Frame v. Ryanstone Coal, LLC , 160 F. App'x 304 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1413
FREDERICK FRAME,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RYANSTONE COAL, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior
District Judge. (CA-03-7-2-REM)
Submitted: November 21, 2005 Decided: December 28, 2005
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank P. Bush, Jr., FRANK P. BUSH & ASSOC., Elkins, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Bryan R. Cokeley, Russell D. Jessee, STEPTOE &
JOHNSON, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Frederick Frame appeals an order granting summary judgment
against him in an action that he brought on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, against Ryanstone Coal, LLC
(Ryanstone). Because Frame does not sufficiently challenge the
bases for the decision against him, we affirm.
I.
Frame was employed by Island Fork Construction, LLC (Island
Fork), which provided Ryanstone with labor to operate the Ryanstone
Coal Mine in Barbour County, West Virginia. Frame worked at the
mine for approximately 10 months before losing his job as the
result of a mass layoff on May 7, 2002.
Following his layoff, Frame initiated the present action. His
complaint alleged that Ryanstone violated the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, see 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101—2109
(West 1999 & Supp. 2005), by not providing him with 60 days notice
of a mass layoff. Frame also claimed that Ryanstone violated the
West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, see W. Va. Code Ann.
§§ 21-5-1 to 21-5-18 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2005), by failing to
pay him certain employee benefits on the first regular payday
following his layoff. Frame sought money damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
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Ryanstone moved to dismiss the complaint, attaching to its
motion an affidavit and an unexecuted copy of its labor agreement
with Island Fork. Because the attachments could not be considered
in regard to a motion to dismiss, the district court treated
Ryanstone’s motion as one for summary judgment. Frame objected,
maintaining that the conversion was premature because he had not
been given the opportunity to conduct discovery. Since Frame
neither filed an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(f)* nor explained what issue he hoped such discovery
would affect, the district court overruled Frame’s objection and
proceeded to rule on the merits of the motion. Concluding that
Frame had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on
either of his claims, the district court granted summary judgment
against him.
II.
Frame first contends that the district court abused its
discretion in ruling on the merits of Ryanstone’s summary judgment
motion without allowing Frame to conduct discovery. In this
regard, however, Frame argues only that he “repeatedly stated in
his response brief and on the record at the hearing on Summary
*
Rule 56(f) allows a district court to deny a motion for
summary judgment if affidavits explain why the party opposing the
motion cannot present by affidavit facts essential to its
opposition to the motion.
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Judgment that further discovery was required to address the issue
raised outside the pleadings.” Br. of Appellant at 16-17. Frame
does not identify any flaw in the analysis offered by the district
court as to why Frame’s general statement, not presented in
affidavit form, that he needed discovery was not sufficient to
warrant postponing its ruling on the merits of the summary judgment
motion. For this reason, Frame has waived review of this issue.
See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (providing that the appellant’s
brief must contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for
them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the appellant relies”); 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince
George’s County, 58 F.3d 988, 993 n.7 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(declining to consider arguments for failure to comply with Rule
28).
Frame also fails to sufficiently challenge the rulings of the
district court on the merits of his claims. With regard to his
WARN Act claim, the district court ruled that Frame had failed to
create a genuine issue of material fact on three issues, any of
which was sufficient by itself to defeat the claim: (1) Ryanstone
was not Frame’s “employer,” as that term is used in the WARN Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(1); (2) Frame was not an “affected
employee[],” as that term is used in the Act, id. § 2101(a)(5); and
(3) the business circumstances exception to the WARN Act absolved
Ryanstone of liability, see id. § 2102(b)(2)(A). In his initial
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brief, Frame completely fails to address either of the latter two
issues and therefore has waived the right to review of them. See
11126 Baltimore Blvd., 58 F.3d at 993 n.7.
Further, the district court ruled against Frame on his state
law claim for three reasons, each of which was sufficient by itself
to support the judgment: (1) Frame was not Ryanstone’s “employee”
within the meaning of the West Virginia Act, W. Va. Code Ann. § 21-
5-1(b); (2) Ryanstone was not engaged in a joint venture with
Frame’s employer, Island Fork, such that Ryanstone could be liable
for Island Fork’s violations; and (3) Frame was not entitled to the
fringe benefits that he sought to recover. Because Frame fails to
challenge any of these reasons in his initial brief, he has waived
the right to review of these issues as well. See 11126 Baltimore
Blvd., 58 F.3d at 993 n.7.
III.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order
granting summary judgment to Ryanstone. Because Frame has waived
each issue that is the subject of this appeal, we conclude that
oral argument would not assist the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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