United States v. Douglas ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 03-4796
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RODNEY WALTER DOUGLAS, a/k/a Randy,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence.   C. Weston Houck, Senior District
    Judge. (CR-03-75)
    Submitted:   March 15, 2006                 Decided:   April 4, 2006
    Before KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis H. Lang, CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South
    Carolina, for Appellant.     Jonathan S. Gasser, United States
    Attorney, Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Rodney Walter Douglas pled guilty to felon in possession
    of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2000).                   He
    received a 70-month sentence.            On appeal, his attorney filed a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    raising the issue of whether the court erred in assessing a four-
    level     enhancement     under   U.S.    Sentencing     Guidelines       Manual
    § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2002).          By way of supplemental briefing, both
    parties have addressed the impact of United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).        Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    On appeal, Douglas argues that the district court erred
    in assessing a four-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5).
    Because Douglas did not object below, review is for plain error.
    United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 547 (4th Cir. 2005).                   To
    demonstrate plain error, an appellant must establish that an error
    occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial
    rights.     United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-32 (1993);
    Hughes,    
    401 F.3d at 547-48
    .     If   an    appellant    meets    these
    requirements, the court’s “discretion is appropriately exercised
    only when failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of
    justice, such as when the defendant is actually innocent or the
    error     seriously     affects   the    fairness,    integrity    or     public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.”            Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 555
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    - 2 -
    Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for a defendant’s offense
    level to be enhanced by four levels if he used or possessed a
    firearm “in connection with another felony offense.”           “The purpose
    of this enhancement is to ensure that a defendant receives more
    severe punishment if, in addition to committing a firearms offense
    within the scope of § 2K2.1, he commits a separate felony offense
    that is rendered more dangerous by the presence of a firearm.”
    United States v. Blount, 
    337 F.3d 404
    , 406 (4th Cir. 2003).                We
    have reviewed the record, and we find no plain error in the court’s
    imposition of this enhancement.
    This court has identified two types of Booker error: a
    violation of the Sixth Amendment, and a failure to treat the
    sentencing guidelines as advisory.         United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 552 (4th Cir. 2005).      A Sixth Amendment error occurs when
    the district court imposes a sentence greater than the maximum
    permitted based on facts found by a jury or admitted by the
    defendant.    Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.       Douglas did not raise a Sixth
    Amendment challenge or object to the mandatory application of the
    guidelines in the district court; review is therefore for plain
    error.   Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 547
    .     Because Douglas’ sentence was not
    enhanced   based   on   any   controverted    fact,   there   was   no   Sixth
    Amendment violation.
    To the extent that Douglas challenges the district
    court’s application of the sentencing guidelines as mandatory, we
    - 3 -
    also find no plain error.           To establish plain error, a defendant
    must “demonstrate, based on the record, that the treatment of the
    guidelines as mandatory caused the district court to impose a
    longer sentence than it otherwise would have imposed.”                   United
    States v. White, 
    405 F.3d 208
    , 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 668
     (2005).        In White, we determined that “the record as a
    whole provide[d] no nonspeculative basis for concluding that the
    treatment of the guidelines as mandatory ‘affect[ed] the district
    court’s selection of the sentence imposed.’”                
    Id. at 223
     (quoting
    Williams v. United States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    , 203 (1992)).                  Thus, we
    concluded that the error did not affect White’s substantial rights
    and affirmed the sentence.          
    Id. at 225
    .     Likewise, the record here
    provides no nonspeculative basis suggesting that the district court
    would have sentenced Douglas differently had the guidelines been
    advisory instead of mandatory.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record, considered Douglas’ pro se supplemental briefs, and have
    found no meritorious issues for appeal.              Accordingly, we affirm.
    This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
    his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.    If the client requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may   move    in   this    court    for   leave    to   withdraw   from
    representation.    Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    - 4 -
    was served on the client.     We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-4796

Judges: King, Gregory, Shedd

Filed Date: 4/4/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024