines advisory.         Id. at
    756-57 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court).
    Here, the district court imposed a 380-month sentence
    based, in part, on a two-level enhancement using facts found by the
    court. Under Booker, the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment.
    However, the alternative sentence imposed by the district court
    treating the guidelines as advisory did not violate the Sixth
    Amendment.      Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
    Booker states that, in reviewing sentences that do not
    involve a Sixth Amendment violation, appellate courts may apply the
    harmless error doctrine in determining whether resentencing is
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    required.    Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)
    (appellate court may disregard any error that does not affect
    substantial rights).     The harmless error standard permits an error
    at sentencing to be disregarded if the reviewing court is certain
    that any such error “did not affect the district court’s selection
    of the sentence imposed.” Williams v. United States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    ,
    203   (1992).    Here,    because    the    district   court   imposed   an
    alternative discretionary sentence pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (2000) that was identical to the guidelines sentence, the error
    inherent in the application of the guidelines as mandatory did not
    affect the court’s ultimate determination of the sentence.               Cf.
    United States v. Hazelwood, 
    398 F.3d 792
    , 801 (6th Cir. 2005)
    (finding error not harmless and remanding where court’s comments
    indicated it might have imposed a lesser sentence under advisory
    guidelines scheme).      We therefore conclude that any error was
    harmless.
    Finally, this Court reviews a sentence imposed pursuant
    to § 3553 to determine whether it is reasonable.          Booker, 125 S.
    Ct. at 764-67 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court)).         In the instant
    case, the district court made use of the sentencing guidelines and
    the other factors under § 3553.         The district court judge noted
    Moses’ extensive criminal history and behavior, both good and bad,
    in the courtroom.      We conclude that because the district court
    considered the factors under § 3553 and imposed a sentence within
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    the   calculated   sentencing   guideline   range,   the   sentence   was
    reasonable.
    Accordingly, we deny Moses’ motion to relieve appellate
    counsel, and we affirm Moses’ conviction and sentence. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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