United States v. Tejeda-Ramirez , 259 F. App'x 535 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4142
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LUIS TEJEDA-RAMIREZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (6:06-cr-00393-HMH)
Submitted: November 16, 2007 Decided: December 11, 2007
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert M. Sneed, FOSTER LAW FIRM, LLP, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, A. Lance
Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Tejeda-Ramirez appeals his conviction for possession
with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) (2000). He
maintains that the district court erred by (1) admitting evidence
of a prior act under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) admitting expert
witness testimony regarding the techniques of drug trafficking; and
(3) denying his motion to suppress the evidence. As explained
below, we find Tejeda-Ramirez’s arguments unpersuasive and affirm.
I.
On March 23, 2006, Lance Corporal Don Gilbert of the
South Carolina Highway Patrol stopped Tejeda-Ramirez after
observing Tejeda-Ramirez’s vehicle driving at a slow rate of speed
and weaving in its lane. As Trooper Gilbert pursued Tejeda-
Ramirez, he also noticed the vehicle license expiration tag was
obscured and that Tejeda-Ramirez had slowed below the minimum speed
limit. At the same time, another vehicle that appeared to be
following Tejeda-Ramirez’s was stopped by Trooper Gilbert’s
supervisor.
Tejeda-Ramirez asserted he did not know anyone in the
other vehicle, and that the vehicle he was driving belonged to a
friend. He claimed he was driving to North Carolina in order to
install some radio equipment into a friend’s wife’s vehicle.
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Tejeda-Ramirez denied possessing weapons or drugs, and gave Trooper
Gilbert permission to search the Volkswagen.
Trooper Gilbert’s canine alerted to the vehicle and a
subsequent search uncovered 11.75 kilograms of cocaine in a hidden
compartment under the back seat. When asked where the cocaine came
from, Tejeda-Ramirez eventually indicated one of the passengers in
the other vehicle.
During pre-trial hearings, the district court denied
Tejeda-Ramirez’s motion to suppress, concluding there was a valid
stop and a consent to search. In addition, the district court
denied Tejeda-Ramirez’s motion in limine to prevent the Government
from introducing evidence regarding a February 2005 traffic stop
and vehicle search in Dekalb County, Georgia (“Dekalb County
Search”). The district court found the evidence was admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was relevant to
assessing Tejeda-Ramirez’s knowledge and absence of mistake.
During trial, Sergeant D.J. Smalls of the Dekalb County
Police Department testified that in February 2005, he assisted in
a traffic stop in which Tejeda-Ramirez was the passenger of a
vehicle driven by his girlfriend and registered to a third party.
A police canine gave a positive alert for the presence of
narcotics, and a subsequent search of the vehicle revealed an empty
hidden compartment. At the conclusion of Sergeant Smalls’
testimony, the district court instructed the jury as to the limited
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purpose for which evidence of the Dekalb County Search was
admitted.
The Government also called a law enforcement officer,
Agent Jay Rajaee, to testify as an expert witness in the methods
and techniques of drug trafficking. His testimony included
information regarding the design and function of hidden
compartments, the use of escort vehicles in the transportation of
narcotics, the quantities normally associated with the distribution
of cocaine, and methods of packaging cocaine for distribution.
Tejeda-Ramirez testified in his own defense, asserting he
did not know anything about the cocaine.
A jury convicted Tejeda Ramirez of the charged offense,
and on January 24, 2007, the district court sentenced him to 121
months’ imprisonment.
II.
Tejeda-Ramirez contends the district court violated
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting evidence of the Dekalb
County Search.* We review the district court’s admission of
*
In addition to challenging the admissibility of any aspect of
the Dekalb County Search, Tejeda-Ramirez contends the district
court further erred in allowing the admission of three details
surrounding the search: (1) that Tejeda-Ramirez built the hidden
compartment discovered in the Dekalb County Search, (2) that a
canine alerted to the vehicle searched in the Dekalb County Search,
and (3) that a federal anti-drug task force was investigating
Tejeda-Ramirez at the time of the search. Upon review of the
record, we conclude the record does not support Tejeda-Ramirez’s
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evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hodge, 354
F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004).
Rule 404(b) is an “inclusionary rule.” United States v.
Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The rule acts as a bar on evidence that “tends to prove
only criminal disposition.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281,
311 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
evidence is admissible if (1) it is relevant to an issue,
such as an element of an offense, and is not offered to
establish the general character of the defendant; (2) it
is necessary in the sense that it is probative of an
essential claim or an element of the offense; (3) it is
reliable; and (4) its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair prejudice
in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to
emotion in the fact finding process.
Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also
United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). Tejeda-
Ramirez does not dispute the evidence’s reliability, but asserts
the Dekalb County Search did not meet the other three requirements
of admissibility.
Contrary to Tejeda-Ramirez’s contention, the evidence was
relevant and necessary here because it went toward knowledge and
assertions, which were not raised below. To the contrary, Sergeant
Smalls never testified that Tejeda-Ramirez built the hidden
compartment discovered in the Dekalb County Search, nor did he
state that Tejeda-Ramirez was under investigation at the time of
the search. Furthermore, we find the admission of Sergeant Smalls’
testimony regarding the canine alert did not constitute plain
error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)
(providing standard for review of issues initially raised on
appeal).
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absence of mistake, two issues that Tejeda-Ramirez contested at
trial and the Government was required to prove. See Mark, 943 F.2d
at 448. In addition, the probative value of this evidence was not
outweighed by confusion or unfair prejudice because the Dekalb
County Search “did not involve conduct any more sensational or
disturbing than the crime[] with which [Tejeda-Ramirez] was
charged.” United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, the district court minimized the risk of unfair prejudice
by explaining the proper uses of the Dekalb County Search evidence.
Hodge, 354 F.3d at 312; see United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681,
692 (4th Cir. 2005). In sum, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the testimony under Rule 404(b).
III.
Tejeda-Ramirez next contends the district court
improperly admitted expert testimony from a law enforcement officer
regarding techniques of drug trafficking. We review a district
court’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Before
allowing expert testimony, the district court must determine the
testimony is both reliable and relevant; that is, that the
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding or
determining a fact in issue in the case. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). This court has
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“repeatedly upheld the admission of law enforcement officers’
expert opinion testimony in drug trafficking cases.” United
States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir. 1994). Techniques
used to package, transport, and distribute drugs are not facts
commonly known to a jury, and expert testimony can help the jury
understand issues relevant to the offense. We find no abuse of
discretion in admission of the expert testimony.
IV.
Tejeda-Ramirez argues the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. Although he concedes the search was
consensual and thus lawful, Tejeda-Ramirez challenges the validity
of the initial stop. He maintains that the district court erred by
failing to make factual findings and credibility determinations
regarding Trooper Gilbert’s testimony, and by stating in
“conclusory fashion” its ruling.
We review the factual findings underlying the denial of
a motion to suppress for clear error and the legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 856 (2005). When a suppression motion has
been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d
542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). In its colloquy with counsel, the
district court recounted Trooper Gilbert’s testimony regarding the
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basis for initiating a stop, and it found no basis for Tejeda-
Ramirez’s challenge to that testimony. Because Trooper Gilbert
observed several traffic violations, the decision to stop Tejeda-
Ramirez’s vehicle was objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1006 (1994). Accordingly, we
find no error in the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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